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VRÉSUMÉ
La croissance exponentielle du nombre de transistors par puce a apporté des progrès considé-
rables aux performances et fonctionnalités des dispositifs semi-conducteurs avec une minia-
turisation des dimensions physiques ainsi qu’une augmentation de vitesse. De nos jours, les
appareils électroniques utilisés dans un large éventail d’applications telles que les systèmes
de divertissement personnels, l’industrie automobile, les systèmes électroniques médicaux,
et le secteur financier ont changé notre façon de vivre. Cependant, des études récentes ont
démontré que le rétrécissement permanent de la taille des transistors qui s’approchent des di-
mensions nanométriques fait surgir des défis majeurs. La réduction de la fiabilité au sens large
(c.-à-d., la capacité à fournir la fonction attendue) est l’un d’entre eux. Lorsqu’un système
est conçu avec une technologie avancée, on s’attend à ce qu’ il connaît plus de défaillances
dans sa durée de vie. De telles défaillances peuvent avoir des conséquences graves allant des
pertes financières aux pertes humaines.
Les erreurs douces induites par la radiation, qui sont apparues d’abord comme une source de
panne plutôt exotique causant des anomalies dans les satellites, sont devenues l’un des pro-
blèmes les plus difficiles qui influencent la fiabilité des systèmes microélectroniques modernes,
y compris les dispositifs terrestres. Dans le secteur médical par exemple, les erreurs douces ont
été responsables de l’échec et du rappel de plusieurs stimulateurs cardiaques implantables.
En fonction du transistor affecté lors de la fabrication, le passage d’une particule peut in-
duire des perturbations isolées qui se manifestent comme un basculement du contenu d’une
cellule de mémoire (c.-à-d., Single Event Upsets (SEU)) ou un changement temporaire de la
sortie (sous forme de bruit) dans la logique combinatoire (c.-à-d., Single Event Transients
(SETs)). Les SEU ont été largement étudiés au cours des trois dernières décennies, car ils
étaient considérés comme la cause principale des erreurs douces. Néanmoins, des études ex-
périmentales ont montré qu’avec plus de miniaturisation technologique, la contribution des
SET au taux d’erreurs douces est remarquable et qu’elle peut même dépasser celui des SEU
dans les systèmes à haute fréquence [1], [2]. Afin de minimiser l’impact des erreurs douces,
l’effet des SET doit être modélisé, prédit et atténué. Toutefois, malgré les progrès considé-
rables accomplis dans la vérification fonctionnelle des circuits numériques, il y a eu très peu
de progrès en matiàre de vérification non-fonctionnelle (par exemple, l’analyse des erreurs
douces). Ceci est dû au fait que la modélisation et l’analyse des propriétés non-fonctionnelles
des SET pose un grand défi. Cela est lié à la nature aléatoire des défauts et à la difficulté
de modéliser la variation de leurs caractéristiques lorsqu’ils se propagent. En outre, plusieurs
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détails manquent à haut niveau d’abstraction concernant la structure des circuits et les carac-
téristiques des SET. Ainsi, plusieurs hypothèses sont généralement envisagées pour modéliser
le comportement des SET dans des analyses de haut niveau, ce qui affecte l’exactitude des
résultats obtenus. Par conséquent, une détection à faible coût des erreurs douces dues aux
SET est très difficile et exige des techniques de vérification plus sophistiquées.
Le présent travail présente une méthodologie multi-niveau (niveau transistor, porte logique,
et transfert de registres) permettant de modéliser, d’analyser et d’estimer le taux d’erreurs
douces induites par des événements singuliers (SEU). La méthodologie proposée étudie la
dépendance des caractéristiques des SET aux formes d’ondes en entrée, aux chemins de
propagation, à la polarité des impulsions, aux chemins divergents et à la re-convergence
dans le circuit au niveau transistor. De nouveaux résultats sur la propagation des SET à
travers différentes combinaisons de logique statiques et de logique TSPC sont présentés. Le
comportement observé est ensuite caractérisé pour refléter avec précision la propagation des
SET à des niveaux d’abstraction plus élevés.
Au niveau portes logiques, plusieurs techniques de vérification de la propagation des SET
sont développées en se basant sur des méthodes formelles et des détails appris à bas niveau,
aux niveaux transitors et masques. Dans ce travail, la modélisation formelle et l’analyse de la
propagation des SET repose sur les Graphes de Décision Multivoie (MDGs) et les Théories
de la Satisfiabilité Modulo (SMT). De nouvelles méthodes qui consiédèrent en même temps
l’impact des effets de masquage, de la variation de largeur et des chemins re-convergents
ont été développées. Les résultats ainsi obtenus montrent que la méthode de modélisation et
d’analyse SMT proposée améliore de façon significative l’efficacité des analyses SET en termes
de : 1)précision dans la mesure où elle donne des estimations exactes de la sensibilité aux
SET appris à partir des modèles de portes logiques extraits des masques. Ces résultats ont
permis d’acquérir de nouvelles connaissances sur la vulnérabilité des circuits combinatoires
aux SET ; 2)rapidité étant donné qu’elle est plus rapide que les techniques contemporaines ;
3)extensibilité comme elle peut manipuler des circuits larges et complexes tels qu’ un mul-
tiplicateur 128 bits. De plus, en se basant sur les résultats de ces analyses au niveau portes
logiques, des tables de propagation sont développées pour résumer les comportements de
propagation des SET.
Au niveau transfert de registre (RTL), cette thèse présente une méthodologie hiérarchique
et multi-niveaux pour estimer le taux des erreurs douces dans les circuits combinatoires. La
méthodologie repose sur la méthode de vérification des modèles et les tables de propaga-
tion au niveau porte logique. La conception RTL est décomposée en sous-composantes et
chaque composante est à son tour annotée avec des détails provenant du niveau transistor.
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De nouvelles méthodes d’abstraction et de réduction de la conception sont ensuite proposées
en fonction des tables de propagation et de la structure du circuit. En outre, deux modèles
différents ont été proposés reposant sur le modèle MDG et le processus de décision marko-
vien (MDP) qui sont ensuite analysés à l’aide des vérificateurs de modèles MDG et PRISM,
respectivement. De plus, une nouvelle méthode pour estimer le taux d’erreur douces (SER)
est proposée. Afin d’illustrer l’utilité pratique de ces techniques de modélisation et d’analyse,
nous avons analysé différents circuits combinatoires. Les approches de modélisation et d’abs-
traction proposées abaissent considérablement le temps et la mémoire liés à la modélisation
et l’analyse de la propagation des SET au niveau transfert de registre. Par exemple, le temps
de traitement et la mémoire requise sont réduits de plus de 60%. Pour la première fois, une
technique basée sur les diagrammes de décision est développée pour analyser des circuits
complexes, comme un multiplicateur 16 bits et des additionneurs 256 bits. D’autre part, les
résultats expérimentaux démontrent que les analyses par MDP proposées sont plus rapides
que les techniques contemporaines tout en assurant une meilleure précision.
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ABSTRACT
The exponential growth in the number of transistors per chip brought tremendous progress
in the performance and the functionality of semiconductor devices associated with reduced
physical dimensions and higher speed. Electronic devices used in a wide range of applications
such as personal entertainment systems, automotive industry, medical electronic systems,
and financial sector changed the way we live nowadays. However, recent studies reveal that
further downscaling of the transistor size at nano-scale technology leads to major challenges.
Reliability (i.e., ability to provide intended functionality) is one of them, where a system
designed in nano-scale nodes is expected to experience more failures in its lifetime than if it
was designed using larger technology node size. Such failures can lead to serious consequences
ranging from financial losses to even loss of human life. Soft errors induced by radiation,
which were initially considered as a rather exotic failure mechanism causing anomalies in
satellites, have become one of the most challenging issues that impact the reliability of modern
microelectronic systems, including devices at terrestrial altitudes. For instance, in the medical
industry, soft errors have been responsible of the failure and recall of many implantable
cardiac pacemakers.
Depending on the affected transistor in the design, a particle strike can manifest as a bit
flip in a state element (i.e., Single Event Upset (SEU)) or temporally change the output of a
combinational gate (i.e., Single Event Transients (SETs)). Initially, SEUs have been widely
studied over the last three decades as they were considered to be the main source of soft errors.
However, recent experiments show that with further technology downscaling, the contribution
of SETs to the overall soft error rate is remarkable and in high frequency systems, it might
exceed that of SEUs [1], [2]. In order to minimize the impact of soft errors, the impact of
SETs needs to be modeled, predicted, and mitigated. However, despite considerable progress
towards developing efficient methodologies for the functional verification of digital designs,
advances in non-functional verification (e.g., soft error analysis) have been lagging. This
is due to the fact that the modeling and analysis of non-functional properties related to
SETs is very challenging. This can be related to the random nature of these faults and the
difficulty of modeling the variation in its characteristics while propagating. Moreover, many
details about the design structure and the SETs characteristics may not be available at high
abstraction levels. Thus, in high level analysis, many assumptions about the SETs behavior
are usually made, which impacts the accuracy of the generated results. Consequently, the low-
cost detection of soft errors due to SETs is very challenging and requires more sophisticated
techniques.
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In this work, we present a multilevel (transistor, gate, and register transfer levels) framework
to model, analyze, and estimate the soft error rate due to single event transients. The pro-
posed framework investigates the dependencies of SET characteristics on the input pattern,
propagation paths, pulse polarity, diverging paths, and re-converging paths at the transistor
level. New insights on SETs propagation through different combinations of static and TSPC
logic are reported. The observed behavior was then characterized to accurately model SET
propagation at higher abstraction levels.
At gate level, different SET propagation techniques are developed based on formal methods
and low level details extracted from transistor level analysis and the design layout. Multiway
Decision Graphs (MDGs) and Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMTs) are utilized to formally
model and analyze SETs propagation. New methods to simultaneously include the impact
of masking effects, width variation, and re-converging paths are developed. Reported results
show that the proposed SMT modeling and analysis significantly enhances the efficiency of
SET analysis in terms of: 1) accuracy as it gives accurate estimates of SET sensitivity based
on gates timing extracted from layout. These results provide new insights on combinational
designs vulnerability to SETs; 2) speed as it is faster than contemporary techniques; and 3)
scalability as it can handle large and complex designs such as 128-bit multipliers. Moreover,
based on the results of these gate level analyses, propagation tables are developed to abstract
SET propagation behaviors.
At Register Transfer Level (RTL), this thesis introduces a hierarchical multi-level method-
ology to estimate soft error rates due to SETs in combinational designs based on formal
model checking and gate level propagation tables. An RTL design is decomposed into sub-
components and then each component is annotated with its gate level details. New abstrac-
tion and design reduction methods are proposed based on the gate level propagation tables
and design structure. Furthermore, two different models are proposed based on MDGs and
Markov Decision Process (MDP) which are then analyzed using MDG and PRISM model
checkers, respectively. Furthermore, a new method to estimate the Soft Error Rate (SER)
is proposed. In order to illustrate the practical usefulness of these modeling and analysis
techniques, we have analyzed different RTL combinational designs. The proposed modeling
and abstraction approaches significantly reduce the time and memory requirements required
to model and analyze SET propagation at RTL. For instance, the CPU time and the memory
required are reduced by more than 60%. For the first time, a decision graph based technique
is developed to analyze complex designs e.g., 16-bit multiplier and 256-bit adders. More-
over, experimental results demonstrate that the proposed MDP based analysis is faster than
contemporary techniques, while ensuring better accuracy.
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1CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Aggressive technology downscaling has enabled a remarkable improvement of integrated cir-
cuits (ICs) performance, power consumption and cost over the past five decades. This evolu-
tion made the integrated circuits indispensable part of our daily lives. However, nanometer
technology scale has brought into attention reliability issues that were previously not as
much of a concern. This is mainly because it is becoming harder to guarantee the correct
functionality of integrated circuits in various environments and design configurations. There
are three main sources of unreliability in nanoscale designs namely ; runtime variations (e.g.,
transistor aging degrade), process variations (e.g., variation in the transistor size), and exter-
nal radiation-induced soft errors. Process variations are naturally occurring variations in the
attributes of transistors (length, widths, oxide thickness) when integrated circuits are fabri-
cated. The unreliability induced by process variations and runtime variations can change cells
delay and might eventually impact the timing of a system. Designers working at circuit level
usually account for such phenomena by introducing additional timing margins (i.e., relaxing
the design timing requirements).
On the other hand, the unexpected behaviors introduced in a system due to external radiation-
induced soft errors are much harder to mitigate. This is mainly because such faults have a
random nature. In other words, soft errors impact the design behavior for very short periods
of time, then they disappear and it is very hard to reproduce and relocate them. For instance,
they were responsible for the catastrophic failure and the recall of many safety critical sys-
tems, such as implantable cardiac pacemakers [7]. Furthermore, developing low-cost analysis
and mitigation techniques for soft errors is very challenging and require novel methods and
tools. As a result, soft errors have become one of the most challenging types of uncertainties
that impact the reliability of modern electronic systems. These errors are the results of an
external hit by a radiation-induced particle when striking the sensitive area of a transistor.
For example, an alpha particle in packaging material or neutron particle from cosmic rays.
These external radiations, if they have the required strength, can change the output of a
transistor for a very short period of time. Depending on the affected transistor, it might
flip the value stored in a state element (called as Single Event Upset (SEU)) or temporarily
change the output of a combinational gate (known as a Single Event Transients (SETs)).
Initially, SEUs have been widely studied over the last three decades as they were considered
to be the main source of soft errors. However, with further technology downscaling, SETs
have become a major source of soft errors in digital circuits. This is mainly because with each
new technology node, a sufficient change in the error generation and propagation behavior is
2observed. According to recent studies, smaller device geometries, large number of transistors,
and the requirement of a high speed design allow particles with smaller energy to generate
SETs and eventually cause a soft error [8], [9]. The sensitivity of integrated circuits to soft
errors has grown significantly over the past decade. As a result, there is a growing need to
analyze and estimate the impact of soft errors on today’s complex digital designs as early
as possible in the digital design cycle. The purpose of such analysis is to guide the design
and the development of circuits that can tolerate soft errors due to SETs in cost and power
effective manner. In other words, in order to achieve cost-efficient reliable integrated circuits,
it is crucial to take the reliability into consideration alongside with the conventional area,
power, and performance metrics in the design flow.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1 identifies and provides evidence of
the problem we are addressing in this thesis. In this section, the main limitations of existing
modeling and analysis techniques at different abstraction levels are summarized. Moreover,
in this section, we introduce both the concept of multilevel and cross layer modeling and
analysis which will be used through this thesis. Thereafter, in Section 1.2, the main objectives
of this thesis are identified in order to advance this area of research. The main contributions
presented in this thesis are summarized in Section 1.3.
1.1 Problem Formulation
Soft errors, induced by radiation, are an increasingly relevant issue impacting the reliabi-
lity of CMOS Integrated Circuits (ICs) adopted not only in safety-critical applications, such
as space and avionic, but also in ground-level applications [10], [11]. The progressive shrin-
king of device sizes in advanced processing technologies, which have scaled from 0.5 µm to
32 nm in less than two decades, leads to miniaturization and performance improvements.
However, the possibility of Single Event Transients (SETs) generation, when an energetic
particle hits one of the sensitive sites of a digital circuit, has significantly increased in mo-
dern Deep Sub-Micron (DSM) technologies. Therefore, ultra-deep sub-micron technologies
are more vulnerable to soft errors [10]. Hence, there is a growing need for fast, accurate, and
efficient analysis and estimation techniques of SET propagation in modern-DSM technologies.
Contemporary techniques for analyzing SET propagation can broadly be classified based on
the level of abstraction at which the analysis is performed : at low or at high abstraction
level.
31.1.1 Analysis of SETs at Low Levels
At the transistor level, SET propagation is analyzed using both circuit simulations and
experimental analysis. Using simulation based techniques, SET propagation scenarios have
been investigated in [3], [12], [13], [14]. Moreover, the impact of technology downscaling
on SET characteristics variation while propagating has been analyzed in [15], [16]. Similar
analyses of the impact of technology scaling on SET characteristics have been done using
both mixed-mode simulations [17] and experimental measurements [18]. SET propagation
has been modeled in [19], [20], [21] as a function of the technology, gate design and bias
history. Further SET studies showed combined effects, such as temperature [22], [23], and
technology [24]. Experiments were also performed to characterize SET sensitivity of new
technologies using broad beams of heavy ions [25], [26], [27], [28], [29].
However, contemporary techniques which analyze SET propagation at this level suffer from
the following shortcomings :
1. Detailed transistor level analysis to investigate the impact of the following factors on
SET characteristics while propagating in digital designs is missing :
— Diverging and re-converging paths : SET propagation through a diverging node
can lead to multiple faults at different primary outputs. Moreover, due to re-
converging paths, the width of SETs, which propagate through different paths
between the fault striking node and the re-converging gate, may combine or overlap
when arriving simultaneously at the input of a re-converging gate. Performing such
analysis by circuit simulation is possible on small circuits but becomes intractable
in large digital systems.
— Input pattern and SET polarity : the variation of the propagation delay for different
input patterns of multiple inputs static gates is well known to the community ([30],
Chapter 6). Hence, it is possible that SET width in a static gate varies for different
input patterns. Moreover, the variation in SET characteristics might be dependent
to its polarity.
— Timing constraints : in the True Single-Phase-Clocked (TSPC) logic, the characte-
ristics of SET may vary due to the particle strike time and the timing conditions of
the gate where SET propagates through. The impact of all these timing constraints
on SET characteristics need to be characterized. Moreover, SET generation and
propagation in TSPC logic have not been fully analyzed. This logic was first pro-
posed to deal with the skew problem in the dynamic logic, such as clocked CMOS
[31], domino [32], and NORA logic [33]. In TSPC logic, it is possible to achieve
high clock frequencies because it simplifies the clock distribution and eliminates
4phase overlapping problems [34, 35, 36, 37]. Different possible implementations
for the TSPC logic, which use low number of transistor, have been presented in
[35]. Furthermore, TSPC logic has been used to develop high operating frequency
dividers, and to reduce the power dissipation [38, 39].
2. Several simulation based techniques and tools to estimate the SER using the Monte
Carlo method at the transistor level have been proposed, such as SEMM [40]. The
accuracy of these techniques is directly related to the number of simulation runs. In
addition, Monte Carlo techniques introduce randomness in the simulations and fail to
cover all possible scenarios. Mixed-mode simulations [17] reduce the simulation time
required by a static approach using a mixed-mode simulator, where the current injec-
tion part is simulated at the circuit level, while the rest of the circuit can be modeled
at the timing level. Moreover, in order to reduce the overhead of detailed circuit simu-
lations, a combination of analytic and simulation based methods to estimate the SER
has been implemented in different tools, such as SERA [41] and SEUPER_FAST [42].
However, simulation based techniques are very time consuming when dealing with
large systems and require a large amount of resources.
1.1.2 Analysis of SETs at Higher Abstraction Levels
As designs in modern DSM are more vulnerable to soft errors, it has become imperative to
address SET propagation issues at an earlier stage in the design flow. Therefore, researchers
came up with different SET propagation models operating at gate and higher abstraction
levels. Some of these techniques are also based on simulations with fault injection based on
random vector generation [43], [44]. Moreover, several Monte Carlo simulation based tech-
niques have been proposed to analyze the impacts of the masking effects (logical, electrical,
and timing masking) on SET propagation at gate level, such as [45], [46], [47].
Other research groups have addressed this issue using formal verification methods such as ;
Binary Decision Diagram (BDD)-based techniques [48], a combination of Reduced-Order
Binary Decision Diagrams (ROBDDs) and Algebraic Decision Diagrams (ADDs) [49], and
Boolean satisfiability solvers (SAT-solvers) [6]. However, contemporary techniques at gate
and higher levels suffer from the following shortcomings :
1. Several simulation based techniques have been proposed to estimate the SER in com-
binational logic at gate and higher abstraction level. At gate level, tools, such as FAST
[45], ASERTA [46], and ASSA [47], have been proposed to analyze the impact of all
masking effects on SET characteristics. These tools use a zero-delay fault simulator to
analyze logical masking. Moreover, these tools have different implementations of the
5delay degradation model due to electrical masking, which was proposed in [3]. The
model in [3] uses look up tables and an equivalent inverters chain based approach.
However, all the aforementioned tools are not able to correctly predict the behavior
of asynchronous circuits. Such techniques can only handle combinational and syn-
chronous sequential circuits. Additionally, simulation based approaches have serious
shortcomings as they can be very time consuming for large designs with many primary
inputs and sequential states. Furthermore, these techniques have their drawbacks in
terms of accuracy. This is mainly because the accuracy of fault simulation decreases
with the ratio of the simulated sample size over the total vector space size.
Different numerical techniques are proposed, such as [50], [51], [52] [41]. Each of these
techniques try to estimate the impact of masking effects on the SER. Electrical mas-
king is presented in [50], temporal masking is analyzed in [41], and a model combining
all masking effects is presented in [51]. However, these techniques are not scalable and
their models do not include the impact of SET broadening and SET re-convergence.
2. State-of-the-art techniques at gate level (such as [48], [49]) analyze the susceptibility
of digital circuits to soft errors by modeling only the masking effects that can prevent
SET in digital designs from propagating [10]. These techniques omit the possibility
that a SET could broaden while propagating. SET broadening was first observed in
[53] and it has recently gained more attention and was addressed in [12, 54, 20, 55].
Furthermore, at Register Transfer Level (RTL), many details related to the design
structure and SET characteristics are not available. Therefore, in [6, 56], SETs are
modeled at RTL as bit flips. Thus, the SER estimated at this abstraction level is
generally inaccurate.
3. Techniques based on contemporary formal verification are resource hungry and suffer
from a state explosion problem. This is mainly due to the intrinsic characteristics
of their SET modeling technique. Indeed, in these techniques, each input vector is
mapped to a unique state. Therefore, the corresponding Markov model has 2M states
(M primary inputs). Additionally, with these techniques, the formal model of the
design size is doubled due to the requirement of two design versions, mainly a golden
and a faulty version. For each injection scenario, in order to determine if a SET is
propagating, the outputs of both the golden and the faulty version are compared.
With such modeling technique, any formal tool rapidly runs out of memory, even
when trying to analyze moderate size designs e.g., a 14-bit adder [56].
61.1.3 Multi-level Modeling and Analysis of SET Propagation
Designers and researchers found that the best way to build complex hardware designs is
to start from very high level descriptions and synthesize them all the way down to layout
as shown in Fig. 1.1. This methodology is only applicable to synthesizable designs. With
synthesis, the code representing the design at one abstraction level can be translated into
lower level implementations using pre-characterized rules and libraries. In other words, a
design is synthesizable if the synthesis tool has the synthesis library (i.e., from which the
low level implementation can be generated) for each part of the design. Therefore, the main
concept in the design methodology is to utilize the lower level details from pre-characterized
data to build large designs. In each synthesis phase between two abstraction levels, more
details about the design structure are added.
Register Transfer Level
Gate Level Netlist
Design Layout
Place & Route
Synthesis
Design 
Specification
Figure 1.1 The Digital Design Flow.
Unfortunately, when it comes to non-functional design verification, it is totally different
and there is no unified approach. Design verification at one abstraction level relies on the
information provided at this level. As shown in Table 8.1, low level analysis is very detailed,
however, it is resource consuming and not applicable for large designs. On the other hand,
higher level analyses are more time and resource efficient. However, their results have limited
accuracy and do not provide much useful information to the designers about the design
behavior in presence of different kinds of uncertainties. Therefore, there is a growing need to
reduce the gap between the fault analyses at these different abstraction levels.
In order to visualize this issue, consider Fig. 1.2. At each abstraction level, there is a number
of faults (represented in Fig. 1.2 as dots) which can lead to design failures. Each of these faults
are triggered by a number of faults from lower abstraction levels. Thus, if the details of faults
from lower abstraction levels are available, then it is possible to accurately model and analyze
7them at higher abstraction levels. Verification engineers define possible fault candidates based
on the amount of details available about the design structure at one abstraction level. The
number of faults in the design increases as we are moving toward lower abstraction levels.
However, faults at one abstraction level do not have the same weight, i.e., possibility of
occurrence.
To overcome this issue, the usability of the results of the fault analysis at each abstraction
level has to be improved. New methods to abstract the design details that directly affect
fault propagation are required. However, we have to ensure that the additional overheads in
terms of learning and verification are reasonable.
High 
Abstraction 
Level 
Low 
Abstraction 
Level 
Figure 1.2 The Concept of Modeling SET Propagation at High Levels Based on the Observed
Behavior at Low Level
Table 1.1 Comparison Between High Level and Low Level Analysis
Analysis at Gate Analysis at Transistor
and Higher Level and lower Level
Fault Modeling Very Abstract Very Detailed
Accuracy does not reflect Reflects actual
actual fault behavior behavior
Complexity Less Complex Very Complex
Result’s Under/Over More
Accuracy estimation accurate
Result’s Not Not
Usability used used
Memory Less Memory High Memory
CPU Verification Less Very Large
Time Time Time
81.1.4 Cross layer Modeling and Analysis of SET Propagation
In order to perform an accurate SET analysis, details from the circuit level are required.
At circuit level, parameters extraction and detailed simulations can provide a certain level
of accuracy for phenomena such as electrical masking and SET width variation. However,
this analysis is very computationally intensive and would be intractable at the chip level
and is only tractable at the cell level. In other words, this type of analysis can be conducted
on hundreds of transistors at most. Similar to functional verification, existing SET analysis
techniques abstract the design details to perform such analysis at higher abstraction levels
(i.e., gate level or higher). However, abstraction normally comes at the cost of reduced accu-
racy, since many details about the design layout and the SET’s characteristics are abstracted.
Therefore, a new technique which satisfies the following requirements is needed : 1) to be
fast ; 2) to be more scalable than circuit level analysis ; and 3) to be able to model SET
propagation based on underlying technology details to maintain a certain level of accuracy.
As explained before, single event transients start at the device level (at some sensitive area of
the transistor) and can propagate to impair the behavior of a whole system. Therefore, one
possible idea is to model each component of a design based on its relation with the injected
SET into the following classes : 1) the component that was affected by radiation and an SET
generated internally in this component ; 2) the components that propagate the generated
SET from where it is injected to one or more primary output ; and 3) the components which
do not generate nor propagate SETs i.e., Error-Free.
Error-Free Cone
Propagation Cone
S0
S1
S2
S3
F1
ʎm 1
Generation 
Cone
Figure 1.3 The Concept of Cross-Layer Modeling and Analysis of SET Prorogation
Based on this classification, for each injection scenario, a design can be divided into three
cones : a) Generation cone ; b) Propagation Cone ; and c) Error-Free Cone as shown in Fig.
91.3. As depicted in this figure, the Generation cone is expected to be small in size, but
contains more details. On the other hand, the propagation cone can be very large in size, but
it contains reduced amount of details (i.e., its accurate modeling is less expensive). In the
propagation cone, we can have different sub cones where each has certain amount of details
based on SET propagation behavior in this sub-cone (see Fig. 1.3). The Error-Free Cone
includes all the Error free components which do not directly propagate the SET but they
might impact its propagation (by enabling or blocking some paths or by loading other paths).
Later in this thesis, this idea of modeling and analyzing the SET propagation using variable
levels of details for different regions in a cross-level approach is investigated in details.
1.2 Thesis Objectives
Based on the previous discussions of the limitations in the existing SET modeling methods,
it can be noticed that the following important questions are not appropriately addressed in
the literature so far :
— R1 : What is the impact of the propagation paths, polarity, and fanout re-convergence
on SET characteristics ?
— R2 : How to abstract the SET propagation behavior observed at transistor level at
higher abstraction levels ?
Based on our discussions of existing SET propagation modeling at higher abstraction levels
(i.e., gate level and higher) it can be noticed that the following important questions are not
appropriately addressed in the literature so far :
— R3 : How to improve the usability of the results generated from lower abstraction levels
such as transistor level analysis ?
— R4 : How to efficiently utilize formal verification methods to model and analyze SET
propagation at high abstraction level ?
— R5 : How to measure the vulnerability of complex designs at high abstraction levels
without losing the accuracy provided from low level analysis ?
— R6 : Is it possible to improve scalability while preserving accuracy ?
Our objective in this thesis is to investigate possible solutions to the questions introduced in
this section at transistor, gate, and register transfer levels.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
In this thesis, I developed a multilevel framework which accurately models and analyze soft
errors in digital circuit due to single event transients from a technology response model derived
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at the transistor level all the way to the register transfer level. At each abstraction level,
suitable modeling of phenomena related to SET propagation are proposed. Formal verification
methods are utilized at the higher abstraction level to build an accurate exhaustive modeling.
Moreover, new quantitative measures of the contribution of SETs at each node in the design
to the design failure are proposed. Furthermore, in the proposed analysis at each abstraction
level, new means of estimating the soft error rate are proposed. The rest of this section
summarizes the main contributions developed in this thesis.
1.3.1 Transistor Level Analysis of SET Propagation
I conducted different analyses to fully understand SET propagation behavior at the transistor
level and to address the research question reported in Section 1.2 (i.e., R1 and R2). I have
analyzed SET characteristics variation while propagating through both static and TSPC logic
at the transistor level. This work is distinct in the following ways :
1. Investigate the impact of propagation path on SET (related to R1 ) : The
variations in SET characteristics based on the characteristics of its propagation paths
are investigated. SET width broadening or attenuation based on the propagation paths
are characterized. Worst and best propagation paths are identified for the analyzed
designs. Moreover, the required timing and characteristic conditions for the generation
and the propagation of SETs through TSPC logic are abstracted. The impact of the
input patterns and SET polarity (negative (1 → 0 → 1) or positive (0 → 1 → 0))
on SET characteristics variation while propagating is fully explored. The variations
in SET width for each possible input pattern and polarity are characterized for both
static and TSPC logic.
2. Investigate the impact of re-converging and diverging paths on SET pro-
pagation (related to R1 ) : The possibilities of SET width attenuation or broadening
due to re-converging paths are investigated. Pulses may re-converge and overlap at a
gate in a circuit if multiple paths exist between the particle striking node (affected
node) and the re-converging gate. The SET propagation scenario which can induce
Byzantine faults is identified. Byzantine faults are defined as faults presenting different
symptoms (or logic interpretation) to different observers.
The transistor level analysis main results and observations in relation with these issues led
to the following publications :
— C1 : G. Bany Hamad, S. R. Hasan, O. Ait Mohamed, Y. Savaria, (2013)“Investi-
gating the Impact of Input Patterns, Propagation Paths and Re-convergent Paths on
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The Propagation Induced Broadening.” 14th IEEE Conference on Radiation Effects on
Components and Systems (RADECS’ 2013).
— J1 : G. Bany Hamad, S. Rafay Hasan, O. Ait Mohamed, and Y. Savaria, (2014).
“New insights into the single event transient propagation through static and TSPC
logic", IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol.61, no.4, pp.1618-1627. In this
thesis, this journal paper is reproduced in Chapter 4.
1.3.2 Modeling and Analysis of SET Propagation at Gate Level
At gate level, I proposed new solutions to abstract, model, and analyze SET propagation
using formal verification methods. Following, the main ideas published proposed in this area
are listed :
1. Abstraction of SET propagation behavior from transistor to gate level (re-
lated R2 and R3 ) : In order to bridge the gap between transistor and gate levels
modeling, I proposed a new logic abstraction of the SET width variation observed
at the circuit level. The impact of the applied input pattern and the gate fan-out on
the SET width is abstracted using the Load and Input Combination Factor (LICF).
Moreover, I proposed new characterization libraries modeling SET propagation that
provide a comprehensive abstraction of several propagation behaviors previously igno-
red at gate level. The proposed analysis and abstraction advances the state-of-the-art
in modeling SET at abstraction levels higher than the circuit level, enabling more
accurate estimation of the soft error sensitivity and improved reliability of digital
systems. The proposed abstraction model led to the following publication :
— G. B. Hamad, S. R. Hasan, O. Ait Mohamed, Y. Savaria, “Abstracting single
event transient propagation characteristics to support gate level modeling", IEEE
International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS’ 2014).
2. Multiway decision graph based modeling and analysis of SETs (related to
R3 and R4 ) : I proposed new means of modeling SET propagation at gate level by
utilizing the Multiway Decision Graphs (MDGs) [57] and transistor level characteri-
zation libraries. MDGs are chosen over other types of decision graphs because they
allow defining SET width variation and other known masking effects (such as logical
masking) in a single decision diagram. This analysis identifies the set of conditions,
related to SET propagation and design structure, that may lead to soft errors. These
conditions are abstracted as gate level characterization libraries for each design. These
libraries can be used to perform SET propagation analysis at higher abstraction levels.
Based on the results of this analysis, a new estimation of the design’s SER is genera-
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ted. This combination leads to more accurate analysis and requires less memory than
contemporary techniques. The proposed MDG based modeling led to the following
publications :
— G. Bany Hamad, S. Rafay Hasan, O. Ait Mohamed, and Y. Savaria, (August,
2014). “Modeling, analyzing, and abstracting single event transient propagation at
gate Level", In IEEE International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems
(MWSCAS), pp.515-518.
— G. Bany Hamad, S. Rafay Hasan, O. Ait Mohamed, and Y. Savaria, (2015).
“Characterizing, modeling, and analyzing soft error propagation in asynchronous
and synchronous digital circuits", Microelectronics Reliability, Volume 55, Issue 1,
Pages 238-250.
3. Satisfiability modulo theories based SETs modeling and analysis (related to
R3, R4, R5, and R6 ) :
I introduced a novel methodology to evaluate the vulnerability of digital designs to
SETs at gate level. This methodology provides a new technique for modeling SETs
propagation by introducing awareness about the underlying observed behavior at tran-
sistor level. SET propagation is modeled as a satisfiability problem leveraging the
efficiency of Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMTs). The theories of linear integer
arithmetic and difference logic are utilized to efficiently model SET width and timing
constraints. Moreover, in this model, concepts of static timing analysis are adapted
to compute the required timing and width for an SET to be latched. In the analysis
phase, the proposed methodology computes the timing and width requirements for
every vulnerable node in the design. This is done by investigating the width variation
and delays along the different propagation paths. I implemented the proposed analy-
sis on different SMT solvers in order to compare the performance of each and decide
on an optimal modeling technique and solver. The solvers I used are Z3 [58], Yices
[59], Mathsat [60], and CVC4 [61]. All these results are characterized into gate level
propagation tables which have the following benefits : 1) They are used to measure
the observability of each SET at each node and the vulnerability of the design i.e.,
SER. 2) They can also be used to further improve the efficiency of the analysis of soft
error mitigation techniques.
The proposed SMT modeling and analysis based on SMTs led to the following publi-
cation :
— G. Bany Hamad, G. Kazma, O. Ait Mohamed, and Y. Savaria, (2016). “Compre-
hensive Non-Functional Analysis of Combinational Circuits Vulnerability to Single
Event Transients", Forum on specification & Design Languages (FDL).
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4. Layout based gate level estimation of SER due to SETs (related to R3, R4,
R5, and R6 ) :
I introduce a novel methodology to estimate the vulnerability of combinational designs
to soft errors at gate level. This methodology starts with the synthesis of an RTL
design into its gate level representation and then the layout of the design is extracted.
Next, gates parasitics are extracted and gates timing details are characterized from the
layout. These parameters are then employed to model and analyze SET propagation.
A new model for SETs propagation is proposed, which captures the variations in
the SET characteristics while propagating, such as the SET width attenuation and
broadening. Moreover, this model includes the impact of all masking effects (logical,
electrical, and temporal) and re-converging paths on SET propagation. Furthermore, a
new formalism modeling SET propagation into a Satisfiability problem utilizing SMTs
to utilize the design timing extracted from the layout is proposed. A new estimate of
the design SER is computed.
The proposed post-layout modeling and analysis based on SMTs led to the following
publications :
— G. Bany Hamad, G. Kazma, O. Ait Mohamed, and Y. Savaria, (2016). “Efficient
and Accurate Analysis of Single Event Transients Propagation Using SMT-Based
Techniques", IEEE International Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD).
1.3.3 Modeling and Analysis of SET Propagation At Register Transfer Level
I proposed different methods to model and analyze SET propagation at RTL using formal
verification methods. This work is distinct in the following ways :
1. MDG based abstraction, modeling, and analysis of SET propagtion at RTL
(related R3, R4, R5, and R6 ) : Abstraction is one of the most relevant techniques for
addressing the state explosion problem [62]. I proposed a new abstraction approach in
which the components in the RTL design are modeled based on their mode of opera-
tions. An RTL component can have three modes of operation ; Injection, Propagation,
or Error-Free. For each injection scenario, SET propagation at RTL is modeled based
on the sub-components mode of operation and their gate level characterization libra-
ries developed beforehand. Similar to the gate level analysis, I utilized MDGs [57] to
analyze SET propagation at RTL. The invariant checking tool from the MDG formal
verification tool set [57] is adapted to perform this analysis. The results, which are
SET propagation conditions for all injection scenarios, are reported as RTL characte-
rization libraries.
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The results of this analysis have been reported in the following publications :
— G. Bany Hamad, O. Ait Mohamed, and Y. Savaria, (May, 2016). “Towards
Formal Abstraction, Modeling, and Analysis of Single Event Transients at RTL",
IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS).
2. Probabilistic modeling and analysis of SET propagation at RTL (related to
R3, R4, R5, and R6 ) : I proposed an efficient probabilistic reduction and modeling
techniques to analyze SET propagation. I proposed two efficient reduction methods
namely the Cone Of Influence (COI) and the component mode of operation methods.
At RTL, SET propagation is modeled based on the proposed fault space mapping
technique. The propagation of high level faults for each sub-component is modeled
as Probabilistic Automata (PA) based on the propagation probabilities of low level
faults reported in the pre-characterized sub-component propagation table. The PAs of
all sub-components are modeled as Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). Thereafter,
SET propagation is quantitatively analyzed using the proposed formal probabilistic
verification technique that utilize the power of PMC. The results of this analysis are
the SET propagation probabilities for all vulnerable nodes. Finally, theses probabilities
are utilized to estimate SERs.
The results of this analysis have been reported in the following publications :
— G. Bany Hamad, O. Ait Mohamed, and Y. Savaria, (2014). “Probabilistic model
checking of single event transient propagation at RTL level", IEEE International
Conference on Electronics Circuits and Systems (ICECS), Marseille, France, pp.
451-454.
— G. Bany Hamad, O. Ait Mohamed, and Y. Savaria, (July, 2015). “Efficient
Multilevel Formal Modeling, Analysis, and Estimation of Design Vulnerability to
Soft Error", IEEE International On-Line Testing Symposium (IOLTS), Athena
Pallas Village, Greece, pp. 1-6.
— G. Bany Hamad, O. Ait Mohamed, and Y. Savaria, (2016). “Comprehensive
Multilevel Probabilistic Analysis of Single Event Transients Propagation Induced
Soft Errors" Submitted for publication.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The organization of this thesis is as follows.
In Chapter 3, the main sources of single event transients in digital circuits are discussed.
Then, the different formal verification methods which we utilized in this thesis to model and
analyze SET propagation at high abstraction levels are introduced.
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In Chapter 2, the details of the most relevant SETs modeling and analysis techniques at
different abstraction levels from register transfer to post silicon levels are discussed.
Chapter 4 explains in detail our investigation on the impact of the propagation paths, input
patterns, and polarity on SET characteristics. This analysis is performed for both static and
TSPC CMOS logic. Based on the transistor level netlist, the worst and best propagation
paths (WPP and BPP) were identified for the analyzed designs. The impacts of Propagation
Induced Pulse Broadening (PIPB) phenomena and SET propagation induced Byzantine faults
are characterized.
Chapter 5 first introduces our proposed abstraction of the variation in the SET characteristics
while propagating due to electrical masking and width broadening. The impact of the applied
input pattern and the gate fan-out on the SET width is abstracted using the Load and Input
Combination Factor (LICF). Then, our proposed modeling of SET propagation at gate level
using multiway decision graphs is explained in details. This chapter also presents our proposed
gate level analysis of SET propagation performed with the MDG model checker. Finally, the
characterization of the results of this gate level analysis are introduced.
Chapter 6 first introduces the proposed design and technology node timing characterization.
Then, we explain the proposed formulation of SET propagation at gate level (which includes
all masking effects and width variation) as an SMT problem. This chapter also presents the
proposed analysis of SET propagation using SMT solvers under specific assertions. Finally,
the chapter proposes an improved method for estimating the SER based on the generated
results (e.g., the set of input vectors that must be present at the primary inputs so that SETs
are not logically masked).
Chapter 7 introduces our proposed hierarchical formal method that allows modeling and ana-
lyzing SET propagation at register transfer level. The chapter first introduces, the proposed
RTL abstraction based on the COI and components mode of operations. Then, it intro-
duces the proposed modeling of the underlying behavior of SET propagation using Multiway
Decision Graphs (MDGs). Next, the proposed SET propagation analysis at RTL based on
invariant checking tool from the MDG tool set is explained. For each SET injection scenario
this analysis returns a CIC that can propagate this SET to the output.
Chapter 8 presents our hierarchical probabilistic framework to quantitatively estimate the
effects of SETs at RTL. First, we explain the proposed RTL reduction for each injection
scenario and the propagation tables generated from lower abstraction level models. Then,
SET propagation through the reduced design is modeled as Markov decision process based
on probabilistic automatas of all the RTL sub-components. Next, a method is proposed for
probabilistic analysis based on the PRISM model checker to analyze the probability of SET
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propagation for all vulnerable nodes. Finally, a new estimation of the Soft Error Rate (SER)
based on the results of this analysis is proposed.
Chapter 9 provides a general discussion about the present work, which has been detailed in
Chapter 4, Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7, and Chapter 8. Chapter 10 summarizes this
thesis and proposes some directions for future work.
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CHAPTER 2 CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, we briefly review the status of existing related SET propagation analysis
techniques ; post-silicon radiation testing and SET analysis at different abstraction levels
(transistor to register transfer levels).
2.1 Post-Silicon Validation of SETs Using Radiation Ground Testing
The traditional and most direct approach to evaluate the SEU vulnerability of a system is
through a process called dynamic radiation ground testing [63], [64]. This method consists in
exposing the target system to a radiation flux (to reproduce the desired radiation environ-
ment) and counting the number of errors observed. The intensity of the artificial radiation
flux is controlled based on the environment that the device has to work in. The outcome is
computed in the form of a parameter known as the dynamic cross section (σ), which esti-
mates the number of errors that occur in an area of the processor over time. There are several
studies investigating the relative contributions of sequential and combinational SER based
on the results of radiation testing which use simple test structures such as SOI and bulk
inverter chains [1, 2, 65, 12]. The results of these experiments confirm that the contribution
of combinational logic is increasing with every new technology node and also has a linear
relation with the circuit frequency. One of the main issues with these experiments is the sim-
plicity of the test structures, i.e., hard to apply to complex designs. Another problem with
the results of these experiments (e.g., dynamic cross section metric) is that any change in
the application, design, technology node, device manufacturer, flux density (i.e., the desired
environments), and the particle strike type requires a new dynamic test. Thus, resulting in
a very expensive and time-consuming method. Furthermore, these analyses have very coarse
controllability, problematic reproducibility, very limited observability, and is very difficult to
debug. For instance, radiation testing techniques cannot accurately determine the contribu-
tion of each component in the design to the overall failure rate of the design. In fact, during
radiation testing experiments on complex circuits, it is difficult to differentiate between the
contribution of the sequential and the combinational parts of the designs. Although these
experiments provide accurate insights into the relative SER of the designs, details about the
vulnerability of different components are missing. These details are critical when designing
mitigation techniques to harden the design. Therefore, these experiments can be used to ve-
rify the existence of some physical phenomena (such as SETs width variation) but they are
not suitable for SER estimation during design stage.
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2.2 Analysis of SETs Propagation at Transistor Level
A large amount of research has been performed for measuring and simulating SET propaga-
tion in deep submicron bulk technologies. The reader is referred to the recent comprehensive
reviews presented in [11], [66] for technical details or further discussion of the literature. In
this section, we discuss the transistor level analysis that we have utilized to fully understand
SET propagation behavior in CMOS logic. The results of these analyses are used to build
a more accurate model at higher abstraction levels. The analysis performed in [53] demons-
trates that SET width variation while propagating can be attributed to the speed difference
between the rising and the falling edge along a given path.
In [13], the distribution of SET width was measured in long SOI chains irradiated with broad
beam heavy ions. In this work, the propagation-induced pulse broadening (PIPB) effect was
first experimentally modeled and measured in SOI inverter chains.
Subsequently, many researchers have analyzed the broadening phenomena of SET width
while propagating and its dependencies on active loading (fan-out) and transistor size such
as [54, 20, 55]. In [20], SET width variation while propagating in logic chains is investiga-
ted. It is shown that significant broadening or attenuation of the propagated SET width is
observed. Moreover, the dependence of the SET width on the struck node capacitance is in-
vestigated. Results demonstrated that increasing node capacitance broadens the SET width
while propagating.
Other parameters, such as the supply voltage, have a significant impact on PIPB. For
example, an inverse relationship has been observed between the PIPB effect and the supply
voltage [12, 67, 68]. Moreover, a direct relationship has been observed between the PIPB
effect and transistor sizes [54, 20, 55].
As explained in Section 1.1, existing state-of-the-art techniques are unable to analyze the
effects of the propagation paths, the re-converging paths, and the input pattern on the SET
characteristics.
2.3 Formal Analysis of SETs Propagation at Gate Level
Several formal methods based techniques and tools have been recently constructed to analyze
and estimate SET propagation at the gate level. Many of these techniques are based on BDDs
such as [69, 48, 70, 49, 71].
In [48], fast analysis of soft-error (FASER) which is an SER estimation tool based on binary
decision diagrams is introduced. The proposed BDD model enumerates all possible input
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vectors by creating a BDD for each gate in a circuit. Static BDDs (which only include the
Boolean functionality) are created for gates outside the SET propagation cone. On the other
hand, BDDs which include details about the propagating SET width and amplitude for
gates in the propagation cone. Thereafter, these BDDs are combined in topological order
to model both the logical and electrical masking of the injected SET. FASER adapts the
delay degradation model for SET width variation while propagating. As explained before,
this model only includes the case where the width of an SET is attenuated while propagating
through logic gates. FASER’s BDD representations can consume a lot of memory when
implemented on practical circuits. Therefore, FASER partitions large designs, to lessen the
amount of memory, into smaller sub-designs.
In [49, 71], the authors used ROBDDs and the algebraic decision diagrams (ADDs) in combi-
nation to model soft errors in combinational and sequential circuits to simultaneously analyze
the effects of logical, electrical. The SET width attenuation is modeled in the ADD and the
logical masking (sensitization paths) are modeled in ROBDD. However, the use of two deci-
sion diagrams makes this technique more complex and it consumes a considerable amount of
memory.
However, despite the prevalence of circuit partitioning techniques, all BDD-based techniques
are inherently limited due to the memory blowup problems associated with them (state
space explosion problem). Furthermore, these techniques [69, 48, 70, 49, 71] oversimplify the
electrical masking impact on the SET while propagating by simulating inverter chains of the
same lengths as the paths.
2.4 Formal Analysis of SETs Propagation at RTL
A new technique was proposed in [6]. It leverages the concepts of Boolean Satisfiability and
uses the so-called SAT (satisfiability) solvers. In spite of the use of very efficient SAT solvers,
this method is time consuming and resource hungry, partly because of the requirement of
unrolling copies of its combinational circuit when analyzing sequential designs.
Soft error analysis at early design phase is essential for applying appropriate mitigation tech-
niques to meet the reliability requirements. In [72], a new approach to investigate the soft
error propagation properties at behavioral RTL, especially for the control paths of the design.
At RTL, low-level circuit details are generally not available, therefore this technique models
soft error propagation as single bit-flips, i.e. Single Event Upsets (SEUs). The probabilistic
behavior of RTL circuit is modeled as finite Discrete Time Markov Chains (DTMCs). The-
reafter, probabilistic model checking (PRISM) is adopted to analyze soft error propagation
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in the RTL DTMC model. However, the well-known state explosion problem [62] limits its
applicability and hence scalability improvement techniques are essential.
Recently, in [73], a new probability model of all three masking effects of SET propagation
is proposed. This methodology involves analyzing standard digital designs (adders, muxes,
etc.), by injecting SETs at all vulnerable nodes and then computing their intrinsic SET rate
at the gate level. In this technique, the possibility of SET width broadening and its impact
on SET propagation probability is not considered.
Several methodologies have been proposed analyze SET propagation at Register Transfer
Level (RTL) using fault simulation [74] and analytical techniques [75]. Other researchers
have addressed this issue using formal verification methods such as Boolean Satisfiability
solvers [6] and Probabilistic Model Checking (PMC) [56], [76, 4]. All these techniques suffer
from the following shortcomings :
1. Contemporary formal verification techniques are resource hungry and limited due to
the state explosion problem. This is mainly due to intrinsic characteristics of their
modeling technique. Indeed, in these techniques, SET propagation is modeled using
concrete Boolean diagrams e.g., Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs). With such tech-
niques, a model checker rapidly runs out of memory, even when modeling moderate
size designs e.g., 14-bit adder [56] or 15-bit multiplier [77].
2. Simulation based techniques (such as [74], [75]) have serious shortcomings as they are
very time consuming for large designs with many primary inputs. Furthermore, these
techniques have their drawbacks in terms of accuracy. This is mainly because their
accuracy is determined by the ratio of the simulated sample size over the total vector
space size.
3. At RTL, many details about design structure and SET characteristics are not available.
Therefore, contemporary techniques make assumptions about SET propagation. For
instance, in [75, 56] and [76], SETs are modeled as bit flips. Such assumptions reduce
the accuracy of the estimated Soft Error Rate (SER).
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CHAPTER 3 BACKGROUND INFORMATION
In this chapter, a brief background is provided about soft errors, single event transients, and
formal methods that are utilized in this thesis.
3.1 Basics of Soft Errors due to Single Events Transients
3.1.1 Origins of Single Event Transients
As the name suggest, soft errors do not permanently damage the circuit as hard errors. These
errors can change the behavior of the circuit temporarily. In this thesis, we are modeling and
analyzing soft errors due to single event transients. These transient faults are the result
of a strike of some radiation-induced particle at a drain of a transistor device. Such strike
can generate a track of electron hole pairs in the bulk of the device. These charges can
be captured to induce a current pulse which may flip the output of a combinational gate
for a short period of time (duration of the induced SET). Alpha particles (generated from
the radioactive impurities in the chip manufacturing and packaging) and neutron particles
(secondary particles from cosmic rays) are two main sources of SETs. The neutron flux is
dependent on the altitude, e.g., the flux at aircrafts flying altitude is more than 300 times
larger than at sea level. For the current technology nodes, neutrons are the main source
of radiation-induced SETs. In advanced smaller technology node, it is expected that the
contribution of protons induced SETs could increase.
3.1.2 SET Masking Effects and Width Variations
The SETs generated in digital designs due to some particle strikes may induce soft errors at
the primary outputs if there exist an open logic path from the striking node to the output.
Moreover, to propagate, SETs must have sufficient amplitude and duration. Fig. 3.1 shows
a chain of four NAND gates. Out_1, Out_2, and Out_3 represent the outputs of G2, G3
and G4, respectively. It is assumed that a particle struck at G1. Contemporary techniques
consider the following scenarios for SET characteristics variation while propagating :
1. SETs can be logically masked by a gate if at least one of its inputs is set at a controlling
logic value (e. g., ‘0’ for a NAND gate).
2. SETs arriving outside of sequential elements latching window are masked (i.e., tem-
porally masked) [10].
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3. If an SET is not logically nor temporally masked then it is propagation to the output is
decided based on its width and amplitude. The propagation of such SETs is categorized
into the following cases :
(a) If SET amplitude and width are above the threshold level of the subsequent com-
binational circuit. Therefore, SET propagates through all the subsequent gates
without losing its strength (first scenario in Fig. 3.1).
(b) If SET amplitude and width are below the threshold level, then it may still pro-
pagate. However, subsequent combinational gate attenuates SET (second scenario
in Fig. 3.1).
(c) If SET amplitude and width are sufficiently lower than the threshold level, SET
can be completely masked (third scenario in Fig. 3.1).
(d) If SET amplitude and width are enough for it to propagate then its width may
broaden while propagating. This is depicted in the fourth scenario in Fig. 3.1. This
scenario was first observed in [53] and it has recently gained more attention and
was addressed in [12, 54, 20, 55].
If an SET is latched in sequential elements at the end of the clock cycle where it occurred
only logical masking factor can mask the error in the subsequent cycles.
3.2 Formal Verification Methods
3.2.1 Multiway Decision Graphs
Multiway Decision Graphs (MDGs) are an extension of Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs)
in the sense that they represent and manipulate a subset of first-order logic formulae suitable
ex3ex2ex1
Figure 3.1 Different Scenarios for SET Pulse Propagation. (*NP Means SET Pulse is Not
Propagating)
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for large data path circuits. One of the advantages of MDGs over BDDs is that a data value
can be represented by a single variable of abstract sort, rather than by concrete Boolean
variables, and a data operation can be represented by an un-interpreted function symbol.
MDG and ROBDD are alike in the sense that both require a fixed order of node labels along
all paths. In ROBDDs all variables are Boolean. But in MDGs every signal/variable must
belong to an appropriate sort, also a type definition must be provided for all functions.
The enumerated data type in MDG facilitates modeling both the logical masking and the
SET pulse width variation (broadening or attenuation) in a single decision diagram. The
data operation in MDGs can be represented by a function symbol, which can apply to a
pre-defined data type.
3.2.2 MDG-Tool Set
A well known academic tool set for the formal verification of digital systems is based on MDG
[57]. The MDG tool has been used to verify various types of complex systems [78, 79, 80].
It includes application procedures for combinational and sequential equivalence checking
[57], model checking [81], and invariant checking [57]. Our methodology utilizes invariant
checking, which is a formal verification approach that performs reachability analysis to check
the potential of system failure due to a particular fault under specified conditions. If an
error exists, then an example is generated to demonstrate the condition under which the
system may fail (such examples where a property fails are commonly called counterexamples
of some property). Moreover, the invariant checking tool allows analyzing the propagation of
the injected SET pulse in one version of the design without the need for two versions of the
design (faulty and error free version) as in BDD based techniques [49, 71].
The MDG tool uses a prolog-style hardware description language called the MDG-HDL [57].
This language supports structural, behavioral and mixed styles of coding. A structural spe-
cification is usually a netlist of components connected by signals. A behavioral description
consists of a tabular representation of the transition and output relations in the form of a
truth table.
3.2.3 PRISM Model Checker
PRISM [82] is a probabilistic symbolic model checker developed at the University of Bir-
mingham. It works with its own high-level modeling language, which is written in form of
state-based modules, each composed by a set of guarded commands. PRISM uses DD and
Multi-Terminal Binary Decision Diagrams (MTBDDs) [83] to construct and compute the
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reachable states of even very large probabilistic models.
PRISM is a flexible tool that allows working with probabilistic real-life models as it allows
for the specification of probabilities inside the model and in the properties. Additionally, this
model checker evaluate the probability of given property failing. Moreover, PRISM allows
step-by-step simulation where the user can chose the simulated variables on the system as
well as their initial values. The simulation may be guided, where the user manually selects
the next state transition, or random, where the user selects the number of random transitions
PRISM should simulate.
3.2.4 Satisfiability Modulo Theories
The advent of Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMTs) [84] solved the problem of being restric-
ted to pure Boolean representations, which fail to represent many classes of systems. SMT is
an extension of the SAT decision problem, where the formula is expressed in first-order logic,
with associated background theories. Based on the employed theories to model the problem,
specialized algorithms are combined to solve it. The modeling requirements of the target
application dictate the choice of theory. For example, when modeling hybrid systems, where
variables with real values are required, the theory of linear arithmetic is commonly used.
In software verification, the theories of arithmetic over integers and arrays are commonly
used. On top of SMT solvers, there are many different verification algorithms that are used
to solve different engineering problems, such as analog circuit verification, RTL functional
verification, and software model checking.
3.3 Digital Design Flow
Without the layout of an integrated circuit, modeling of electrical masking and SET cha-
racteristics variations cannot be fully accurate, due to the lack of exact loading and timing
details. This can lead to some SETs not being detected, thereby the calculated quantitative
estimates are not accurate and they can serve only as approximations. In this thesis (Chapter
6), the proposed gate level analysis involves generating and characterizing the timings of the
layout of a design using EDA tools. The main steps followed to characterize the timings of
the cells in the layout are reported in Alg. 1. The typical inputs of the post-layout charac-
terization are (i) a gate level netlist generated from a synthesis tool, (ii) a target technology
timing file (i.e., lib file), and (iii) a set of timing constraints used to drive the place and route
process, which is reported as the Synopsys Design Constraints (SDC) file. Place-and-route
tools create a layout by utilizing the layouts of pre-defined standard cells such that the inter-
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connections between cells, as specified in the netlist, are preserved. Place-and-route tools also
take into account the detailed timing issues that arise from the actual location of the various
cells in the layout. In this thesis, the generation of the design layout and the extraction of
its parasitics is done using the SOC encounter Cadence tool.
Algorithm 1 Design Timing Characterization From Layout
1: Inputs : Netlist.v, SDC_file.sdc, Tech.lib, LEF_lib.lef, TPTs.
2: Outputs : Layout, SPEF_layout.spef, SDF_layout.sdf
3: Tools : SOC Encounter Cadence, Synopsys PrimeTime
4: procedure LayoutTimingExtraction
5: ImportDesing(Netlist, LEF_lib, Tech) ;
6: SetUp_Timing(delay_corner, SDC_file, Tech) ;
7: FloorPlanning(Core_Size, Core_Bound, Core_utiliz) ;
8: PowerPlanning(Add_Ring, Add_Strip) ;
9: Place & Route(SRoute, PlaceDesign, RouteDesign, AddFiller) ;
10: SPEF_layout ← ExtractRC(RC_corner, Layout) ;
11: SDF_layout ←WriteSDF_PT(Netlist, Tech, SPEF_layout)
It is preferable that the timing characterization step employs a highly accurate device-level
simulator such as HSPICE [85] or some static timing software at the transistor level or
gate level. In this thesis, timing characterization is performed at the gate level using the
static timing analysis software from Synopsys (i.e., PrimeTime [86]). To do that, (i) the
gate netlist, (ii) the detailed layout parasitics extracted in the Standard Parasitic Exchange
Format (SPEF) file, and (iii) the timing model lib file are required. The results of this process
is the detailed layout timing of each gate, which is characterized into a Standard Delay Format
(SDF) file.
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CHAPTER 4 ARTICLE 1 : NEW INSIGHTS INTO THE SINGLE EVENT
TRANSIENT PROPAGATION THROUGH STATIC AND TSPC LOGIC
Summary of the Chapter
In this chapter, the work which was done in the first phase of this thesis is repor-
ted. In this phase, different circuit level simulations were performed to understand
the impact of the propagation paths, input patterns, and re-convergent paths on
the SET characteristics. Initially, the idea was introduced (and subsequently publi-
shed) in a paper entitled “Investigating the Impact of Input Patterns, Propagation
Paths and Re-convergent Paths on The Propagation Induced Pulse Broadening”
which was published in the 14th IEEE Conference on Radiation Effects on Compo-
nents and Systems (RADECS) on 2013. In order to confirm the observed behaviors
this analysis was performed for different circuits from both static and TSPC logic
families. Further analyses were performed and all the results were reported in a
journal paper which was published in the IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science
on 2014. The published journal paper is reproduced in this chapter.
Title : New Insights Into the Single Event Transient Propagation Through Static
and TSPC Logic
Authors—Ghaith Bany Hamad, Syed Rafay Hasan, Otmane Ait Mohamed, and Yvon Sa-
varia
Abstract— An investigation of the Single Event Transient (SET) characteristics (amplitude
and width) variation while propagating through static and True Single Phase Clock (TSPC)
logic is presented. The dependencies of the SET characteristics on the input patterns, pro-
pagation paths, pulse polarity, diverging paths, and re-converging paths are investigated.
New insights on the propagation induced pulse broadening (PIPB) phenomenon in different
combinations of static and TSPC logic are reported. The worst and the best propagation
paths for SET pulse broadening and attenuation are identified. Our results demonstrate that
SET pulses propagation can lead to Byzantine faults as they propagate through diverging
paths. A new way to abstract all possible interpretations of the SET induced Byzantine fault
phenomenon is proposed.
Index Terms—propagation induced pulse broadening (PIPB), Soft Errors, Broadening,
Input Pattern, Propagation Path, True Single Phase Clocked (TSPC), single event transient
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(SET), Byzantine Faults, Diverging Paths, Re-converging Paths.
4.1 Introduction
Soft errors, induced by radiations, are an increasing issue impacting the reliability of CMOS
Integrated Circuits (ICs) adopted not only in safety-critical applications, notably found in
space and avionic environments, but also in ground-level applications [10], [11]. The progres-
sive shrinking of device sizes in advanced processing technologies, which have scaled from
0.5 µm to 32 nm in less than two decades, leads to miniaturization and performance impro-
vements, but on the other hand, ultra-deep sub-micron technologies are more vulnerable to
soft errors [10].
Several research activities have been done recently in order to analyze the radiation effects
in digital circuits at different abstraction levels. Some early work on analyzing soft error
sensitivity in digital circuits was based on Monte-Carlo simulations such as the soft error
Monte-Carlo modeling program (SEMM) [40]. Other techniques have also been proposed
such as binary decision diagram (BDD)-based techniques [48], a combination of reduced-
order binary decision diagrams (ROBDDs) and algebraic decision diagrams (ADDs) [49],
and Boolean satisfiability solvers (SAT-solvers) [6]. State-of-the-art techniques analyze the
susceptibility of digital circuits to soft errors by only modeling the masking effects that can
prevent a single event transient (SET) pulse in digital designs from propagating : logical mas-
king (related to the logic operation of the gate), electrical masking (related to the electrical
property of logic gates), and latching window masking (related to the sensitive time window
of the sequential elements) [10].
However, contemporary techniques (such as [40] - [6]) are not sufficiently accurate in mo-
deling soft error propagation, as these techniques omit the possibility that a soft error pulse
could broaden while propagating. In [53, 87], the SET pulse broadening phenomenon was
first observed and partly characterized. The results showed that pulse broadening can be
attributed to the speed difference between the rising and the falling edge along a given path
[53]. Recently, the distribution of SET pulse width was measured in long SOI chains ir-
radiated with broad beam heavy ions. The propagation-induced pulse broadening (PIPB)
effect was experimentally modeled and measured in SOI inverter chains for the first time in
[13]. Subsequently, many researchers have analyzed the PIPB effect in SOI and bulk inverter
chains and its dependencies on active loading (fan-out) and passive loading (interconnect)
of the target circuits such as [12]-[55]. A direct relationship has been observed between the
PIPB effect and both the node capacitance (capacitive loads) and the transistor size [12]-[55].
Other authors proposed a gate-level SER estimation method in [65]. This method takes into
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account both the masking effects and the PIPB effect. Results indicate that the PIPB effect
increases the soft error rate (SER) [65]. Nonetheless, existing state-of-the-art techniques are
unable to analyze the effects of the propagation paths, the re-converging paths, and the input
patterns on the PIPB. Moreover, the SET pulse generation and propagation in dynamic logic
family such as the True Single-Phase-Clocked (TSPC) logic have not been fully analyzed.
The TSPC logic style has two main features : 1) the combinational functionality is combined
with the storage behavior and thus offers low transistor count. 2) It requires just a single
clock which simplifies clock generation and clock distribution.
In order to overcome these shortcomings, we explore further the SET pulse characteristic
variation while propagating through both static and TSPC logic. This work is distinct in the
following ways : 1- For the first time, the relationship between the specific logic structure and
the SET pulse width broadening or attenuation is investigated. Worst and best propagation
paths are identified for the analyzed designs. 2- We investigate the impact of both the input
patterns and the SET pulse polarity (negative (1→ 0→ 1) or positive (0→ 1→ 0)) on the
PIPB. 3- The impact of re-converging paths on the SET pulse propagation is investigated.
Pulses may re-converge and overlap at a gate in a circuit if multiple paths exist between the
particle striking node (affected node) and the re-converging gate. 4- The analysis of diverging
paths effect on SET pulse propagation provides direct evidence that it can lead to Byzantine
faults, which are defined as faults presenting different symptoms (or logic interpretation) to
different observers [88], [89], [90]. 5- The required timing conditions for the generation and
the propagation of the SET pulse through TSPC logic are abstracted. Finally, our investiga-
tion allows designers to make informed decision when approximating soft error propagation
possibilities in micro-architectures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 identifies the problem we are
addressing. In Section 4.3, we investigate the SET pulse characteristics variation in static and
TSPC logic due to the input patterns and the pulse polarity. The impacts of the propagation
path, the diverging paths, and the re-converging paths on the SET pulse characteristics are
analyzed in Section 4.4. Section 8.8 concludes this work.
4.2 Problem Formulation
The generated SET pulse in digital designs due to a particle strike might induce a soft
error at the primary output if there exists an open logic path from the striking node to the
output. Contemporary techniques model SET pulse propagation by considering the following
scenarios :
1- If the SET pulse amplitude and width are sufficiently small, the SET pulse is electrically
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masked.
2- If a SET pulse width and amplitude are below a threshold level, then the SET pulse
may still propagate. However, the subsequent combinational gates will attenuate the pulse
amplitude and width until it vanishes.
3- If the SET pulse width and amplitude are above a threshold value then it may broaden
while propagating through digital designs [53]-[12]. Moreover, in digital designs, multiple
factors can effect the SET pulse propagation which are described below :
— Fan-out : the output of a logic gate is connected to the input(s) of one or more
logic gates. This increases the capacitive load on the driving gate. Note that fan-out
increases the propagation threshold, but this phenomenon can also lead to broadening
of a SET pulse width, due to the difference between the rise and the fall times. This
factor has been analyzed for the static logic in [12]-[20].
— Diverging and re-converging paths : the SET pulse propagation can lead to Multiple
Event Transients (MET) if it propagates through a diverging node. Moreover, due to
re-converging paths, the width of a SET pulse, which propagates through different
paths between the fault striking node and the re-converging gate, may combine or
overlap when arriving simultaneously at the input of a re-converging gate.
— Input patterns and SET pulse polarity : the variation of the propagation delay for
different input patterns of multiple inputs static gates is well known to the community
([30], Chapter 6). Hence, it is possible that the SET pulse width in a static gate varies
for different input patterns. Moreover, the variation in a SET pulse characteristics
may depend on its polarity.
— Timing Constraints : In dynamic logic the characteristics of the SET pulse may vary
due to the particle strike time and the dynamic characteristics of the gate through
which the SET pulse propagates. In this work, we analyze the impact of all these timing
constraints on a SET pulse characteristics for the TSPC logic. This logic was first
proposed to deal with the skew problem in dynamic logic, such as clocked CMOS [31],
domino [32], and NORA logic [33]. In TSPC logic, it is possible to achieve high clock
frequencies because of the simplifications of the clock distribution and the elimination
of the phase overlapping problems [34, 35, 36, 37]. Different possible implementations
of TSPC logic, which use low number of transistors, have been presented in [35].
Furthermore, TSPC logic has been used in high operating frequency dividers and to
reduce power dissipation [38, 39].
To efficiently design digital systems robust to soft errors, engineers should consider soft error
effects as early in the design cycle as possible. Therefore, researchers came up with SET
propagation models operating at higher abstraction levels, such as gate levels and RTL levels
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[48]-[6]. However, many of these models have not considered the PIPB effect. Recently, in
[65], authors have proposed a model considering the PIPB effect at the gate level. This model
ignores the effects of re-converging paths, propagation paths, and input patterns and only
deals with static CMOS logic. Our work analyzes the effects of these unexplored phenomena
(namely, propagation path, re-converging paths, diverging paths, and input patterns). We
analyze these effects in CMOS circuits, which are sufficiently accurate to serve as a foundation
for modeling such phenomena at the gate level and at higher abstraction levels.
4.3 SET Characteristics Variation in Static and TSPC Logic
In this section, the SET pulse characteristics (amplitude and width) variation in static and
TSPC logic are investigated. Electrical simulations are performed using HSPICE and a 65
nm CMOS technology library from TSMC.
4.3.1 Static Logic
The SET pulse characteristics vary in static logic gates due to the input patterns because
each input combination leads to different equivalent internal resistance and capacitance. The
schematics of the analyzed 4-input NAND and the 4-input NOR gates are depicted in Fig.
4.1. Positive and negative SET pulses are injected at the primary inputs. tpLH refers to the
time for the output transition from logic ‘0’ (low) to logic ‘1’ (high), while tpHL refers to the
time for high to low output transition. The input and the output signal width are measured
between the 50 % transition points of the waveform. We started by matching the transistors
and finding the optimal transistors size for a fan-out of 4. The results reported in Tables 4.1,
and 4.2, for the NAND and the NOR gates shown in Fig. 4.1, are obtained by applying a
specific input pattern. The input SET pulse width is equal to 100 ps. The second columns
in both Tables I, and II depict the simulated input pattern and the node where the pulse is
injected.
NAND Gate
The CMOS implementation of a NAND gate is shown in Fig. 4.1a. In order to avoid the
logical masking effect, when a pulse is injected at one input node then all the other primary
inputs must be at logic 1. ∆tp in the last column of Table 4.1 represents the difference
between tpHL and tpLH (tpHL − tpLH). Simulation results in Table 4.1 lead to the following
observations : 1- the NAND gate attenuates the negative pulse and broadens the positive
pulse. 2- The amount of the attenuation, broadening, tpHL, tpLH , and ∆tp, can be explained
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Figure 4.1 CMOS Transistor Level Implementation of (a)- a 4-Input NAND Gate, (b)- a
4-Input NOR Gate.
based on the different RC delay characteristics of the CMOS logic, which is dependent on
the input patterns ([30], Chapter 6). For example, the fifth row in Table 4.1 shows the case
when a SET pulse of positive polarity is injected at node A of Fig. 4.1a, which resulted in
the least SET pulse broadening (6 ps). Whereas the most broadening is observed when the
same SET pulse occurs at the transistor nearest to ground. It is observed to be 12 ps and
tabulated in the last row of Table 4.1. Similar behavior has been observed for the AND gate
(recall that a CMOS AND is a NAND combined with an inverter and polarities on output
are inverted).
NOR Gate
The CMOS implementation of a NOR gate is depicted in Fig. 4.1b. To make sure that logical
masking does not prevent the SET pulse from propagating, all the other primary inputs are
set to non-controlling logic state (logic ‘0’). Table 4.2 shows the output pulse width of the
NOR gate depicted in Fig. 4.1b. ∆tp in the last column of Table 4.2 represents the difference
between tpLH and tpHL (tpLH − tpHL). Simulation results in Table 4.2 lead to the following
observations : 1- the NOR gate attenuates the positive pulse and broadens the negative pulse.
2- Similar to the NAND gate the amount of attenuation, broadening, tpHL, tpLH , and ∆tp,
are dependent on the input patterns. For example, when a SET pulse of negative polarity
is injected at node A of Fig. 4.1b the SET broadens the least (8.03 ps). Whereas the most
broadening is observed (14.5 ps) when it propagates through input D as depicted in Table
4.2. Similar behavior has been observed for the OR gate.
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4.3.2 TSPC Logic
In this section, we analyze all possible SET pulse generation scenarios in TSPC logic. Moreo-
ver, we analyze the impact of the input patterns and the pulse polarities on the SET pulse
characteristics in TSPC logic. The circuit schematic of a split output TSPC buffer is shown
in Fig. 4.2. When a particle strikes a vulnerable node of a TSPC logic gate it may generate
a SET pulse. If this pulse reaches the output, it will cause a soft error. In this analysis, the
nodes vulnerable to radiation are the surroundings of the reverse biased drain junctions of
a transistor biased in the OFF state. If a strike occurs at the drain of a NMOS transistor,
then a negative SET pulse 1 → 0 → 1 is generated (substrate is connected to Ground). If
the strike occurs at the drain of a PMOS transistor then a positive SET pulse (0→ 1→ 0)
is generated (substrate is connected to VDD).
In this work, the maximum input voltage that can be interpreted as logic ‘0’ is considered
to be VIL. Similarly, the minimum input voltage that can be interpreted as a logic ‘1’ is
considered to be VIH .
The first detailed analysis consisted of analyzing the impact of the input pattern on SET
pulse generation. In the TSPC buffer depicted in Fig. 4.2a, a particle strike can occur either
while the clock is ON (M2 is conducting) or when the clock is OFF (M2 is disconnected).
Table 4.1 SET Pulse Propagation Through a 4-Input NAND Gate.
Input Pattern
Input Output
tpLH tpHL ∆tpWidth Width
(ps) (ps) (ps) (ps) (ps)
A
tt
en
ua
tio
n
B = C = D = 1, 100 95 8.4 13.39 4.99
A = 1→ 0→ 1
A = C = D = 1, 100 93.5 12.5 19 6.5
B = 1→ 0→ 1
A = B = D = 1, 100 91 13.6 22.63 9
C = 1→ 0→ 1
A = C = B = 1, 100 89 13.6 24.6 11
D = 1→ 0→ 1
Br
oa
de
ni
ng
D = B = C = 1, 100 106 7.45 13.45 6
A = 0→ 1→ 0
A = C = D = 1, 100 108 10.17 18.18 8.01
B = 0→ 1→ 0
A = B = D = 1, 100 111 10 21 11
C = 0→ 1→ 0
A = C = B = 1, 100 112 10.1 22.1 12
D = 0→ 1→ 0
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Table 4.2 SET Pulse Propagation Through a 4-Input NOR Gate.
Input Pattern
Input Output
tpLH tpHL ∆tpWidth Width
(ps) (ps) (ps) (ps) (ps)
A
tt
en
ua
tio
n
A = C = B = 0, 100 85 27.85 12.86 14.99
D = 0→ 1→ 0
A = B = D = 0, 100 87.5 20.39 8.39 12
C = 0→ 1→ 0
A = C = D = 0, 100 90 25.5 15.4 10.1
B = 0→ 1→ 0
D = C = B = 0, 100 91.9 14.2 6.15 8.05
A = 0→ 1→ 0
Br
oa
de
ni
ng
A = B = C = 0, 100 114.5 24.8 10.25 14.55
D = 1→ 0→ 1
A = B = D = 0, 100 112 23.43 11.4 12.03
C = 1→ 0→ 1
A = C = D = 0, 100 110 19.53 9.03 10.5
B = 1→ 0→ 1
D = C = B = 0, 100 108.03 14.1 6.1 8
A = 1→ 0→ 1
DD
DD
DD
DD
Figure 4.2 Transistor level schematic of TSPC buffer gate (split output implementation). (a)
Positive latch (b) Negative latch.
The SET pulse generation scenarios for the TSPC buffer of Fig. 4.2a while the clock is ON
are summarized in Table 4.3. The first, second, third, fourth, and fifth columns present the
possible logic levels of IN, CLK, internal nodes (Y, X), and Out in Fig. 4.2a, respectively.
34
First and fourth rows provide the error free scenarios. Table 4.3 summarizes the relationship
between input patterns and the generation of the SET pulse. For example, if the applied input
pattern is (IN = 1, CLK=1, second and third row of Table 4.3), then under this condition in
normal operation, X and Y should be at logic ‘0’. If a particle strikes at M1, then a positive
SET pulse is generated at node X, and may propagate to node Y as M2 is on (CLK = 1).
This can result in the generation of a negative pulse at the output. Another possibility of
the SET pulse generation, with CLK =1, is when a particle strikes at M5 (see third row in
Table 4.3) then a negative SET pulse is generated at the output. In this case, the affected
node is the Out node as shown in Fig. 4.2a.
Table 4.3 SET Pulse Generation Scenarios for the TSPC Buffer When the Clock is ON.
IN CLK X Y Out
1 1 0 0 1
1 1 0→ 1→ 0 0→ 1→ 0 1→ 0→ 1at M1
1 1 0 0 1→ 0→ 1at M5
0 1 1 1 0
0 1 1→ 0→ 1 1→ 0→ 1 0→ 1→ 0at M3
0 1 1 1 0→ 1→ 0at M4
Table 4.4, summarizes the SET generation scenarios for a TSPC buffer (positive latch) when
CLK (gate of M2 in Fig. 2a) is at logic low (OFF). In this Table, the possibility of flipping
the stored logic value at the Out node due to soft error is investigated. The first, second,
fourth, and fifth columns depict the logic levels of the IN, previous state of the Out (Out(t-
1)), internal nodes (X, Y ), and current Out node in Fig. 4.2a. As depicted in the first and
fifth rows in Table 4.4, it is possible for a SET pulse to be masked (no propagation) after
it gets generated at a vulnerable node. For example, in the scenario shown in the first row,
node X is charged (0→ 1) if a particle strike at M1 (under the conditions that the out(t-1)
= 1, IN = 1, and the stored value at the internal node X is 0). However, there is no path
for this pulse to propagate to the output (M4 is OFF). A SET pulse can be generated at the
Out node due to a strike at M4 or M5, as shown in the second and third row of Table 4.4.
Moreover, when out(t-1) =0, IN=0, and CLK=0, a strike at M2 (node X) can generate a
positive pulse at the output as shown in the fourth row in Table 4.4.
To further our analysis, we investigated how a particle strike timing impacts on the SET
pulse width. For this purpose, consider the case shown in the second row in Table 4.3, where
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IN=1, CLK=1, and a particle strikes at M1, which generates a negative pulse at the output.
Due to the strike time variation, the width of this SET pulse can be one of the following : 1-
If the particle strike time is within the CLK hold time, then the SET pulse width depends
on the radiation strength (collected charge at the vulnerable node) as shown in Fig. 4.3a. 2-
If the strike time is near the clock edge, then the SET pulse width extends from the strike
time until the next clock cycle. This case is shown in Fig. 4.3b, where TSET is the duration
of the SET pulse. Moreover, the width of the SET pulse mainly depends on the clock period.
CLK
IN
1
X
Out
1
(b)
X
1
1
CLK
IN
Out TSET
(c)
Tx
Tclk
TSET
Tx
Tclk
(a)
CLK
Out
1
IN
Figure 4.3 SET Pulse Width Variations Due to the Strike Time for the Scenario Shown in
the 2nd Row of Table 4.3.
Table 4.4 SET Pulse Generation Scenarios for the TSPC Buffer When the Clock is OFF.
IN out(t-1) CLK X Y Out
1 1 0 0→ 1 at M1 0 No propagation
1 1 0 0 0 1→ 0→ 1 at M5
0 0 0 1 1 0→ 1→ 0 at M4
0 0 0 1→ 0→ 1 at M2 1 0→ 1→ 0
0 0 0 1 1→ 0 No propagationat M3
Table 4.5 shows the result of our findings regarding the impact of the strike time on the SET
pulse amplitude. Two possible scenarios which lead to a SET pulse at the output, with an
amplitude υ where VIL < υ < VIH , are depicted in both Table 4.5 and Fig. 4.3. The first
scenario occurs when CLK = 1, IN is charging 0→ 1, X=Y= 1→ 0, and Out= 0→ 1. Due
to a particle strike at M1, node X is charged again (0 → 1). Immediately, the clock (CLK )
turns off, thus, X cannot switch to 0 (M2 off). Therefore, a SET pulse, with an ambiguous
amplitude υ, is stored at the output until the next clock cycle, as shown in Fig. 4.3b. The
second scenario, depicted in the second column in Table 4.5, occurs when the CLK = 1, IN
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Table 4.5 The Dependence of the SET Pulse Amplitude on the Particle Strike Time for the
TSPC Buffer.
First Scenario Second Scenario
CLK =1 CLK =1
Current IN =0→ 1 IN =1→ 0
State X=Y=1→ 0 X=Y=0→ 1
Out=0→ 1 Out=1→ 0
SET 1- strike at M1 ⇒ 1- strike at M3 ⇒
Generation SET (0→ 1) at X SET (1→ 0) at Y
Scenario 2- CLK switch OFF 2- CLK switch OFF3- Out = υ, 3- Out = υ,
Where VIL < υ < VIH Where VIL < υ < VIH
is discharging 1 → 0, X=Y= 0 → 1, and Out= 1 → 0. Due to a particle strike at M3, node
Y is discharged again (1 → 0). The clock immediately turns off M2, thus X cannot switch
to 1. Therefore, a SET pulse, with an ambiguous amplitude υ, is stored at the output until
the next clock cycle, as shown in Fig. 4.3c. Our analysis results of the SET pulse amplitude
variation due to the strike time are illustrated in Table 4.6 for both scenarios shown in Table
4.5. In the reported analysis, the clock period is 300 ps, while the clock ON (1) width is 150
ps. υ and Tset are the amplitude and width of the SET pulse, respectively. The first column
in Table 4.6 is the strike time TX . The amplitude of the SET pulse also has an effect on its
propagation. For example, in the analysis of the first scenario in Table 4.6, the amplitude of
the SET pulse can be divided into three categories based on TX : 1) if TX > 146 ps, then the
SET pulse is interpreted as a logic ‘1’. 2) If TX < 140 ps, then the SET pulse is interpreted
as logic ‘0’. 3) If 140 ps < TX < 146 ps, then the SET pulse has an amplitude which can be
interpreted as ‘1’ or ‘0’ depending on the subsequent TSPC gate.
In summary, in TSPC logic, the input pattern, pulse polarity, strike node, and strike time
impact the width of a generated SET pulse. Similarly, the negative latch TSPC buffer shown
in Fig. 4.2b can be analyzed. In the next section, we investigate the propagation of SET
pulses (including the ambiguous pulses) through different combinations of TSPC logic.
4.4 The Impact of the Logic Structure on the SET Pulse Characteristics
In this section, we investigate the impact of the propagation paths, the diverging paths, and
the re-converging paths in both static and TSPC logic on the SET pulse characteristics.
The results reported in this section rely on electrical simulations using HSPICE with 65 nm
CMOS technology library from TSMC.
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Table 4.6 Analysis of the SET Pulse Characteristics Variation Due to the Strike Time for the
Scenarios in Table 4.5.
Strike Time First Scenario Second Scenario
(TX) υ Tset xset Tset
(ps) (V ) (ps) (V ) (ps)
120 0 180 1.2 180
130 0.330 170 1.11 170
140 0.500 160 0.959 160
144 0.625 156 0.805 156
145 0.700 155 0.653 155
146 0.809 154 0.515 154
147 0.950 153 0.391 153
150 1.2 150 0 150
4.4.1 Static Logic
In this work, we define the best propagation path (BPP) and the worst propagation path
(WPP) as the logic paths between the vulnerable node and the primary outputs. In the BPP,
SET pulse suffers from the smallest amount of broadening, where in the WPP, SET pulse
suffers from the largest amount of broadening. In this section, four detailed analysis of the
SET pulse propagation are performed. The first analysis consisted on analyzing the impact
of the propagation paths on the SET pulse broadening and identifying the BPP and the
WPP of both the NAND and the NOR chain. Positive and negative SET pulses are injected
with different initial widths at certain distances from the output. We obtained three kinds of
information :
1- Results in section 4.3 showed that a NAND gate attenuates negative pulses and broa-
dens positive pulses with almost the same magnitudes. In case of propagating the SET pulse
through a logic chain, where all gates have the same type and size (same tpHL, tpLH) no
significant broadening has been observed. This is because ∆tp of the subsequent logic stages
has the same magnitude but opposite polarity that broadening and attenuation alternate
between subsequent stages. Therefore, in order to analyze one SET pulse propagation pheno-
mena at a time (broadening or attenuation) through a chain of gates, a chain of 126 4-input
NAND gates and a chain of 126 4-input NOR gates were simulated as shown in Fig. 4.4,
where an inverter is added between every two cascaded gates. The choice of a chain of 126
gates is somewhat arbitrary. Our goal is to have a sufficiently complex combinational circuit
to observe the phenomena of interest.
2- Similar to the single gate, our NAND chain also attenuates negative pulses and broadens
positive pulses for all input widths. By contrast, the inverse occur in the NOR chain.
38
3- The amount of broadening is related to the propagation path as depicted Fig. 4.5. Both
BPP and WPP for the NAND and NOR gates chain are depicted in Fig. 4.4a and 4.4b res-
pectively. Note that for a positive pulse propagating through the NAND chain, the BPP is
when the pulse propagates through the first input of each NAND gate (input A in Fig. 4.1a)
as depicted in Fig. 4.4a. For the NOR gates chain, the BPP for a negative SET pulse, as
shown in Fig. 4.4b, occurs when the SET pulse propagates through the fourth input of each
NOR gate (which is input A in Fig. 4.1b). The PIPB factor shown in Fig. 4.5, e.g. 19 ps for
the WPP of the NOR chain, can be determined from the slope of the curve, and it represents
the broadening occurring at each gate stage. As shown in Fig. 4.5, the broadening increases
with the logic depth, and the amount of broadening in the NOR chain is larger than in the
NAND chain.
The second investigation we performed is analyzing the effect of both the supply voltage and
the propagation path on the PIPB. Fig. 4.6 shows that the SET pulse broadens linearly with
the number of gates separating the radiation strike node and the primary output. Fig. 4.6
also shows that the broadening increases when the supply voltage decreases for the WPP
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Figure 4.4 Schematic Description of the Chain of the NAND and NOR Gates. (a)- the BPP
and the WPP for the NAND Gates Chain (b)- the BPP and the WPP for the NOR Gates
Chain (c)- the Re-converging Path Combinational Design
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Figure 4.5 The WPP and the BPP for the NAND and NOR Gates Chain. Measured SET
Pulse Width Versus the Strike Node Along the NAND Gates Chain. The Chain Supply
Voltage 1.2 V. The Input SET Pulse Width is 100 ps.
and the BPP for both the NAND and the NOR chain. Largest expansion occurs when SET
pulse propagates in WPP of the NOR chain and with 1.0 V supply voltage.
Fig. 4.7 shows the simulation results for the BPP and the WPP for the NAND chain shown
in Fig. 4.4a at different process corners using 65 nm CMOS bulk technology. One can see
the variation in the broadening, which results from different propagation paths (WPP and
BPP) and different process corners (slow-slow (SS) and fast-fast (FF) corners). The largest
broadening occurs as the SET pulse propagates in the WPP at the SS corner as depicted in
Fig. 4.7.
The combinational design we built to perform our third detailed analysis of the effect of the
re-converging paths on the PIPB is depicted in Fig. 4.4c. Four different length logic paths
converge in a 4-input NAND gate. SET pulses (transition 0 → 1 → 0 for the NAND paths
and 1 → 0 → 1 for the NOR path) are injected at the input of each path. Results in Table
4.7 indicate that due to the re-converging paths, the individual pulses propagating through
path1–path4, are adding up at the re-converging gate (NAND gate). Thus, the broadening in
the re-converging gate is much larger than what we observed in the NAND chain before. For
example, around 185-ps broadening in the NAND gate (see Table 4.7).
In summary, the SET pulse broadening phenomenon is significant because a relatively short
pulse, just sufficient to propagate, can become arbitrarily long, provided the existence of a
sufficient logic depth. Moreover, the contemporary transistor level (such as [20], [11], [91])
and higher abstraction level (as [65], [11]) modeling techniques do not consider the effects of
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Figure 4.6 Measured SET Pulse Width Versus the Strike Position Along the NAND and the
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Figure 4.7 Simulation Results for the Best and Worst Propagation Path Among Different
Corners for a Chain of 14 NAND Gates.
41
Table 4.7 The Effect of the Re-converging Paths on the PIPB.
Input Output Output Output Output Output
Pulse Path1 Path2 Path3 Path4 Re-converging
Width Width Width Width Width Width
(ps) (ps) (ps) (ps) (ps) (ps)
100 384 327 250 289 485
1000 1300 1240 1159 1199 1381
1200 1501 1440 1360 1399 1582
3500 3808 3745 3663 3704 3889
the propagation path, the polarity of the SET pulse, and the re-converging paths on the SET
pulse propagation. Hence our analysis should lay the foundation of more accurate SET pulse
propagation modeling techniques. Results in [65] demonstrate that assuming a rate of 1-ps
width broadening per stage of gates leads to increase the SER. Thus, SER is proportional
to the pulse broadening. Our results make evident the relationship between the PIPB and
both the propagation path and the input pattern, which will be beneficial in accurate SER
estimation.
4.4.2 TSPC Logic
TSPC logic is mainly used in designing concurrent systems implemented as arrays of logic
blocks operating in a pipeline manner. Doing so, idle times of the logic blocks are avoided
and therefore the overall system performance is improved. In section 4.3.2, multiple SET
generation scenarios in single TSPC buffer have been analyzed. In this section, we analyze
the impact of the propagation paths, the diverging paths, and the re-converging paths on the
SET pulse characteristics. This analysis is based on the worst generation scenarios where the
particle strike occurs near the clock edge and has two properties. 1- Its width extends from
the strike time until the next clock cycle as shown in Fig. 4.3. 2- Its amplitude can be 0, 1, or
υ, where υ is any value between VIL and VIH as shown in Table 4.5. In this work, the origin
gate is the TSPC gate where the particle strikes and the SET pulse is generated. Moreover,
the observer is the subsequent TSPC gate where the SET pulse propagates to.
The first detailed analysis consisted on investigating SET pulse propagation behavior in the
chain of TSPC buffers depicted in Fig. 4.8a. The N-block and the P-block in Fig. 4.8 are the
positive and the negative latch shown in Fig. 4.2a, and Fig. 4.2b, respectively. Fig. 4.8a depicts
a chain of of TSPC buffers which alternates the N-block and the P-Block. The dependence
of SET pulse propagation on the subsequent gate is investigated in Fig. 4.9 for the design
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shown in Fig. 4.8a. The error free behavior is shown in the left side of Fig. 4.9. Due to the
timing conditions of the observer (N- or P-block), SET pulse can propagate through all the
design stages. For example, for the chain in Fig. 4.8a, which alternates between N-blocks and
P-Blocks, a SET pulse can expand to a full clock cycle duration at an internal node. This
is analogous to flipping the state of a latch in a shift register. The fully stretched pulse can
then propagate through the TSPC chain, as in a shift register, from the origin gate to the
primary output.
Fig. 4.10 depicts the variation in the SET pulse width while propagating through the chain
of TSPC buffers shown in Fig. 4.8a. Two observations can be made : 1) the main broadening
in the SET pulse width occurs at the origin gate, where pulse extends from the strike time
until the next clock cycle ; 2) the pulse width is directly related to the clock period.
The second detailed analysis consisted on analyzing the impact of diverging paths on SET
pulse propagation. The TSPC logic design used in this analysis is depicted in Fig. 4.8b.
If the SET pulse Xset, with an amplitude υ, propagates through a diverging node then
different interpretations (0, 1, or υ) are observed for different subsequent gates (observers)
depending on their thresholds, biases, and timing. This phenomenon is known in the literature
as Byzantine faults, which is defined as a fault presenting different symptoms to different
observers [88], [89], [90]. These different interpretations lead to different faults, one in each
path, hence increasing the soft error rate at the primary outputs. The number of SET pulse
interpretations at the diverging node are equal to 3z, where z is the fan-out at the diverging
node. For example, in Table 4.8 we abstracted the nine possible interpretations of the SET
pulse by the subsequent gates assuming that the fan-out of the diverging node in Fig. 4.8b is
2. Moreover, the impact of the fan-out of the observer gate on the amplitude of the SET pulse
is investigated, as shown in Fig. 4.11. In this analysis the generation scenarios in Table 4.5
are applied at the origin gate. The fan-out of the TSPC buffers, depicted in Fig. 4.8, (X_T1,
X_F1, and X_T2) has been changed from 1 to 4. For each fan-out case the amplitude of
the SET pulse was measured at the output of each cascaded gate. As depicted in Fig. 4.11,
fan-out increases the threshold voltage of the logic gates. Therefore, fan-out impacts the
interpretation of the SET pulse (0, 1, or υ). Furthermore, the SET pulse with υ logic level
can propagate through multiple stages of logic and still remain at an ambiguous level.
The third detailed analysis consisted on analyzing the impact of the re-converging paths on
the SET pulse propagation. In this scenario, the SET pulse interpretations at the diverging
node converge at a subsequent gate in the design. Fig. 4.8b shows the case where two SET
pulses (with amplitude υ) re-converge in 2-input TSPC OR gate. The re-converging gate
(OR gate) interpretation of the re-converging pulses varies based on its timing, threshold,
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SET
Figure 4.8 Schematic Description of the Combination of the TSPC Logic. (a)- Chain of
Alternative N-block and P-block of TSPC Buffers, (b)- Diverging and Re-converging Paths.
Figure 4.9 Simulation Results of the SET Pulse Propagation Through a Chain of TSPC
Buffers Shown in Fig. 4.8(a).
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Figure 4.10 Variation in the Width of SET Pulses While Propagating Through a Chain of
TSPC Buffer.
Table 4.8 Abstraction of the SET Pulse Propagation Induced Byzantine Fault Scenarios.
SET Byzantine Pulse PP1 PP2
υ 0 0
υ 0 1
υ 1 0
υ 1 1
υ 0 υ
υ 1 υ
υ υ 1
υ υ 0
υ υ υ
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Figure 4.11 The Variation in the Amplitude of the SET Pulse While Propagating Through
a Chain of TSPC Buffers.
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and pulses amplitude. In Table 4.9 all possible interpretations of these two ambiguous pulses
and the corresponding output of the re-converging gate are abstracted. Similarly, tables for
other re-converging gates, such as AND, NAND, can be generated.
As a summary, in TSPC logic, the effect of electrical masking is not dominant. Therefore, the
main masking effect that can prevent SET pulses from propagating in TSPC logic is logical
masking. Our analysis has demonstrated that SET pulses propagation can lead to Byzantine
faults (very serious for safety-critical systems [89]). Finally, it is important to develop a
soft error tolerant technique which takes into account the impact of all these propagation
scenarios.
4.4.3 Abstraction and Automation of the Proposed Analysis
The tendency of SET pulse propagation is worsening as geometric dimensions are scaled down
[11]. Moreover, as our results demonstrate, the SET pulse characteristics are dependent on
the propagation paths, the input patterns, the strike time, the converging node and the
diverging node. Therefore, it is predicted that all these factors will continue to impact the
SET pulse characteristics with technology scaling. Moreover, as explained before, the main
source of SET pulse width variation is the imbalance between the TPLH and the TPHL. This
imbalance is inevitable in most logic families, hence SET pulse width will vary in most logic
families.
Digital designs are traditionally structured, i.e. substantial parts of the digital systems can
be replicated. Our knowledge of digital systems allows us to safely assume that a majority of
the digital design will comprise circuits that fall into one or more of the following categories :
— Chain of similar gates (NAND/NOR chains) ;
— Chain of different gates ;
— Convergent paths ;
— Divergent paths.
Certainly, all these categories may have sub-categories, but in principle these categories cover
the majority of digital combinational structures. Most complex digital systems are composed
of combinations of one or more of these categories. To abstract the results provided in this
paper, characterization libraries that can be developed for each of these categories should
include the following information :
— SET Pulse propagation characteristics variation due to all input patterns and all
possible initial SET pulse polarity.
— The Best Propagation Paths (BPP) and the Worst Propagation Paths (WPP) are
identified based on the SET Pulse propagation characteristics variation.
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Table 4.9 Abstraction of the SET Byzantine Pulse Re-converging Propagation Scenario for
2-Input TSPC OR Gate.
X1 X2 Out
0 0 0
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 1
0 υ υ
1 υ 1
υ 1 1
υ 0 υ
υ υ υ
Figure 4.12 General Steps of a Possible Automated SET Pulse Propagation Analysis.
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Once characterization libraries of SET pulse propagation are made, then one can package
them into a Verilog netlist, which can become part of a standard cell library. This library can
be invoked to estimate the possible BPP, and WPP for the SET pulse propagation, which
will assist in developing soft error tolerant designs.
In order to attain the full benefit of this work, it is desirable to propagate the observed
behaviors from our paper at higher abstraction level. A flow chart of a methodical approach
to perform this analysis is depicted in Fig. 4.12, which can be implemented using CAD tools
or scripting languages. As depicted in Fig. 4.12, this methodology allows building characte-
rization libraries for each relevant category listed before as following :
— For each circuit category (chain of similar gates, chain of different gates, convergent
paths, and divergent paths) the vulnerable nodes are identified.
— The threshold amplitude and duration of the SET pulse propagation is to be deter-
mined. In order to find out whether a particular SET pulse would propagate to the
output under different constraints, we need to inject SET pulses into circuit level mo-
dels. SET pulse injection at circuit level is well known to the community [92, 93, 94].
This characterization can be first made on the individual gates ; with parametric ana-
lysis to find out the threshold SET pulse width for different gate strengths.
— Next, representative circuits for each of these categories can be characterized for the
effects of input patterns and propagation paths against the depth for SET propagation.
In the process WPP and BPP can also be identified.
Similar to the automation methodology presented herein, a methodology to characterize
thoroughly the defective behavior of transistors level circuit representation of a rich CML
digital library using Hspice has been proposed in [95]. Two CAD tools were developed to
automate this methodology. The First was an Inductive Fault Analysis (IFA) tool and the
second was an Automated Fault Characterization Tool (AFCT). Automating the abstraction
process would require similar tools that could be developed as further research.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the variations of SET pulse characteristics while propagating
in both static and TSPC logic. Our analysis of static logic has addressed the impact of
propagation paths, input patterns, and polarity of SET pulses (positive or negative) on
the SET PIPB phenomenon. We demonstrated that these factors aggravate the SET pulse
broadening phenomenon. For example, in one of our simulations, a 200% broadening of the
pulse width was observed due to re-converging paths. Moreover, a new analysis of electrical
masking of SET propagation was presented. Worst and best propagation paths (WPP and
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BPP) were identified for the analyzed designs.
The reported analysis of TSPC logic has addressed the impact of the propagation paths,
diverging paths, fan-out, and re-converging paths on the SET pulse amplitude and width.
Moreover, timing constraints related to the SET propagation such as timing of the strike and
clock period are identified.
Finally, we have demonstrated that propagating a SET pulse through a diverging node may
lead to a Byzantine faults. We have proposed a way to abstract all possible interpretations
of the SET pulse at diverging nodes.
49
CHAPTER 5 ARTICLE 2 : MODELING, ANALYZING, AND
ABSTRACTING SINGLE EVENT TRANSIENT PROPAGATION AT GATE
LEVEL
Summary of the Chapter
In this chapter, our first attempt to bridge the gap between the analysis of SETs
at transistor and gate levels is explained. Initially, a new abstraction of the re-
sults which were reported in Chapter 4 is introduced. This abstraction was first
introduced in a paper entitled “Abstracting Single Event Transient Propagation
Characteristics to Support Gate Level Modeling" which was subsequently publi-
shed in the IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS) on
2014. Thereafter, this abstraction was utilized to accurately model and analyze
SET propagation at gate level using multiway decision graphs. The proposed mo-
deling and the results this gate level analysis on different combinational designs
was reported in a paper which was published in the IEEE International Midwest
Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS) on 2014. This published pa-
per is reproduced in this chapter.
Title : Modeling, Analyzing, and Abstracting Single Event Transient Propaga-
tion at Gate Level
Authors—Ghaith Bany Hamad, Syed Rafay Hasan, Otmane Ait Mohamed, and Yvon Sa-
varia
Abstract—Soft errors have become one of the most challenging issues that impact the re-
liability of modern microelectronic systems at terrestrial altitudes. A new methodology to
abstract, model, and analyze Single Event Transient (SET) propagation at different abstrac-
tion levels (transistor and gate level) is proposed. Transistor level characterization libraries
are developed to abstract the impact of input patterns, pulse polarity, and propagation paths
characteristics on the SET duration. Thereafter, these libraries are utilized to analyze SET
pulse propagation at gate level using MDG model checker. We have implemented the propo-
sed method on different ISCAS85 benchmark combinational circuits. Proposed methodology
is orders of magnitude faster circuit level simulations. Moreover, we have developed gate level
characterization libraries to abstract SET pulse propagation behavior at the gate level.
Index Terms—Soft Errors, SET, MDG, multiway decision graphs, delay degradation model,
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PIPB, Byzantine Faults.
5.1 Introduction
Single Event Transients (SETs) are becoming a major source of errors in digital designs [11].
The SET propensity for propagation is enhanced as the technology size scales down. Moreo-
ver, the growing speed and complexity in new generation circuits increased the probability
of SET to be captured as errors [11]. As a result, over the past two decades, several analy-
sis techniques of SET pulse propagation operating at different abstraction levels have been
proposed.
At transistor level, circuit simulation and experimental analysis have been performed. For
instance, SET pulse width broadening and attenuation while propagating have been investi-
gated [96, 3, 12]. Some other studies investigated the effects of fan-out [20] and the impacts
of input pattern and logic structure [96] on SET pulse width. The analysis of SET pulse
propagation at transistor level consumes large amount of time and requires full details of the
design structure and the SET pulse characteristics. Hence, it has become very important to
analyze SET pulse propagation at high abstraction levels.
Several research activities have been conducted recently in order to develop new methodo-
logies to analyze SET pulse propagation at the gate level, such as the Fault injection based
technique proposed in [43]. Some research groups have addressed this issue using formal
methods such as ; Binary Decision Diagram (BDD)-based technique [48], a combination of
Reduced-Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (ROBDDs) and Algebraic Decision Diagrams
(ADDs) [71], and a Boolean Satisfiability solver [6] (SAT-solver).
One of the main challenges in analyzing SET pulse propagation at higher abstraction level is
to accurately model all the SET pulse propagation scenarios observed at the transistor level.
For example, contemporary techniques (such as [48], [6]) are not sufficiently accurate, as
these techniques omit the possibility of the SET pulse broadening while propagating. Moreo-
ver, state-of-the-art techniques at gate or higher abstraction levels analyze the susceptibility
of digital circuits to soft error by only modeling the masking effects that can prevent SET
pulses from propagating [11]. Nonetheless, existing state-of-art techniques are unable to mo-
del the effects of propagation paths characteristics, re-converging paths, and input patterns
on SET pulse characteristics at high abstraction levels.
In order to overcome these shortcomings, in this paper, a new methodology to abstract, model,
and analyze SET pulse propagation at gate level is proposed ; this work is original in the
following ways. 1- We propose new characterization libraries of SET pulse propagation which
51
have two main advantages : a) the proposed libraries provide a comprehensive abstraction
of several previously unconsidered SET pulse propagation scenarios ; b) these libraries also
characterize the impacts of the logic structure and the input pattern. 2- For the first time,
such libraries are utilized to accurately model and analyze SET pulse propagation at gate level
using Multiway Decision Graphs (MDGs). Moreover, based on this analysis, we develop gate
level characterization libraries to accurately abstract the observed SET pulse propagation.
3- We unravel scenarios through which Byzantine faults (defined later on) can occur due to
SET pulse propagation through diverging paths.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides evidence of the problems
we are addressing. Section 5.3 explains our proposed multi-level analysis of SET pulse pro-
pagation. The proposed abstraction of SET pulse propagation behavior at transistor level
is explained in Section 5.4. Our proposed gate level analysis of SET pulse propagation is
explained in Section 5.5. Section 8.8 concludes this work.
5.2 Problem Formulation
Based on transistor level analysis of the SET pulse propagation [96], [12], [20], [3] the
following propagation scenarios can be observed : a) SET pulses can be logically masked by
a gate if one of its inputs is set at a controlling logic value (e. g., ‘0’ for a NAND gate) ; b)
SET pulse width can be attenuated (electrically masked) [3] or broadened [96], [12] while
propagating ; c) SET pulses can be also masked if their arrival time is outside the latching
window of sequential elements.
In parallel with the analysis at the transistor level, different approaches to analyze SET pulse
propagation at gate and higher abstraction levels have been proposed (such as [48], [6]).
However, state-of-the-art techniques, which operates at high abstraction levels, suffer from
the following shortcomings : 1) They omit the possibility of SET pulse broadening, which is
significant because a relatively short pulse, just sufficient to propagate, can become arbitrarily
long, provided the existence of a sufficient logic depth ; 2) Simulation based approaches (such
as [43]) have serious shortcomings as they can be very time consuming and memory intensive
for large designs, and the accuracy of fault simulation decreases with the decrease in the ratio
of the simulated sample size over the total vector space size ; 3) At gate and higher abstraction
levels, contemporary models do not include circuit level details and the impact of the logic
structure and the input pattern on the SET pulse characteristics. Deficiencies in conventional
models lead to inaccurate estimation of soft error rate (SER). Hence, there is a growing need
to better abstract and characterize SET pulse propagation at gate and higher abstraction
levels.
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Figure 5.1 General Steps of our Proposed Methodology of SET Pulse Propagation Analysis
at Transistor and Gate Level.
5.3 Proposed Multi-level SET Pulse Propagation Analysis
Our proposed general methodology, which includes the analysis of SET pulse propagation
at both transistor level and gate level, is depicted in Fig. 5.1. Our analysis of SET pulse
propagation at the transistor level was partly reported in [96]. In Section 5.4, essential cha-
racteristics of SET pulse propagation are abstracted, which allows propagating the observed
behaviors to the gate level.
Our gate level analysis has the following steps, as shown in Fig. 5.1 : 1- Modeling SET pulse
propagation at gate level by utilizing transistor level characterization libraries ; 2- Identifying
the vulnerable nodes in a design and injecting SET pulse at one of these nodes. 3- Analysis of
SET pulse propagation for each injection scenario, with the second and the third step being
repeated for all vulnerable nodes in the design. 4- Finally, the results of our analysis of the
SET pulse propagation behavior at gate level are abstracted as gate level characterization
libraries. In section 5.5, we explain in details our SET pulse propagation analysis method
based on MDG.
5.4 Proposed Abstraction of SET Pulse Propagation Based on Characterization
Libraries
This section introduces a new approach to abstract SET pulse propagation scenarios obser-
ved at transistor level. To obtain this abstraction, we developed characterization libraries
to characterize SET pulse propagation as a function of input patterns, pulse polarity, and
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IF ((x=0) or (y=0)) THEN
Z =1; %logical masking 
ELSEIF (y_SET ≤ SET_weak) THEN
Z= x; % electrical masking
ELSEIF ( y_SET > SET_weak ) THEN
  IF y_SET is positive THEN 
Z = y_SET + LICFy ; % Broadening
 ELSE
Z = y_SET – LICFy ; % Attenuation
    ENDIF;
ELSEIF (x_SET ≤ SET_weak) THEN
Z= y; % electrical masking
ELSEIF ( x_SET > SET_weak) THEN
  IF (x_SET is positive) THEN 
Z = x_SET + LICFx ; % Broadening
  ELSE
Z = x_SET – LICFx ; % Attenuation
  ENDIF;
ENDIF;
 NAND Gate 
IF ((x=1) or (y=1)) THEN
Z =0; %logical masking 
ELSEIF (y_SET ≤ SET_weak) THEN
Z= x; % electrical masking
ELSEIF (y_SET > SET_weak ) THEN
  IF (y_SET is negative) THEN 
Z = y_SET + LICFy ; % Broadening
  ELSE
Z = y_SET – LICFy ; % Attenuation
  ENDIF;
ELSEIF (x_SET ≤ SET_weak) THEN
Z= y; % electrical masking
ELSEIF (x_SET >  SET_weak) THEN
  IF (x_SET is negative) THEN 
Z = x_SET + LICFx ; % Broadening
  ELSE
Z = x_SET – LICFx ; % Attenuation
 ENDIF;
ENDIF;
NOR  Gate 
X
Y
Z
X
Y
Z
SET Propagating Through 
Y
SET Propagating Through 
X
SET Propagating Through 
Y
SET Propagating Through 
X
 N = 1 N = 2
F a n -O u t ≈  1 6 8
F a n -O u t ≈  2 8 1 0
F a n -O u t ≈  3 1 0 1 2
F a n -O u t ≈  4 1 2 1 4
 N = 1 N = 2
F a n -O u t ≈  1 7 8
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F a n -O u t ≈  3 1 1 1 2
F a n -O u t ≈  4 1 3 1 5
Logical Masking 
Logical Masking 
LICF values for 60 nm
LICF values for 60 nm
Figure 5.2 Characterization Libraries of Both NAND and NOR Gates.
fan-out. In this work, if the SET pulse width is less than the propagation threshold of the
subsequent gate then this width is called SET_weak. The characterization libraries of the
NAND and the NOR gates are depicted in Fig. 5.2. To illustrate how these libraries are
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used, explanations on the NAND gate library use are provided in the sequel. The library
element which reflects logical masking expressed as (IF ((X=0) or (Y = 0)) then (Z = 1)).
Moreover, as shown in Fig. 5.2, if we consider SET pulse propagation through node Y, then
the SET pulse width variation is modeled based on its strength according to the following
scenarios : a) If (Y_SET ≤ SET_weak), then it will be electrically masked ; b) if (Y_SET
> SET_weak), then the width of the SET pulse at the output depends on its polarity. Posi-
tive SET pulse broadens while propagating, while negative SET pulse attenuates. Moreover,
SET pulse width variation due to input pattern and load is abstracted using the Load Input
Combination Factor (LICF), proposed in [97], as shown in Fig. 5.2.
The second detailed analysis consisted of abstracting the SET pulses re-converging scenarios.
The SET pulse width variation while propagating through a re-convergent gate, which is
abstracted in the characterization library shown in Fig. 5.3 two factors : a) the difference
between the re-converging paths propagation delays (|D1−D2|) ; b) the difference between
the duration of the SET pulses (|DSET1−DSET2|). There are two main scenarios that influence
converging SET pulses :
1- The first scenario occurs if |D1 − D2| is less than the duration of the longest pulse
(MAX(DSET1, DSET2)). The amount of broadening in this scenario is divided into two sub-
IF (|D1 – D2| ≤  MAX (DSET1, DSET2)) THEN
IF ((|D1 – D2| ≤  |DSET1 – DSET2|) &(longest SET arrive first)) THEN 
DSET_Z = SET1 {MAX (DSET1, DSET2)}; % Smallest Broadening
ELSEIF  (|D1 – D2| >  |DSET1 – DSET2|) THEN
     MAX(DSET1, DSET2) < DSET_Z ≤  (DSET1+ DSET2)
ENDIF;
ELSE
Normal behavior; % no re-converging broadening
ENDIF;
Re-convergent Gate
Combinational Logic 
Z
Path 1, D1
Path 2, D2
SET1 {DSET1}
SET2 {DSET2}
SET {DSET}
SET1
Out
(a)
SET2
|D1-D2|
DSET1
DSET2
DSET_out
(b)
SET1
Out
SET2
|D1-D2|
DSET1
DSET2
DSET_out
Figure 5.3 Characterization Library Modeling of a Re-convergent Gate.
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Figure 5.4 (a) SET Pulse Propagation Induced Byzantine Fault in Static Logic. (b) Abstrac-
tion of SET Pulse Propagation Induced Byzantine Fault Scenarios.
scenarios. a) If |D1 − D2| < |DSET1 − DSET2| and the longest pulse arrives first, then no
broadening occurs as shown in Fig. 5.3a. The duration of the SET pulse at the output is
nominally the same as the duration of the longest pulse. b) If |D1−D2| > |DSET1−DSET2|,
then the SET pulse duration at the output depends on the overlap between the converging
pulses which is (MAX(DSET1, DSET2) < SET_pulse < (DSET1 +DSET2)) as shown in Fig.
5.3b.
2- The second scenario that occurs if (|D1 − D2| > MAX(DSET1, DSET2)), in which case
the converging pulses will not overlap (no re-converging broadening). Therefore, the gate
propagates one SET pulse at a time (similar to Fig. 5.2).
Our third detailed analysis relates to means of abstracting SET pulse (with duration τ)
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Graph (MDG) for G5 From the C17 Design.
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propagation through diverging paths as shown in Fig. 5.4. Different interpretations (‘0’ or ‘1’)
are observed for different diverging paths depending on their thresholds. This phenomenon is
known in the literature as the Byzantine fault, which is defined as a fault presenting different
symptoms or interpretations to different observers [89]. These different interpretations lead
to different faults in different paths, which can have a large impact on the design behavior.
For example, the state machine in Fig. 5.4 confirms its action by the acknowledgment signal.
However, due to the Byzantine fault the SET pulse at the diverging node can be interpreted
as ‘0’ in path3 and as ‘1’ in path1. In such case, the state machine acts as if the action is not
performed while the outside world thinks that it has been performed.
The number of the SET pulse interpretations at the diverging node is equal to 2z, where
z is the number of the diverging paths, e.g. Fig. 5.4b depicts all possible interpretations of
the SET pulse when z=3. However, the knowledge of the diverging paths thresholds and the
SET pulse width, can help eliminating some of the cases in Fig. 5.4b. For example, when
SET pulse duration is τ and path2 threshold is 7τ , then all the cases in Fig. 5.4 when path2
interpretation is ‘1’ are not possible.
Table 5.1 The Characterization Library of the C17
Pulse Injected Output CICNode Polarity SET SET PIW
a Positive SET(3) SET(3) (b=1, c=0)/ (b=1, d=1) 2Negative SET(3) SET(3) (b=1, c=0)/(b=1, d=1)
b Positive SET(3) SET(3)/SET(4) (a=1, c=0)/(b=1, c=1, a=0) 4Negative SET(3) SET(3)/SET(2) (a=1, c=0)/(b=1, c=1, a=0)
c Positive SET(3) SET(3) (b=0)/(d=0, b=0) 3Negative SET(3) SET(3) (b=0)/(d=0, b=0)
d Positive SET(3) SET(4) (b=1, c=1, a=0) 2Negative SET(3) SET(2) (b=1, c=1, a=0)
e Positive SET(3) SET(3) (d=0, c=0)/(b=0, c=0) 0Negative SET(3) SET(3) (d=0, c=0)/(b=0, c=0)
OG1 Positive SET(3) SET(4) (c=0)/ (b=1, d=1) -Negative SET(3) SET(2) (c=0)/ (b=1, d=1)
OG2 Positive SET(3) SET(3) (c=1, a=0)/ (c=1, b=0) -Negative SET(3) SET(3) (c=1, a=0)/ (c=1, b=0)
OG3 Positive SET(3) SET(4) (a=0)/(b=0) -Negative SET(3) SET(2) (a=0)/(b=0)
OG4 Positive SET(3) SET(4) (c=0)/(d=1, b=1) -Negative SET(3) SET(2) (c=0)/(d=1, b=1)
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5.5 Gate Level Analysis of SET Pulse Propagation
In this section, the SET pulse propagation is analyzed at the gate level by utilizing the
transistor level characterization libraries. Moreover, our gate level analysis is performed using
the MDG, which is a tool set used for the formal verification of complex digital systems [81].
It includes application procedures for equivalence checking, model checking, and invariant
checking [81].
First, the SET pulse categories defined in Section 5.4 are termed into two classes : a) SET(1)
which corresponds to the SET_weak ; b) SET(P) which corresponds to the case when SET
pulse width is larger than SET_weak, P value corresponds to the SET pulse strength. The-
refore, the attenuation and the broadening of this pulse are modeled by changing the value
of P. As an example, if a positive SET(P) pulse propagates through a NAND gate then at
the output it is termed as SET(P+LICF). Next, our MDG based technique is applied which
has the following steps as shown in Fig. 5.1 :
5.5.1 Design Annotation and SET Pulse Injection
Our methodology start by annotating each node in the design with its corresponding LICF
value. In Fig. 5.5, this value is termed as LICF FN , N is the node where the SET propagates, F
is the gate fan-out. These values are depicted in Fig. 5.2, which are characterized beforehand
using electrical simulation with 65 nm CMOS technology library from TSMC. Next, the
SET pulse is injected using the fault injection element (FIE), which select between the error
free mode and the faulty mode during verification. Thereafter, the MDG tool builds graph
representation for each gate based on its characterization library. As an example, Fig. 5.5b
depicts the MDG of G5 in the circuit shown in Fig. 5.5a. This MDG graph implements the
NAND gate characterization library depicted in Fig. 5.2. G5 is a two input NAND gate ; the
in
out
Figure 5.6 The Use of the Characterization Library at the RTL.
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output of G1 (OG1 ) and the output of G3 (OG3 ). It is shown that, when OG3 is ‘0’, then
OG5 is ‘1’ irrespective of OG1 (logical masking). But if OG3 is ‘1’ then OG5 is dependent on
OG1. In the last case, SET pulse at OG1 can broaden (OG5 is SET(P+LICF)) or attenuate
(OG5 is SET(P-LICF)) while propagating.
Table 5.2 Analyzed Benchmark Circuits
Circuit Circuit Total Input Output
Name Function Gates Lines Lines
74182 CLA 19 9 4
74283 Fast Adder 36 9 5
C432 Priority Decoder 160 (18 EXOR) 36 7
C499 ECAT 202 (104 EXOR) 41 32
C880 ALU and Control 383 60 26
5.5.2 Gate Level Analysis and Results Abstraction
Our proposed methodology analyzes SET pulse propagation using the invariant checking tool
from the MDG tool set. This tool generates counterexamples if the SET pulse can propagate
from the vulnerable node (where SET is injected) to the primary output as shown in Fig.
5.1. This analysis is performed for all vulnerable nodes in the design.
Our proposed methodology abstracts the SET pulse propagation behavior at the gate level by
developing gate level characterization libraries. Tables 5.1 is the characterization library of the
design shown in Fig. 5.5a. The following information related to the SET pulse propagation can
be observed from such library. 1- The Critical Input Combinations (CICs) that allow the SET
pulse to propagate to the output. 2- The SET pulse width variation behavior (attenuation
or broadening). 3- It reports the Primary Input Weight (PIW) which is a measure of the
impact of each input node on the SET pulse propagation. For example, the value of node b
is related to four SET pulse propagation scenarios. Moreover, these libraries can be utilized
at the RTL level. Simple example is shown in Fig. 5.6b, where using the half adder (HA)
characterization library, the full adder (FA) can be analyzed without the need of its gates
level structure. We have performed our analysis on several designs such as the benchmark
designs listed in Table 5.2.
Fig. 5.7 depicts the predicted SET pulse width variation while propagating through the design
in Fig. 5.5a by applying our proposed model and the delay degradation model [3]. In this
analysis, a SET(2) pulse (P=2) is injected at each node in Fig. 5.5a. According to the delay
degradation model this pulse is electrically masked if injected at node a, b, c, d, e, and OG2,
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Figure 5.7 The SET Pulse Propagation Based on the Delay Degradation Model (DDM) [3]
Versus our Proposed Model.
as depicted in Fig. 5.7. However, our proposed model demonstrates that this pulse may reach
the output with sufficient strength for all these nodes. We can conclude that state-of-the-art
SET modeling miss some propagation scenarios if the broadening is not considered along
with the masking effects.
5.6 Conclusion
In this paper, a new approach to better abstract SET pulse propagation scenarios and to
characterize the impact of the pulse polarity, the logic structure, and the input patterns
on the propagating SET pulse width is proposed. Moreover, we have utilized transistor level
characterization libraries to model and analyze SET pulse propagation at the gate level using
the MDG tool. Finally, we proposed new gate level characterization libraries which can be
used to accurately analyze SET pulse propagation and estimate the SER at the RTL level.
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CHAPTER 6 ARTICLE 3 : EFFICIENT AND ACCURATE ANALYSIS OF
SINGLE EVENT TRANSIENTS PROPAGATION USING SMT-BASED
TECHNIQUES
Summary of the Chapter
In this chapter, a new methodology to bridge the gap between SET transistor and
gate levels analysis and improve the scalability of gate level analysis is introduced.
In this chapter, we explain in details the proposed modeling of SETs propagation
as a satisfiability problem by utilizing the efficiency of the Satisfiability Modulo
Theories (SMTs) and the underlying details extracted from the layout and charac-
terized from technology node (reported in Chapter 4). The proposed methodology
and the results of its implementation on different designs was first introduced
(and subsequently published) in a major conference paper in the IEEE Internatio-
nal Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD) on 2016. This published
paper is reproduced in this chapter.
Title : Efficient and Accurate Analysis of Single Event Transients Propagation
Using SMT-Based Techniques
Authors—Ghaith Bany Hamad, Ghaith Kazma, Otmane Ait Mohamed, and Yvon Savaria
Abstract—This paper presents a hierarchical framework to model, analyze, and estimate
digital design vulnerability to soft errors due to Single Event Transients (SETs). A new SET
propagation model is proposed. This model simultaneously includes the impact of masking
effects, width variation, and re-converging paths by utilizing satisfiability modulo theories.
Furthermore, new metrics characterizing the soft error rate of a given design are proposed.
Reported results show that the proposed methodology significantly enhances the efficiency of
SET analysis in terms of : 1) accuracy as it gives accurate estimates of SET sensitivity based
on gates timing extracted from layout. These results provide new insights to combinational
designs vulnerability to SETs ; 2) speed as it is orders of magnitude faster than contempo-
rary techniques ; 3) scalability as it can handle large and complex designs such as 128-bit
multipliers, whereas contemporary techniques are unable to handle multipliers larger than
32 bits.
Index Terms—Soft Errors, SETs, gate level, layout, technology characterization, Satisfia-
bility Modulo Theories, PIPB, Yices solver, multipliers, making effects, re-converging paths.
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6.1 Introduction
Soft errors due to Single Event Transients (SETs) have now become one of the most chal-
lenging types of uncertainties that impact the reliability of modern electronic systems. For
instance, they were responsible for the catastrophic failure and the recall of many safety
critical systems, such as implantable cardiac pacemakers [7]. Therefore, there is a growing
need to analyze and estimate the impact of soft errors on today’s complex digital designs to
be able to develop efficient fault tolerance techniques.
The propagation of SET through combinational designs is affected by three masking effects ;
logical, electrical, and temporal. An SET is logically masked by a gate if, while propagating
through one or more inputs, at least one of the other inputs has a controlling logic value (e.g.,
‘0’ for a NAND gate). Electrical masking occurs when the duration (i.e., width) of an SET
is less than the threshold of the subsequent logic gates. An SET is masked due to temporal
masking if it arrives outside the latching window of registers. Furthermore, if an SET is not
logically and electrically masked, it may be subject to attenuation or broadening as it pro-
pagates [12]. Recent radiation testing and circuit simulation experiments have demonstrated
that the broadening phenomenon has a high impact on the Soft Error Rate (SER) of a circuit
[20], [12].
One of the most challenging issues in evaluating design vulnerability to SETs is to accurately
model SET propagation. Different analysis methodologies that operate at different levels of
abstraction, both formal and simulation-based, have been proposed.
At circuit level, parameters extraction and detailed simulations can provide a certain level of
accuracy for phenomena such as electrical masking and SET width variation. However, this
analysis is very computationally intensive and would be intractable at the chip level and is
only tractable at the cell level. In other words, this type of analysis could be conducted on
hundreds of transistors at most.
Performing such analysis at the gate level comes at the cost of less accuracy, since gates
loading and timing details are abstracted. These details, which are critical for modeling
electrical and temporal masking, are only available at the post-layout stage. Previous studies
at gate level can be categorized into three groups :
1) Simulation based techniques [74, 98] : In these techniques, SET propagation has to be
analyzed over all possible input vectors, for all possible SET widths, and both polarities.
Obviously, complete exhaustive analysis of propagation possibilities in complex systems is
intractable at the logic level using simulations. Consequently, such techniques have their limits
in accuracy. Generally, their accuracy is determined by the ratio of the simulated sample size
62
over the total vector space size.
2) Numerical based techniques ([50], [51], [52] [41]) : Each of these techniques try to estimate
the impact of masking effects on the SER. Electrical masking is presented in [50], temporal
masking is analyzed in [41], and a model combining all masking effects is presented in [51].
However, these techniques are not scalable and their models do not include the impact of
SET broadening and SET re-converging.
3) Formal based techniques [49, 56, 5] : Model checking [5] and equivalence checking [49, 56]
based techniques have been developed to improve the coverage of SET analysis. However,
these techniques restrict their model to Boolean representation [49, 56] or some enumerated
data type [5], which greatly limits the modeling of variations in SET characteristics, such as
width variations and timing constraints. Moreover, most of the existing techniques generate
two formal models of the design ; a golden and a faulty model. Then, similar to fault simula-
tion, the states of the outputs of both models are compared thus such techniques double the
resource requirements. Another issue with existing techniques is that they map each input
vector to a unique state. Thus, the corresponding model has at least 2 × 2M states (where
M is the number of primary inputs). With such techniques, any formal tool rapidly runs
out of memory, even when modeling small desings at RTL levels e.g., a 14-bit adder [56].
Additionally, the size of the formal model grows exponentially with the size of some types of
arithmetic circuits such as multipliers. This is mostly attributed to the intrinsically complex
structure of such circuits i.e., large number of re-converging paths.
In summary, the important question on “how to measure the vulnerability of complex de-
signs at gate level without losing the accuracy provided from circuit level analysis ?" is not
appropriately addressed in the literature so far. To answer this question, we introduce a no-
vel methodology to estimate the vulnerability of combinational designs to soft errors. This
methodology starts with the synthesis of an RTL design into its gate level representation
and then the layout of the design is extracted. Next, gates parasitics are extracted and gates
timing details are characterized from the layout. These parameters are then employed to
model and analyze SET propagation. A new model for SETs propagation is proposed, which
captures the variations in the SET characteristics while propagating, such as the SET width
attenuation and broadening. Moreover, this model includes the impact of all masking effects
(logical, electrical, and temporal) and re-converging paths on SET propagation.
Furthermore, a new formalism modeling SET propagation into a Satisfiability problem utili-
zing Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMTs) is proposed. The proposed methodology provides
an exhaustive analysis of SETs propagation from each vulnerable node to each output using
efficient well-known SMT solvers. It generates the required conditions for SET propagation
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which are then used to compute the vulnerability of each node and to estimate the Soft Error
Rate (SER) of the design. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first time a SMT
based technique exploits the layout details to provide an accurate estimation of the SER at
the gate level.
In comparison with [51], [41], [5], experimental results reported later show that the proposed
methodology significantly reduces the resource requirements while improving the accuracy of
the computed SERs. For instance, it can analyze complex arithmetic circuits such as a 128-bit
multiplier in about 70 minutes, while existing techniques ([51], [41]) require 499 minutes to
analyze a 24-bit multiplier and fail to handle 32 bit multipliers.
Design Timin
Characterizat
Figure 6.1 The Proposed Methodology for SET Modeling and Analysis.
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6.2 Proposed Framework
An overview of the proposed methodology is shown in Fig. 6.1. It starts with the synthesis of
the RTL design into its gate level representation using EDA synthesis tools. In this process,
the design constraints are also generated. The gate level analysis starts by characterizing the
timing details of each gate. This process consists on generating the complete mask layout of
the intended design by following some well known VLSI design flow. Then, the exact parasitics
of the layout are extracted, which are then employed to compute the exact timing for each
gate using EDA static timing analysis tools. Moreover, transistor level analysis is performed
to generate the Transistor Propagation Tables (TPTs). These tables report the technology
parameters required to model SET propagation behavior for the technology node of interest.
Thereafter, the extracted design timing, TPTs, and the gate level netlist are utilized in order
to model SET propagation as an SMT problem. Next, the SET is injected (with different
polarities) and its propagation is exhaustively analyzed, from each vulnerable node to each
primary output. For each vulnerable node in the design, the proposed analysis generates :
a) the set of input vectors that must be present at the primary inputs so that an injected
SET is not logically masked ; b) the maximum SET strike time within the clock cycle so it
is not temporally masked by the latching window of the register ; and c) the minimum SET
width required at the strike time so it is not electrically masked. These results are then used
to compute the vulnerability of each node and to estimate the SER of the design. In the
following subsections, the main steps of the proposed methodology are explained in detail.
6.2.1 Design Timing Characterization
Without the layout, the modeling of electrical masking and SET characteristics variations
cannot be fully accurate due to the lack of exact loading and exact timing details. This can
lead to some SETs not being detected, thereby the calculated quantitative estimates are not
accurate and they can serve only as approximations. Therefore, the proposed methodology
involves generating and characterizing the layout of a design using EDA tools. The inputs of
the post-layout characterization are (i) the gate level netlist generated from the synthesis tool,
(ii) the target technology timing file (i.e., lib file), and (iii) the set of timing constraints used
to drive the place and route process, which is reported as the Synopsys Design Constraints
(SDC) file. Place-and-route tools create a layout by utilizing the layouts of the pre-defined
standard cells such that the interconnections between the cells, as specified in the netlist,
are preserved. Place-and-route tools also take into account the detailed timing issues that
arise from the actual location of the various cells in the layout. In this work, the generation
of the design layout and the extraction of its parasitics are done using the SOC encounter
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tool from Cadence. It is preferable that the timing characterization step employs a highly
accurate device-level simulator such as HSPICE [85] or some static timing software at the
transistor level or gate level. In this work, timing characterization is performed at the gate
level using the static timing analysis software from synopsys (i.e., PrimeTime [86]). To do
that, (i) the gate netlist, (ii) the detailed layout parasitics extracted in the Standard Parasitic
Exchange Format (SPEF) file, and (iii) the timing model lib file are required. The result of
this process is the detailed layout timing of each gate, which is characterized into a Standard
Delay Format (SDF) file.
6.2.2 Technology Node Characterization
SET propagation behavior varies based on the technology of interest. This variation is in-
cluded in our model as a technology dependent parameter (a.k.a fitting paramter k) that
impacts the SET width variation while propagating through each gate as proposed in [20].
This parameter is obtained through detailed transistor level analysis which investigates the
impact of different design parameters on SET characteristics. The main steps of this analysis
are summarized in Alg. 2. This analysis is performed using HSPICE [85] simulations of all
standard cells and their combinations (chain of similar gates, chain of different gates, and
diverging paths). This analysis starts by matching the transistors and finding good transistor
sizes according to a suitable criteria. To characterize the impact of each design parameter,
all others are fixed and the gate is simulated over a range of possible values of the target
parameter. The variations in the SET characteristics due to variations in the design para-
meters (such as the node capacitance, the input pattern, and the fan-out) are characterized.
For example, the impact of the node capacitance is characterized by performing different
HSPICE simulations for a range of possible values of output capacitances and different fan-
outs (fan-out of 1 to fan-out of 4) over a possible range of SET widths at the inputs. The
results of all these analyses are stored in the Transistor-level Propagation Table (TPT) which
contains the value of the fitting parameter (i.e., k) for each gate, for different loading and
inputs. The transistor level analysis of standard cells is done beforehand and only once for
each technology node.
6.2.3 Fault Propagation Modeling
The proposed modeling utilizes the characterized design layout timing details reported in
the SDF file as explained in Section 6.2.1. Each gate is annotated with its propagation
delay (i.e., tp) which is equal to tpLH or tpHL depending on the SET polarity. Each gate is
also annotated with ∆tp which is the difference between tpLH and tpHL or tpHL and tpLH
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Algorithm 2 Transistor Level Timing Characterization
Inputs : Netlist.v, Tech.lib, LEF_lib.lef
Outputs : Transistor Propagation Table (TPT)
Tools : HSPICE Synopsys circuit simulator
procedure TranTimingExtraction
Parameters ← Identify circuit parameters ;
for each p ∈ Paramters ;
IdentifySize(PMOS(w,l), NMOS(w,l), C) ;
Cir ←Build example circuit ;
Nodes ← Identify vulnerable nodes in Cir ;
for each n ∈ Nodes ;
SET_in ←InjectSET(n, width, polarity) ;
CircuitSimulation(Netlist, InPattern, SET_in) ;
k ← CharactrizeResults(SET_out, Tp ) ;
Update TPT ;
for each input to output transition depending on the SET polarity, as illustrated in Fig.
6.2. Moreover, the results of the transistor level characterization reported in the TPT are
utilized to provide the technology dependent parameters (i.e., k), as explained in Section
6.2.2. The SET width propagation threshold for each gate (i.e., Wthr) is approximated as k,
the technology dependent parameter, times tp, which is required to model electrical masking.
The proposed methodology models the SET propagation as a satisfiability problem based
on the Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMTs). In order for this model to fully capture the
design functionality and the variation in SET characteristics, signals in the design possess
four attributes : logic of bit type, faulty of Boolean type, FaultWidth of real type, and the
SET arrival time (FaultTime) of real type, as follows :
Structure SET = [bit logic, bool faulty, real FaultWidth, real FaultTime]
The logic variable stores the original value of the signal. A signal is faulty if its faulty attribute
is ‘true’. The SET polarity is decided based on the logic attribute. A fault is considered to
have a positive polarity if faulty is ‘true’ and logic is ‘0’ and is considered to have a negative
polarity if faulty is ‘true’ and logic is ‘1’. The fault time is taken with respect to the clock
period. For example, at a certain node i, if there is a fault with a positive polarity injected
at time x and with a width y, its signal would be described as follows :
Node_i = SET (logic = 0, faulty = True, FaultT ime = x, FaultWidth = y)
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Figure 6.2 Modeling of Combinational Designs.
A library of the SMT models for all the standard logic gates was developed. These models
include methods to evaluate the gate logic functionality and each masking effects. The effect
of logical masking is modeled as a Boolean function over the faulty and the logic attributes
of each input signal based on the gate functionality.
The possibility that an SET is electrically masked is modeled as a linear arithmetic constraints
over the gate SET propagation threshold Wthr. The width of the SET at the input of the
gate (τset) has to be greater than Wthr to cause an error at the output. In our model, if the
SET is not logically and electrically masked, then its width can broaden or attenuate while
propagating. In order to accurately model the variation in SET width while propagating, the
models proposed in [20] and [12] are adapted. The variation in SET width is modeled based
on τset and ∆tp. It is important to note that ∆tp is computed based on the input pattern
i.e., each input pattern has its own delay and ∆tp. For example, a NAND gate broadens the
width of a positive SET by k ∗∆tp and attenuates the width of a negative SET by k ∗∆tp
[12].
In the proposed temporal masking model, for an SET to be latched, it must arrive before
the clock edge by the setup time of the register (Tclk − Ts). Moreover, an SET has to have a
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steady state after the clock edge by the hold time of the register (Tclk + Th), i.e., its width
must be ≥ (Th + Ts). To accurately model this, several factors are taken into consideration,
such as the strike time (Tst), initial width (Win), and the delay (tp) and width variation (∆tp)
of all the gates in the SET propagation path. It is assumed that a register is connected to
each primary output as shown in Fig. 6.2.
Contemporary studies are not accurately modeling the impact of re-converging paths. For
instance, they assume that SETs never re-converge and always propagate separately [41],
whereas in reality SETs at the inputs always logically mask each other in the overlap per-
iod for some gates [12]. In this work, we propose a new characterization of the different
SETs re-converging scenarios based on their arrival times, widths, polarities, and the re-
converging gate functionality. The proposed characterization for 2-input NAND/AND re-
converging gates is summarized in Fig. 6.3. At the input of the re-converging gate we have :
D1 and D2, which are the propagation delays of the re-converging paths, WSET1 and WSET2
which are the width of the two SETs. If there is an overlap between the two re-converging
SETs (((D1 ≥ D2)&(D2+WSET2 > D1))|((D2 ≥ D1)&(D1+WSET1 > D2))) then there are
six different re-converging scenarios to be checked. In order to better explain the different sce-
narios for this re-convergence, Fig. 6.4 depicts an example of two paths re-converging through
2-input AND gate. Following, we explain each re-converging scenario for this example :
1. If both SETs have controlling values i.e., in the case of the AND gate, negative po-
larity SETs, the SET at the output is the result of the disjunction of both SETs
(min(D1, D2) < SET_out < max(D1 + WSET1, D2 + WSET2)), as shown in Fig.
6.4(a).
2. If both SETs have non controlling values i.e., in the case of the AND gate, positive
polarity SETs, the SET at the output is the result of the conjunction of both SETs
(max(D1, D2) < SET_out < min(D1 + WSET1, D2 + WSET2)), as shown in Fig.
6.4(b).
3. If only one SET has controlling value and fully overlaps the other SET, then both
SETs logically mask each other, as shown in Fig. 6.4(c).
4. If only one SET has controlling value and is fully overlapped by the other SET, the
output SET is composed of the non-overlapping regions between the two SETs (see
Fig. 6.4(d)). In this scenario, two shorter SETs are generated, i.e., SETs are attenuated
due to re-converging paths by the overlap region between them.
5. If only one SET has controlling value and partially overlaps the other SET, then the
width of the SET at the output equals the region where the non-controlling SET is
propagating, as shown in Fig. 6.4(e), (f).
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Figure 6.3 Proposed Characterization of Re-converging SETs.
If there is no overlap between the SETs, then the re-converging gate evaluates their propa-
gation separately (as shown in Fig. 6.3).
6.2.4 Fault Propagation Analysis
The proposed analysis starts by identifying the Cone Of Influence (COI) for each output in
order to evaluate its vulnerability to SETs. To do that, the technique recently proposed in
[99] is adapted to compute all COIs in a single pass. The main steps of the COI evaluation are
detailed in Alg. 4. The main idea is to assign a bit array called BMP (ni) to each node. The
COI for each node is extracted using a backward depth-first traversal of unvisited nodes, i.e.,
whenever node nj is reached by node ni, the label of nj is bitwise ORed with the label of ni
(BMP (nj) = BMP (nj)|BMP (ni)). Thus, the set of nodes in the COI of a node correlates
to the bits with value ‘1’ in its bitmap. Thereafter, an SMT model of the design is built based
on the developed standard gates SMT models. Next, an SET is injected at one gate at time
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Figure 6.4 An Example on the SET Re-converging Scenarios.
and SMT solvers are utilized to exhaustively analyze the SET propagation from this gate to
the primary output by verifying the following set of properties :
— Logical masking property : is there an input vector which opens a sensitized path for
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the injected SET so it reaches the design output ?
— Temporal masking property : what is the maximum strike time (Tst) for an SET within
the clock cycle so it can be latched at a register ?
— Electrical masking property : what is the minimum width (MW) for an SET so it
is not electrically masked and to be latched by a register ? Electrical and temporal
masking are mutually dependent and their effects should be considered simultaneously.
The minimum width is computed based on the maximum strike time i.e., MW ≥
Tclk + Th −∆tp(path)−Delay(path)− Tst.
Based on the results of the verification of the first property, the SET propagation probability
(that is not logically masked) is computed as follows :
PP = num(SAT instances)
N
(6.1)
Where num(SAT instances) is the number of solutions in the randomly restricted search
space N . This analysis is performed for both negative (i.e., PPn) and positive (i.e., PPp)
SETs. The results of the verification of the second and the third property are the Minimum
Positive Width (MPW) and the Minimum Negative Width (MNW) for positive and negative
SETs, respectively. MNW and MPW are used to calculate the probability that an SET is
not electrically and temporally masked as the ratio of these durations to the operated clock
period duration Tclk. In case a fault has more than one MNW or MPW, then their disjunction
is computed. Therefore, combining the impact of all masking effects and width variation, the
probability of SET propagation from one node to the output is computed as follows :
P (z) =
Pep(z) · PPp · MPWTclk + Pen(z) · PPn · MNWTclk
2 (6.2)
Pen(z) and Pep(z) denote the probabilities that a negative and a positive SET is injected
at node z, respectively. These probabilities depend on the sensitive collection areas and the
substrate or well voltage bias around the vulnerable node. In absence of these details as well
as necessary details related to the energy distribution of the aggressor particles, it is assumed
that Pen(z) and Pep(z) are equal. The vulnerability of an output node in the design can be
estimated using the SET propagation probabilities from all the nodes in its COI as follows :
V ul(Oi) =
∑
z∈allnodes
P (z) (6.3)
This approach is accurate when the COIs of all outputs are mutually exclusive. By contrast,
when COIs of different outputs overlap (or do not correspond to mutually exclusive events),
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Algorithm 3 Modeling and Analysis of SET Propagation
CombinationlDesign{
Get technology node parameter ;
Sort gates topologically ;
Annotate each gate with its parameters ;
Compute_COI for each output ;
Generate SMT model for each gate ;
for each output
for each gate
Compute number of random tests N ;
Generate all solution in search space ;
Calculate propagation probabilities ;
Compute output vulnerability ;
Compute SER ;
}
Compute_COI{
Clear all visit_flag ;
Clear all node bitmaps ;
Set all nodes bitmaps with their bithot ;
foreach ti ∈ T
BitMap(ti) =Reach_DF(ti) ;
}
procedure Reach_DF(n)
Set visit_flag of n ;
foreach vi in the adjacent list of n
if (v is not visited)
BitMap(v) = Reach_DF(ti) ;
BitMap(n) = BitMap(n)|BitMap(v) ;
then the probabilities for SET propagation to these outputs are correlated. In this case,
if exact probabilities are required, then signal dependencies due to re-convergent fan-outs
and/or correlated inputs have to be investigated. This leads to the path enumeration pro-
blem, where the number of paths that have to be enumerated independently can increase
exponentially with the number of dependent re-convergent fanouts and correlated inputs
[100]. Therefore, to avoid such complexity, COIs are assumed to be mutually exclusive as in
Eq. 6.3 which can lead to safe over approximated probabilities. Finally, we estimate the SER
of the design using the vulnerability of all outputs as follows :
SER(comb) =
∑
O∈comb
V ul(O) (6.4)
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6.3 Experimental Results
The proposed methodology is fully automated. RTL synthesis to gate level, generation of
the layout, and extraction of its details into an SDF file are automated using TCL scripting
and EDA tools. An SMT model of the design is automatically built, from its gate level
verilog netslit and our library of the standard gates SMT models, using Python scripting.
The proposed analysis (outlined in Alg. 4) is fully performed using Python scripting and
the Yices SMT solver. Experiments were conducted on an I7-3770K processor clocked at
3.50GHz with 16 GB RAM.
The proposed framework was implemented on the ISCAS85 benchmark circuits and different
size array multipliers. The layouts of the analyzed designs were generated based on the
FreePDK45 design kit [101]. This kit supplies technology files and layouts for a generic 45-nm
process. It has been used to characterize the vulnerability of logic cells to soft errors [102].
Our first detailed analysis consisted on investigating the relationship between SET width
variations and the SER. The results of the analysis of different designs that are depicted in
Fig. 6.5 lead to the following observations :
1. SER increases as the width of the injected SET increases until it reaches a certain
width threshold. After that threshold, no significant change in the SER is observed.
This can be explained by the fact that different propagation paths have different SET
width requirements. Therefore, increasing the width of the injected SET increases
its probability to propagate through longer paths without being electrically masked.
Nevertheless, if SET width is sufficiently large, then its width is large enough to
propagate through all possible propagation paths i.e., logical and temporal masking
dominate its propagation. Moreover, when taking into account the temporal masking,
the SERs are reduced by factors proportional to the latching window and inversely
proportional to the clock period.
2. It is essential to carefully model SET width broadening for accurate vulnerability
evaluation. In Fig. 6.5, we investigate the impact of modeling the SET width broade-
ning on the design SER. For example, when broadening is modeled, the SET width
threshold for the C499 design was evaluated to be around 300 ps. However, without
modeling the broadening, the threshold SET width was evaluated to be around 800ps.
This is due to the fact that the SET width is only attenuated while propagating, i.e.,
larger widths are required for SETs to be able to reach the outputs and cause an error.
The same results were observed for all other ISCAS85 circuits as shown in Fig. 6.5.
To see how much inaccuracy can be introduced with such modeling, results shown in
Fig. 6.5 demonstrate that it can cause significant underestimations of the SER.
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The second detailed analysis consisted on investigating the applicability of the proposed fra-
mework to any combinational circuit. Table 6.1 shows the CPU time consumed by Yices to
analyze all the ISCAS85 benchmark circuits. The reported times are the times consumed by
the SMT solver to analyze all injection scenarios. It is observed that our framework’s verifi-
Table 6.1 Comparison of Processing Times to Estimate SERs Between our Framework and
Contemporary Techniques for ISCAS85 Benchmarks.
SSER SEAT MC Proposed
[51] [52] [5] Methodology
circuit CPU CPU CPU CPU SER
(Sec) (Sec) (Sec) (Sec)
c17 30.43 - 0.432 0.09 0.43
c432 269.71 6480 21.15 1.1 0.621
c499 36.90 12960 6.48 10.15 0.887
c880 273.20 6120 34.5 0.64 0.145
c1355 109.25 9720 - 15 0.315
c1908 120.23 64380 81 1.149 0.0555
c2670 309.53 32820 392.2 23.2 0.05
c3540 403.17 - 150.2 2.47 0.0254
c5315 4710.04 - 207.6 3.52 0.033
c7552 658.37 - 316.17 42.16 0.105
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Figure 6.5 The Relationship Between SER and SET Width.
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cation time for most of the circuits is much less than those reported with other contemporary
methods.
6.3.1 SET Analysis For Multipliers
In general, multipliers are very complex benchmarks. This is due to the fact that increasing
multiplier sizes quadratically increases the number of gates, but exponentially increases the
number of re-converging paths. Therefore, the work on SER analysis of multipliers is rather
limited.
In order to evaluate the scalability and the efficiency of the proposed methodology, different
size array multipliers are modeled and verified. Their sizes range from 8 to 128 bits. The re-
sults of this analysis are reported in the sixth and the seventh columns of Table 6.2. Moreover,
a comparison with state-of-the-art existing techniques (SSER [51] and SERA [41]) in terms
of CPU time is also provided in Table 6.2. It is important to note that existing techniques
do not take in consideration the impact of re-converging paths as explained before. When
analyzing multipliers, we observed that such assumption has the following consequences :
1) it highly reduces the complexity of the SET propagation analysis. For example, when
no re-convergence between SETs is considered, then each re-converging path is investigated
separately. This means that the complexity of the analysis is directly related to the number
of re-converging paths. However, when SET re-convergence is modeled, then the complexity
of the analysis depends on the number of re-converging paths and their delays, SET widths,
and SET arrival times as characterized in Section 6.2.3. However, as shown in Table 6.2, even
with this assumption, SERA [41] requires 593 minutes to analyze a 32-bit multiplier, while
SSER [51] requires 498 minutes to analyze a 24-bit multiplier. The proposed methodology is
able to analyze a 128-bit multiplier in around 70 minutes, as shown in Table 6.2.
2) it highly affects the estimated SER. This is mainly because the number of re-converging
paths in multipliers is huge. Moreover, re-converging paths can be short and the difference
between their delays is very small due to the structure of the multiplier (such as the structure
of array multipliers). Based on the extracted timing details from the layout it was observed
that the difference between the delays of many re-converging paths was less than 200 ps.
Moreover, based on the circuit level analysis performed in [102] injecting 15 MeV-cm2/mg ion
strike on FreePDK45 cells can lead to SET with widths range from 464 to 639 ps. Therefore,
it is clear that SETs propagating in multipliers can have high chances to re-converge. In order
to investigate the inaccuracy introduced by this assumption, the SER of the multipliers were
computed with and without modeling SETs re-convergence. In the last column of Table 6.2,
the percentage variation in the SERs (|SERrec − SERno_rec|/SERrec) is reported. Results
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demonstrate that the errors in the SERs introduced by the lack of re-convergence modeling
increases as the size of the multiplier increases. For example, the error in the SERs can be
as high as 924% for the 128-bit multiplier.
Table 6.2 Comparison of SER Analysis Times for Different Multipliers with State-of-the-art
Methods.
SSER SERA MC* Our
[51] [41] [5] Methodology
Size # of CPU CPU CPU CPU M SER
(bit) gates (Sec) (Sec) (Sec) (Sec) %
4 124 34.85 6 27 1 4.24
8 568 271.03 78 TO 11.4 21.67
16 2.4K 5010.40 2472 TO 50.1 53.79
24 5.5k 29930.01 - TO 381.12 90.17
32 10K TO 35580 TO 690.249 131.84
64 44k TO TO TO 1947.81 334.28
128 163K TO TO TO 4170 924.08
* MC : Model Checking, 16-bit multiplier is the C6288 ISCAS85 benchmark
TO : Time Out.
6.4 Conclusion
This paper presents a comprehensive methodology to analyze and measure the vulnerability
of combinational circuits to soft-errors due to SETs. A new model of SET propagation, that
includes the impacts of all masking effects, the width variation (broadening and attenuation),
and re-converging paths, is proposed. Moreover, a new formalism of SETs propagation mo-
dels them as a Satisfiability problem by utilizing Satifiability modulo theories is proposed.
An SMT-based exhaustive analysis of SET propagation is proposed. In the proposed metho-
dology, gate level analysis is instantiated with the pre-characterized TPTs of the technology
node and the exact gates timing extracted from the layout. The implementation of the pro-
posed methodology on different combinational designs shows its accuracy, applicability, and
scalability. For instance, it can analyze complex arithmetic circuits such as a 128-bit multi-
plier in about 70 minutes, while existing techniques fail to handle multipliers larger than 32
bits. Ongoing work promises to extend the proposed methodology to handle sequential logic
in addition to combinational logic.
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CHAPTER 7 ARTICLE 4 : TOWARDS FORMAL ABSTRACTION,
MODELING, AND ANALYSIS OF SINGLE EVENT TRANSIENTS AT RTL
Summary of the Chapter
In this chapter, we introduce the proposed Register Transfer Level (RTL) abs-
traction and modeling approaches of the underlying behavior of SET propagation
observed by gate level analysis (reported in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) using Mul-
tiway Decision Graphs (MDGs). The proposed MDG-based modeling and verifica-
tion (based on invariant checking) was introduced (and subsequently published) in
a paper in the IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS)
on 2016. This published paper is reproduced in this chapter.
Title : Towards Formal Abstraction, Modeling, and Analysis of Single Event
Transients at RTL
Authors—Ghaith Bany Hamad, Otmane Ait Mohamed, and Yvon Savaria
Abstract—Soft errors due to Single Event Transients (SETs) have become one of the most
challenging issues that impact the reliability of modern microelectronic systems at terrestrial
altitudes. This is mainly due to the progressive shrinking of device sizes. Traditionally, the
analysis of SETs has been carried out by simulations and experimental analysis. However,
these techniques are resource hungry and require full details of the design structure and
SET characteristics. This paper develops a hierarchical framework for formal analysis of SET
propagation by (1) introducing Register Transfer Level (RTL) abstraction and modeling
approaches of the underlying behavior of SET propagation using Multiway Decision Graphs
(MDGs) ; and (2) investigating SET propagation conditions at RTL using a formal model
checker. In order to illustrate the practical utilization of our work, we have analyzed different
RTL combinational designs. Experimental results demonstrate the proposed framework is
orders of magnitude faster than other comparable contemporary techniques. Moreover, for
the first time, a decision graph based technique is developed to analyze multiplier designs.
Index Terms—Soft Errors, SET, MDG, multiway decision graphs, logical masking, CIC,
invariant checking, model checking, multipliers, counterexamples.
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7.1 Introduction
Single Event Transients (SETs) are becoming a major source of soft errors in digital designs
[11]. SETs propagate more easily as the technology scales down. Moreover, the growing speed
and complexity in new generation circuits increased the probability that SETs lead to soft
errors [11]. Therefore, there is a growing need to analyze and estimate the impact of SETs
on today’s complex digital designs. Over the past two decades, several techniques have been
proposed to analyze SET propagation at different abstraction levels. At gate level, researchers
proposed different techniques such as fault injection [44] and formal verification methods [5].
However, these techniques are time consuming, resource hungry, and require full details (gate
level net-list) of design structure. Thus, they are not applicable at early design stages.
Several methodologies have been proposed to perform the analysis at Register Transfer Level
(RTL) such as ; fault simulation [74] and analytical techniques [75]. Other researchers have
addressed this issue using formal verification methods such as Boolean Satisfiability solvers
[6] and Probabilistic Model Checking (PMC) [56], [76, 4]. All these techniques suffer from
the following shortcomings :
1. Contemporary formal verification based techniques are resource hungry and limited
due to the state explosion problem. This is mainly due to intrinsic characteristics of
their modeling technique. Indeed, in these techniques, SET propagation is modeled
using concrete Boolean diagrams e.g., Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs). With such
techniques, a model checker rapidly runs out of memory, even when modeling moderate
size designs e.g., 14-bit adder [56] or 15-bit multiplier [77].
2. Simulation based techniques (such as [74], [75]) have serious shortcomings as they are
very time consuming for large designs with many primary inputs. Furthermore, these
techniques have their drawbacks in terms of accuracy. This is mainly because their
accuracy is determined by the ratio of the simulated sample size over the total vector
space size.
3. At RTL, many of the details about design structure and SET characteristics are not
available. Therefore, contemporary techniques make assumptions about SET propa-
gation behavior. For instance, in [75, 56] and [76], SETs are modeled as bit flips. Such
assumptions reduce the accuracy of the estimated Soft Error Rate (SER).
In this paper, a hierarchical framework is proposed to analyze SET propagation at RTL. This
work is distinct from previous works in the following ways :
1. Abstraction is one of the most relevant techniques for addressing the state explosion
problem [62]. Our proposed framework introduces a new abstraction approach. An
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Figure 7.1 Steps of the Proposed Framework for the Investigation of SET Propagation at
Gate and RTL Levels.
RTL component can have three modes of operation ; Injection, Propagation, or Error-
Free. For each injection scenario, SET propagation at RTL is modeled based on the
sub-components mode of operation and their gate level characterization libraries deve-
loped beforehand. Moreover, the proposed framework utilizes the Multiway Decision
Graphs (MDGs) [57]. This decision graph provides different modeling options, rather
than being limited to the boolean representation (such as [76]).
2. A new formal method to analyze SET propagation at RTL is proposed. The invariant
checking tool from the MDG formal verification tool set [57] is adapted to perform this
analysis. The results, which are SET propagation conditions for all injection scenarios,
are reported as RTL characterization libraries.
Our results demonstrate that the CPU time and the memory required to analyze SET propa-
gation are significantly reduced. Therefore, for the first time, a decision graph based technique
is able to analyze fault propagation through complex arithmetic circuits such as large (16 by
16) multipliers.
7.2 Proposed Framework
The goal of this work is to develop new mechanisms to bridge the gap between design abstrac-
tion levels (gate and RTL). The verification process starts at gate level. Gate level libraries
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which characterize SET propagation are developed to be utilized at RTL, as depicted in Fig.
8.1.
7.2.1 Gate Level SET Analysis and Characterization
At gate level, SET propagation is modeled by utilizing transistor level characterization li-
braries generated based on transistor level analyses such as [96]. The set of vulnerable nodes
in a design is identified and an SET is injected at one of these nodes. Next, SET propa-
gation is analyzed from this vulnerable node to each primary output. The results of this
analysis are characterized. For each SET injection scenario, fault configurations that allow
SET propagation to the output are reported. Different formal techniques can be adapted to
perform this analysis such as [5], [71]. However, in this paper, the technique proposed in [5]
is adopted, because it is the only technique that provides an exhaustive analysis and the
generated results can be used to build the desired gate level libraries. As an example, SET
propagation through the full adder shown in Fig. 8.12 is analyzed. Propagation conditions for
each injection scenario are shown in Table 7.1. Generating such table for basic components
is a one-time effort that can be done oﬄine. Table 7.2 shows some of the basic combinational
designs that have been characterized.
Table 7.1 Results of our Gate Level Analysis of a Full Adder
Vuln. Node Output Node Propagation Conditions
a=SET S (b = 0/1) ∧ (c = 0/1) ∧ (S = SET )Cout (c = 1) ∧ (b = 0) ∧ (Cout = SET )
b=SET S (a = 0/1) ∧ (c = 0/1) ∧ (S = SET )Cout (a = 1) ∧ (c = 0) ∧ (Cout = SET )
c=SET S (a = 0/1) ∧ (b = 0/1) ∧ (S = SET )Cout (a = 0) ∧ (b = 1) ∧ (Cout = SET )
OG1=SET S (c = 0/1) ∧ (S = SET )Cout (c = 1) ∧ (b = 0) ∧ (Cout = SET )
OG2=SET S NPCout (a = 0) ∧ (Cout = SET )
OG3=SET S NPCout (c = 0) ∧ (Cout = SET )
OG4=SET S APCout NP
OG5=SET S NPCout AP
NP : No Propagation, AP : Always propagates
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Figure 7.2 Gate Level Model of a Full Adder
Table 7.2 Benchmark Circuits Characterized at Gate Level
Circuit Circuit Total Input Output
Name Function Gates Lines Lines
FA Full adder 5 3 2
4-bit RCA Adder 20 9 5
8-bit RCA Adder 40 17 9
74182 CLA 19 9 4
74283 Fast Adder 36 9 5
C432 Priority Decoder 160 (18 EXOR) 36 7
7.2.2 Abstraction of SET Propagation at RTL
Contemporary techniques such as [103] proposed different abstraction approaches to improve
the scalability of their analysis. However, these techniques are limited to certain design struc-
tures and tools. They eliminate details about the design structure which can be related to
SET propagation. Thus, the accuracy of the analysis results can be affected.
Our framework abstracts irrelevant design details. In other words, we are only interested in
modeling the design details that affect SET propagation and not the design’s functionality.
These details are defined based on three factors ; design structure, where the SET is injected,
and the characterized gate level results. We abstract the RTL component behavior by its
mode of operation : Injection, Propagation, or Error-Free. A component is in the Injection
mode if a SET is injected inside this component. In this mode, the vulnerable nodes are the
set of internal nodes. To abstract the behavior of this component, the Cone Of Influence
(COI) for each output is identified as depicted in Fig. 8.3. The propagation conditions for
each output is determined by disjuncting the gate level propagation conditions of all internal
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nodes in its COI. A component is in the Propagation mode if it is in the propagation path
of the injected SET (i.e., an SET propagates through its primary inputs). In this mode, the
vulnerable nodes are the primary inputs of the component. A component is in the Error-Free
mode if it is not in the propagation path of the injected SET. As depicted in Fig. 8.3, there
are two types of Error-Free components :
1. Components which are outside the propagation zone of the injected SET (i.e., outside
the COI of Outi in Fig. 8.3). These components are eliminated to reduce the size of
the design i.e., improving scalability while preserving accuracy.
2. Components which are in the COI of the injected SET. We preserve these components
because their behavior affects SET propagation. However, if the component has dif-
ferent outputs then we eliminate all outputs which are not related to the propagation
zone.
Error-Free 
mode - 
outside COI
Error-Free 
mode - 
inside COI
Injection 
mode
SET
Propagation 
Mode
COI of Outi
In1
o1
om
Inn
COI of O1
Out1
Outm
Outi
Figure 7.3 Decomposing an RTL Design and Deciding the Mode of Operation of its Sub-
components Based on the Injection Scenario.
7.2.3 Formal RTL Modeling and Analysis
The inputs to the proposed analysis are the RTL structure description expressed in Verilog
and the pre-characterized gate level results of basic digital components, as shown in Fig.
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8.1. First, the RTL design is decomposed into a set of logic sub-functions, each of which is
represented as sub-components.
For each injection scenario, the mode of operation for each sub-component is decided, where
one component can be in Injection mode and all other components are either in Propagation
or Error-Free mode, as depicted in Fig. 8.3. Next, each component is annotated with its
pre-characterized gate level library. In the sequel, the corresponding RTL model of each
component is built as a multiway decision graph (MDG). The formal logic underlying MDGs
is a many-sorted first-order logic accommodating concrete and abstract sorts. Concrete sorts
have enumerations of individual constants. Signals in components which operate in injection
and Propagation mode are modeled as a Concrete sort that has values taken from the set
{0, 1, SET}. The value SET is used when the signal is infected with a SET. Signals in
components which operate in Error-Free mode are modeled as Booleans (0, 1). The proposed
modeling allows the analysis of SET propagation in one version of the design without the
need for two versions of the design (faulty and fault free) as required in BDD based techniques
[76].
Next, we utilize the MDG verification tool set to analyze SET propagation at the RTL as it
supports a mixture of structural and behavioral descriptions. SET propagation to a primary
output (e.g., po) is evaluated by verifying the following properties over the MDG model of
the design :
RTL_PC? [ F (po = SET) ] (7.1)
Which means : “what are the fault configurations at the RTL (which we call RTL propagation
conditions i.e., RTL_PC) that allow the injected SET to eventually reach a po". Our analysis
demonstrates that if a SET has to propagate through n components to reach an output, then
its RTL_PC is the combination of the gate level propagation conditions of all the components
in the propagation path :
RTL_PC = PCm1 ∧ PCm2 . . . ∧ PCmn (7.2)
7.3 Experiments
In this section, we demonstrate how effectively SET propagation conditions can be evaluated
directly at RTL using our framework. Our experiments are performed on a workstation with
an Intel Core i7 running at 3 GHz and 24 GB RAM. To the best of the authors knowledge,
this is the first time such abstraction and analysis of SET propagation at RTL is proposed.
Therefore, for comparison purposes, we have implemented what we call the Boolean method.
In this method, an RTL design is decomposed into sub components. Thereafter, propagation
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of SETs through each component is modeled without any abstraction. The results of our
proposed framework and the Boolean method for different ISCAS 85 benchmark designs
are depicted in Fig. 7.4. The reported processing time and memory are the average CPU
time and memory required to construct the decision graph and analyze SET propagation
for one injection scenario. Results in Fig. 7.4 demonstrate that our framework significantly
reduces the resources required to verify SET propagation by around 60%. Moreover, it can
be observed that the CPU time and Memory are mainly consumed when constructing the
MDG graph (around 9 times larger than verification time and around 4 times more than the
memory consumed on verification). The proposed framework significantly reduces the size of
MDG graphs. Hence, it reduces the CPU time and the memory required to construct MDG
graphs by around 70% and 45%, respectively.
Decision graph based techniques (such as [56, 76, 4, 77, 104]) cannot handle some classes of
circuits such as multipliers. This is mainly due to the combinatorial explosion in the number
of nodes. For example, building a decision graph for a 15-bit multiplier requires over 12
million nodes (around 260 MB) [77, 104]. The number of nodes increases exponentially with
the word size, and hence even much more powerful computers will have difficulty getting
much beyond this point. As shown in Table 7.3, with the state-of-the-art techniques, model
checkers run out of memory while constructing the graph for moderate size multipliers (≥ 8-
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M2 is the Boolean Method. (a) Comparison Between M1 and M2 for the Processing Time.
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Table 7.3 The Verification of SET Pulse Propagation for Multipliers
RTL
PI PO
RTL Contemporary OurMultiplier Cells Techniques
Design Count [56]– [4, 104] Framework
4-bit 8 8 12
√ √
6-bit 12 12 42
√ √
8-bit 16 16 56 × √
10-bit 20 20 90 × √
14-bit 28 28 182 × √
16-bit 32 32 240 × √
× : with this technique, the model checker runs out of memory while building the decision graph
of this design.√ : with this technique, it is possible to construct the decision graph and SET pulse propagation
is verified.
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Figure 7.5 The Variation in the Average Processing Time, Memory, and Number of Decision
Graph Nodes Required to Construct the MDG Graph and Analyze SET Propagation for one
Injection Scenario.
bit). Our framework efficiently constructs the decision graph and analyzes SET propagation
as shown in Table 7.3. Furthermore, the results in Fig. 7.5 demonstrate that with the proposed
technique, the processing time, the memory, and the number decision graph nodes scale well
with the size of the multiplier design. Therefore, the proposed methodology can replace some
time consuming simulations to analyze larger designs at RTL. Moreover, we believe that
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our formal framework can assist in building accurate system models by developing RTL
characterization libraries. These libraries help circuit designers to evaluate the contribution
of each vulnerable node on possible system failures. This allows identifying the nodes which
need more protection if they are exposed to radiation-harsh environments or other related
environments, such as those subject to crosstalk.
7.4 Conclusion
The Analysis of SET propagation at higher levels of abstraction is key to managing the
complexity of today’s VLSI chips. In this paper, we proposed a novel hierarchical framework
to abstract, model, and investigate SET propagation. Gate level characterization libraries
are utilized to model SET propagation at RTL. The proposed modeling and abstraction
approaches significantly reduce the time and memory requirements required to model and
analyze SET propagation at RTL. For instance, the CPU time and the memory required
are reduced by more than 60%. For the first time, analysis of SET propagation through
complex designs is possible e.g., 16-bit multiplier with less than 2 MB. The probabilities of
SET propagation can be computed and an accurate estimation of soft error rates can be
developed based the results of the proposed RTL analysis.
87
CHAPTER 8 ARTICLE 5 : COMPREHENSIVE MULTILEVEL
PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS OF SINGLE EVENT TRANSIENTS
PROPAGATION INDUCED SOFT ERRORS
Summary of the Chapter
In this chapter, we introduce a hierarchical multi-level probabilistic framework to
model, analyze, and estimate SETs propagation in combinational designs expres-
sed at different abstraction levels. Underlying probabilistic behavior of SET pro-
pagation is utilized to model this problem as a Markov Decision Process (MDP).
PRISM model checker is adapted to analyze the probability of SET propagation for
all vulnerable nodes. Furthermore, a new method to estimate the Soft Error Rate
(SER) is proposed. The main idea behind this methodology was first introduced at
RTL (and subsequently published) in a paper entitled “Efficient Multilevel Formal
Modeling, Analysis, and Estimation of Design Vulnerability to Soft Error" which
was published in the IEEE International On-Line Testing Symposium (IOLTS) on
2015. Thereafter, this methodology was extended to other abstraction levels and
more accurate modeling is introduced based on the concept of fault space map-
ping. The general methodology was reported and submitted for publication. This
submitted paper is reproduced in this chapter.
Title : Comprehensive Multilevel Probabilistic Analysis of Single Event Tran-
sients Propagation Induced Soft Errors
Authors—Ghaith Bany Hamad, Otmane Ait Mohamed, and Yvon Savaria.
Abstract—Soft errors, induced by radiation, have a growing impact on the reliability of
CMOS integrated circuits. The progressive shrinking of device sizes in advanced technologies
leads to miniaturization and performance improvements. However, ultra-deep sub-micron
technologies are more vulnerable to soft errors. In this paper, we propose a hierarchical
multi-level methodology to model, analyze, and estimate Single Event Transients (SETs)
propagation in combinational designs expressed at different abstraction levels (transistor to
Register Transfer (RT) levels). Basic components are modeled and analyzed at low level and
the results of this analysis are condensed into SET propagation tables. At high level, these
tables are utilized to model the underlying probabilistic behavior of SET propagation as
Probabilistic Automatas (PAs). Thereafter, the PAs of the different design components are
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used to construct a Markov Decision Process (MDP) model for SET propagation through the
complete design. A probabilistic model checker is adapted to analyze the probability of SET
propagation for all vulnerable nodes. Furthermore, a new method to estimate the Soft Error
Rate (SER) is proposed. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed framework is
orders of magnitude faster than contemporary techniques, while ensuring better accuracy.
Moreover, it can handle designs as large as 256-bit adders.
8.1 Introduction
Despite considerable progress towards developing efficient methodologies for the functional
verification of digital designs, advances in non-functional verification have been lagging. Non-
functional verification is the type of verification that investigates the behavior of a Design
Under Verification (DUV) in the presence of different uncertainties. The modeling and analy-
sis of non-functional properties are more challenging than those of corresponding functional
properties. This can be contributed to the difficulty encountered while characterizing and mo-
deling the variation of the characteristics observed while transients due to single event effects
[11, 66] propagate. Moreover, many details about the design structure and the uncertain-
ty’s characteristics may not be available at high abstraction levels. Thus, many assumptions
about the uncertainty behavior are usually made, which impacts the accuracy of the genera-
ted results.
Soft errors, which started as a rather exotic failure mechanism causing anomalies in satellites,
have become one of the most challenging types of uncertainties that impact the reliability of
modern electronic systems. In the medical industry, for example, soft errors have been found
responsible for the failure and the recall of many implantable cardiac pacemakers [7].
The exponential growth in the number of transistors per chip has brought tremendous pro-
gress in the performance of semiconductor devices ; however it increased the vulnerability
of integrated electronics to soft errors. The expected Soft Error Rate (SER) per chip has
been reported to increase 100-fold, from the 180nm to the 16nm CMOS technology nodes
[105]. Therefore, there is a growing need to analyze and estimate the impact of soft errors on
today’s complex digital designs.
In general, single event effects (SEE) induced by radiation can have different effect such as
Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and Single Event Transients (SETs) [11, 66]. This paper focuses
on SETs. Several methodologies have been proposed to model the impact of SETs at different
stages in the design cycle.
At transistor level, circuit simulation and experimental analysis have been performed [96, 3,
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12, 20]. For instance, SET width broadening and attenuation while propagating have been
investigated [96, 3, 12]. Some other studies investigated the effects of fan-out [20] and the
impacts of input pattern and logic structure [96] on SET width. The analysis of SET pro-
pagation at transistor level can provide a certain level of accuracy for phenomena such as
electrical masking and SET width variation. However, such analyses consume large amount
of time and requires full details of the design structure and of SET characteristics. In other
words, this type of analysis would be intractable at the chip level and is only tractable at
the cell level (for hundreds of transistors at most) to get a certain level of accuracy. Hence,
in order to investigate SET propagation in large scale designs, researchers proposed different
methodologies to perform this analysis at higher abstraction levels. At gate level, researchers
proposed different techniques such as fault injection [44] and formal verification methods
[106]. At Register Transfer Level (RTL), SET propagation is analyzed using different tech-
niques such as fault simulation [74], analytical techniques [75], and formal verification me-
thods [56, 76, 6]. Contemporary formal based techniques model SET propagation as Discrete
Time Markov Chains (DTMCs) [56, 76] or as Boolean Satisfiability problems [6]. Thereafter,
a formal verification tool is adapted (such as SAT solvers [6] and Probabilistic Model Che-
ckers (PMCs) [56, 76]) to investigate SET propagation. All aforementioned contemporary
techniques operating at high abstraction levels suffer from the following shortcomings :
1. Techniques based on contemporary formal verification are resource hungry and suffer
from a state explosion problem. This is mainly due to the intrinsic characteristics
of their SET modeling technique. Indeed, in these techniques, each input vector is
mapped to a unique state. Therefore, the corresponding Markov model has 2M states
(M primary inputs). Additionally, with these techniques, the formal model of the
design size is doubled due to the requirement of two design versions, mainly a golden
and a faulty version. For each injection scenario, in order to determine if a SET is
propagating, the outputs of both the golden and the faulty versions are compared.
With such modeling technique, any formal tool rapidly runs out of memory, even
when trying to analyze moderate size designs e.g., a 14-bit adder [56].
2. Contemporary simulation and formal techniques have their drawbacks in terms of
accuracy. This is mainly because these techniques explore a limited number of input
vectors (random input assumption) to evaluate SET propagation probabilities, thus
providing an incomplete analysis. Furthermore, at RTL and higher abstraction levels,
many details about the design structure and SET characteristics are not available.
Hence, assumptions are made about the SET propagation behavior. For instance, in
[6, 56] SETs are modeled at RTL as bit flips. Such assumptions reduce the accuracy
of the estimated SER. Our results demonstrate that the existing techniques, which
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operate at gate and higher levels such as [6, 5, 4] generally provide an underestimated
propagation probabilities.
In summary, the following important questions are not appropriately addressed in the litera-
ture so far :
1. How to improve the usability of results of the transistor level analysis ?
2. How to measure the vulnerability of complex designs at high abstraction levels without
losing the accuracy provided from low level analysis ?
3. Is it possible to improve scalability while preserving accuracy ?
To answer these questions, we introduce a novel methodology to estimate the vulnerability
of combinational designs to soft errors ; this work is distinct in the following ways :
1. For the first time, a multi-level formal verification framework is proposed to analyze
SET propagation at gate and Register Transfer (RT) levels. SET propagation tables,
which report the SET propagation behavior at lower abstraction levels are developed.
These tables are utilized at higher abstraction levels to introduce awareness about the
underlying probabilistic behavior of SET propagation.
2. Efficient probabilistic abstraction and modeling techniques of SET propagation are
proposed. At high abstraction levels, we describe two efficient reduction methods,
namely the Cone Of Influence (COI) and the component mode of operation methods.
At any abstraction level, SET propagation is modeled based on the proposed fault
space mapping technique. The propagation of high level faults for each sub-component
is modeled as Probabilistic Automatas (PAs) based on the propagation probabilities
of low level faults reported in the pre-characterized sub-component propagation table.
The PAs of all sub-components are modeled as Markov Decision Processes (MDPs).
Thereafter, SET propagation is quantitatively analyzed using the proposed formal
probabilistic verification technique that utilize the power of PMC. The results of this
analysis are the SET propagation probabilities for all vulnerable nodes. Finally, theses
probabilities are utilized to estimate SERs.
In this work, we implemented the proposed framework and applied it to different combinatio-
nal designs modeled at gate and RT levels. Compared with existing techniques [6, 5, 4], our
results demonstrate that the proposed framework significantly reduces the number of states
(i.e., memory) and the CPU time required to analyze SET propagation. Furthermore, the
proposed framework improves the accuracy of the measured design vulnerability (i.e., estima-
ted SER). The results of the proposed analysis can be used to further improve the efficiency
of the analysis of soft error mitigation techniques such as Triple Module Redundancy (TMR)
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and retiming. Furthermore, it can improve the efficiency of the verification methodology by
reducing verification time, thus enabling improved time-to-market.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 8.2, provides evidence of the problems we
are addressing and gives an overview of probabilistic model checkers. Section 8.3 explains the
main steps of the proposed framework. The proposed design reduction is explained in Section
8.4. In Section 8.5, the proposed SET propagation modeling and analysis are explained. In
Section 8.6, we explain the implementation of the proposed framework for both gate and
RT levels. In Section 8.7, our results are reported, discussed, and compared with the results
produced by contemporary techniques. Section 8.8 concludes this work.
8.2 Background and Problem Formulation
8.2.1 Functional vs Non-Functional Verification
Designers and researchers found that the best way to build complex hardware designs is
to start from high level descriptions and synthesize them all the way down to layout. This
methodology is only applicable to synthesizable designs. With synthesis the code representing
the design at one abstraction level can be translated into lower level implementations using
pre-characterized rules and libraries. In other words, a design is synthesizable if the synthesis
tool has the synthesis library (i.e., from which the low level implementation can be generated)
for each part of the design. Therefore, the main concept in the design methodology is to utilize
the lower level details from pre-characterized data to build large designs. In each synthesis
phase between two abstraction levels more details about the design structure are added.
Unfortunately, when it comes to non-functional design verification, there is a different culture,
and there is no unified approach. Design verification at one abstraction level relies on the
information provided at this level. As shown in Table 8.1, low level analysis is very detailed,
however, it is resource consuming and typically not applicable for large designs. On the other
hand, higher level analyses are more time and resource efficient. However, their results have
limited accuracy and may not provide much useful information to the designers about the
design behavior in presence of different kinds of uncertainties. Therefore, there is a growing
need to reduce the gap between the fault analyses at different abstraction levels. To achieve
this goal, the usability of the results of the fault analysis at each abstraction level has to be
improved. New methods to abstract the design details that directly affect fault propagation
are required. However, we have to make sure that the additional overheads in terms of learning
and verification are reasonable.
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Table 8.1 Comparison Between High Level and Low Level Analysis
Analysis at Gate Analysis at Transistor
and Higher Level and lower Level
Fault Modeling Very abstract, Very detailed,
Accuracy does not reflect reflects actual
actual fault behavior behavior
Complexity Less complex Very complex
Results Under/over More
Accuracy estimation accurate
Memory Less More
CPU Verification Less Much
Time more
8.2.2 Probabilistic Model Checking & PRISM
Probabilistic Model Checking (PMC) is a formal verification technique that can be applied to
systems with stochastic behavior [107]. It does not only provide a Yes/No answer on whether
a property holds. PMC can also quantify the probability (min/max) that the verified property
is satisfied. Moreover, it has a wide range of applications in fields such as communication
protocols and reliability analysis.
In this work, we use PRISM [82], which is an efficient probabilistic symbolic model che-
cker. It employs efficient algorithms and data structures such as Binary Decision Diagrams
(BDDs). In addition, PRISM supports different implementations of Markov chains, namely
discrete-time and continuous-time Markov chains and MDP. It also supports a wide range of
probabilistic temporal logic to specify the properties to be verified such as PCTL, PCTL*,
and CSL.
8.3 Proposed Framework
This paper addresses the verification problem using a unified approach, which utilizes new
mechanisms to bridge the gap between design abstraction levels. In the proposed framework,
the verification process starts as early as possible, while providing the flexibility to move
across different abstraction levels.
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Figure 8.1 The Proposed Multi-Level Framework for Modeling and Investigating Fault Pro-
pagation.
8.3.1 Proposed Framework Steps
The proposed methodology is divided into two parts based on the abstraction level where it
operates. At low level, it performs a transistor level analysis, but at high level it works with
gate and higher level abstractions. As depicted in Fig. 8.1, the proposed multilevel analysis
comprises the following main steps :
Step 1 : Performing detailed transistor level analysis of the fault propagation through
standard logic CMOS gates such as AND and NAND using HSPICE for a certain technology
node. Then, we characterize the results as transistor-level propagation tables.
Step 2 : Performing design structure reduction at high level for each primary output
and fault injection scenario. In Section 8.4, both the cone of influence reduction and the
component based reductions are explained in details.
Step 3 : Performing high level formal modeling and analysis of the probabilistic be-
havior of fault propagation at gate and higher abstraction level. This step is performed for
standard digital designs. Then, we characterize the results as propagation tables which can
be used at higher abstraction levels. in other words, the propagation table of one circuit at
one abstraction level (e.g., gate-level) is utilized to model the fault propagation of this circuit
(when it is part of a larger design) at higher levels (e.g., RTL). As an example, Fig. 8.2 depicts
a chain of components which can be gates, RTL components, systems level components. A
SET is injected at the input of component 1. The probability for this fault to propagate to
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the output j is
P (j = F ) =
3∏
i=1
P (Ci = F |Ci−1 = F )
SET
a
d g i
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c1 c2 c3
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Figure 8.2 The Concept of Modeling SET Propagation at High Level Based on Low Level
Propagation Details
Recently, different fault simulation [108] and formal model checking based techniques [5, 4]
were proposed to generate such tables. In these techniques, propagation tables report the set
of input vectors that allow fault propagation (called the Critical Input Combinations (CICs)).
Later in this paper, we will explain in more details how the propagation tables developed
in this paper provide more accurate information about fault propagation than other tables
(developed in [5, 4, 108]).
8.3.2 Transistor-Level Analysis
In this analysis, the impacts of input patterns, fault polarity, and propagation paths on fault
characteristics are investigated. Such analysis can be done by performing the following main
steps :
— Fault propagation paths are divided into four main categories : chain of similar gates,
chain of different gates, convergent paths, and divergent paths. Then, the vulnerable
nodes in each category are identified.
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— Thereafter, parametric analysis is performed to find out the threshold amplitude and
duration for different gate strengths for a certain technology node.
— Next, representative circuits for each of category are analyzed using HSPICE circuit
simulation. The purpose of this analysis is to measure the fault characteristics variation
due to the input pattern and the logic structure. This step is done for all input patterns
and for all vulnerable nodes.
— The last step of the analysis includes the abstraction of Transistor-level Propagation
Tables (TPT) to describe SET propagation behavior at transistor level as depicted
in Fig. 8.1. This detailed analysis is a one-time effort and can be done oﬄine for a
certain technology library.
In this work, we build our formal model at gate and higher abstraction levels using the results
of our analysis of SET propagation at the transistor level as previously reported in [96], [109].
8.4 High Level Design Reduction
Reduction is one of the most relevant techniques for addressing the state explosion problem.
The main purpose of reduction is to eliminate irrelevant details. However, what constitute
relevant details is often left open to interpretation. In this work, the relevant details are
defined as those which directly affect SET propagation. These details are identified based
on three factors ; design structure, injection scenario (i.e., where the SET is injected), and
low level propagation tables. To perform the proposed reduction, a design which is expressed
at any suitable abstraction level is decomposed into main sub-components. Then, the set
of vulnerable nodes are identified, which can be a gate, a wire, or a RTL component. The
first step is to identify the Cone Of Influence (COI) for each output node. To do that, the
framework recently proposed in [99] is adapted to compute all COIs in a single-pass. The
main steps of the COI evaluation are detailed in Algorithm 4. All components in the design
are associated with a visited flag and a bit array encoding, i.e., a bitmap. Each component is
represented with one bit in this bitmap, i.e., the i-th bit in the bitmap correlates to the i-th
component. The bitmap associated with a component ni is denoted BMP (ni). Initially, all
visited flags are set to false, and all components are labeled with a 0 bitmap. All components
are labeled with a one-hot encoding of their variable index, i.e., BMP (ni) = BitHot(i). As
proposed in [99], the COI for each node is extracted using a backward depth-first traversal
from the output, i.e., whenever node nj is reached by node ni, the label of nj is bitwise ORed
with the label of ni (BMP (nj) = BMP (nj)|BMP (ni)). Thus, the set of nodes in the COI
of a node correlates to the 1 bits in its bitmap.
In order to further reduce the size of the design representation, the component based reduction
96
Algorithm 4 Proposed Formal Modeling and Analysis
Inputs : Prop_Tables, Structural description (R)
Outputs : SER, Prop_Tables
1: SET_Model_Analysis{
2: Get Prop_Tables, R ;
3: Sort components topologically ;
4: Annotate each component with its Prop_Tables ;
5: Compute_COI(foreach output) ;
6: foreach output
7: foreach component ci
8: Inject SET ; % Generation mode
9: Extract SET probabilities from Prop_Tables ;
10: Decide Mode_Of_Operation(all components) ;
11: Build PA foreach component ;
12: Build MDP model ;
13: Investigate propagation probabilities ;
14: Store propagation probabilities ;
15: Compute output vulnerability ;
16: Compute SER ;
17: }
18:
19: Mode_Of_Operation{
20: foreach (cj not ci)
21: if (BitMap(ci) ∧BitHot(cj) == BitHot(ci))
22: cj operates in propagation mode ;
23: Extract SET probabilities for PIs from Prop_Tables ;
24: else
25: cj operates in Error-Free mode ;
26: Extract cj Boolean behavior ;
27: Calculate P (0) and P (1) ;
28: }
29:
30: Compute_COI{
31: Clear all visit_flag ;
32: Clear all node bitmaps ;
33: set bitmap foreach node BitMap(i) = BitHot(i) ;
34: foreach ti ∈ T
35: BitMap(ti) =Reach_DF(ti) ;
36: }
37: procedure Reach_DF(n)
38: Set visit_flag of n ;
39: foreach vi in the adjacent list of n
40: if (v is not visited)
41: BitMap(v) = Reach_DF(ti) ;
42: BitMap(n) = BitMap(n)|BitMap(v) ;
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Figure 8.3 COI and Model Based Reduction.
technique at RTL (proposed in [4]) is adapted. After determining the COI of each output, the
fault models for each COI are generated. Each fault model is the result of injecting a SET at
one component in the COI. Each component in a fault model is modeled based on its modes
of operation ; Generation, Propagation, or Error-Free. A component is in the Generation
mode if an SET is injected internally in this component. A component is in the propagation
mode if it is in the propagation path of an injected SET (i.e., the SET propagates through
its primary inputs). A component in a COI is in the Error-Free mode if it is not in the
propagation path of the injected SET. In this work, one component can be in Generation
mode at a time and all other components are either in Propagation or Error-Free mode and
this is decided based on their bitmaps. Let us assume that component cj is in the Generation
mode. If we need to decide the mode of operation of ci, then if the bitwise AND of BMP (ci)
and BMP (cj) is equal to BitHot(cj) then ci is in the propagation path of cj. For example,
consider the circuit illustrated structurally in Fig. 8.3. Assuming that an SET is injected at
m1. A bitwise AND of BMP (m3) and BMP (m1) is equal to BitHot(m1), i.e., m3 is in the
Propagation mode. Similarly, it can be determined that m6 is also in the Propagation mode,
and m4 is in the Error-Free mode. Next, the SET propagation behavior for the components
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in the Generation and the Propagation mode is modeled based on the low level propagation
probabilities. For components which operate in the Error-Free mode, the probabilities of
having 0 or 1 at the output of these components are evaluated using the Exhaustive Boolean
Truth Table or the Signal Probability (SP) technique [110]. These probabilities are used to
compute the probabilities of SET propagation.
8.5 High Level Formal Modeling and Analysis
In this section, we explain in details the proposed modeling and analysis of SET propagation
at high abstraction levels.
8.5.1 Fault Space Mapping
At each abstraction level, some faults can lead to design failure. Verification engineers define
possible fault candidates based on the amount of details available about the design structure
at one abstraction level. The number of faults in the design increases as it is modeled at lower
abstraction levels. However, faults at one abstraction level do not have the same weight, i.e.,
possibility of occurrence. To demonstrate this concept, Fig. 8.4 depicts the Fault Tree (FT)
of the fault space mapping between faults considered at different abstraction levels. In this
FT, each fault at each abstraction level, which is considered as a Top Level Event (TLE),
occurs due to faults at lower abstraction levels (i.e., Low Level Events (LLEs)). This FT can
be characterized into cut-sets such that for each TLE at any abstraction level, there exists
fault configurations down to the transistor level which makes this TLE true. For example, as
RFn
GLF1 GLFj
TLF1 TLFc
RTL
Gate Level
Transistor 
LevelTLF1 TLFh
RF1
GLF1 GLFk
TLF1 TLFmTLF1 TLFi
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One-to-Many
Many-to-one
Figure 8.4 Fault Tree of our Proposed Fault Space Mapping.
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shown in Fig. 8.4, RTL Faults (RFs) are the TLEs of the Gate Level Faults (GLFs) which
are in turn the TLEs to the Transistor Level Faults (TLFs). Each High Level Fault (HLF)
can be mapped through a one-to-many mapping to its corresponding set of Low Level Faults
(LLFs) realization, which is defined as a correlation group. Therefore, the probability of an
HLF is defined as follows :
P(HLF ) =
N⋃
i=1
P(LLFi)
8.5.2 Proposed Formal Model Construction
It is evident that contemporary techniques do not fully utilize the power of formal verification
methods. This is mainly because in spite of using the formal verification methods, the design
is modeled similar to the fault simulation based method. For instance, these techniques test
the response of both a faulty and a golden (i.e., Error-Free) version of the design for each test
vector (input combination) as shown in Fig. 8.5(a). The proposed modeling is also limited
to Boolean representation. Thus, in order to determine whether a fault is propagating to
the design output (i.e., is this a faulty 0 or a faulty 1 ?) this output is compared with the
Error-Free output. With such modeling scheme, the formal model size is doubled. Therefore,
these technique are limited even when scalability improvement techniques are adapted as
demonstrated in [56, 76].
In this work, the proposed modeling takes as input the design which is reduced using both the
COI reduction and the model based reduction. All the details related to SET propagation are
modeled in only one version of the design. This can be achieved thanks to the expressiveness
Faulty 
Model
PIs
POs PIs POs
(a) (b)
Fault
Fault
Error Free Model 
(Golden Model)
Faulty Model
Figure 8.5 Comparison Between the Proposed Framework and the Contemporary Techniques.
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power of formal methods. It is also of interest that our model is not limited to Boolean
representation. In our model, signals which are in the propagation path of each injected fault
take the values {T, X_F} instead of {0, 1}. A signal takes the value X_F if it is faulty i.e.,
(1 → 0) or (0 → 1). The Error-Free signal carries the value T. Components which operate
in the Error-Free mode are modeled based on the probability of their output to be logic ‘1’
or ‘0’. Signals in such component are modeled in Boolean. With such modeling, it is possible
to determine “the possibility for the output to eventually (at one state of the design) become
faulty", which can be expressed as follows with a formal property : F ((Out = X_F )).
This is equivalent to AG((Out = T )) which means “for all possible paths and all possible
states, the output (out) is equal to T". Furthermore, with the proposed model, it is not
required to model the design behavior over all input combinations, because propagation
tables abstracting low levels analysis are utilized as shown 8.5. Thus, the probability under
which a signal at higher level will have the value T or X_F is pre-characterized. Table
8.2 provide a detailed comparison between our modeling approach and the contemporary
methods which are adopted by most state-of-the art techniques.
The next step in the proposed framework is to build a probabilistic model for the fault pro-
pagation. In this process, the function PA_gen (line 16 in Algorithm 4) models the behavior
of each component as a PA which is formally described as :
— S, a finite set of states,
— δ ⊆ (S × S), a set of transitions between the states,
— PPr, a set of propagation probabilities,
Table 8.2 Comparison Between the Proposed Framework and the Contemporary Techniques
(a) Contemporary (b) Our
Methods Framework
Model Size Double the size Original size
Modeling Modeling based on Model based on
Technique all input combination fault propagation
Abstraction RTL and higher Gate and
level levels higher
Reduction PIs based partitioning POs based partitioning
Abstraction Eliminate design details Model based abstraction
which might be related by utilizing details from
to fault propagation, low level propagation
e.g., DTR abstraction tables
Preserve Loss accuracy to PreservedAccuracy improve scalability
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Figure 8.6 General Probabilistic Automata for any Component.
— pi : δ(S × S) → (P, 1 − P ), a transition function assigning probability P ∈ PPr for
each transition.
The general probabilistic automata for fault propagation behavior is depicted in Fig. 8.6.
Basically, a fault propagates from a node zi to an output node vj with probability P(zi,vj)
and it will be masked with probability 1− P(zi,vj). Next, these PAs are modeled as separate
PRISM modules using the PA_model function, as shown in Algorithm 4. It is important
to mention that the PA of each component is built based on its mode of operation for each
injection scenario.
8.5.3 Proposed Markov Modeling of SET Propagation
In this paper, SET propagation is modeled as a Markov chain which is composed of the PAs
of all the sub-components. With Markov chains, the set of probabilistic paths from the initial
state and the desired state are identified. In these paths, the probability between any pair of
states is identified such that the probability of a path ω is P (ω) = P (s, s1)∗ . . .∗P (sn−1, sn).
However, there are different implementations of Markov chains such as DTMC and MDP
which can be implemented to model and analyze SET propagation. The type of Markov
chain that should be used is decided based on the problem the verification engineer is trying
to solve. Contemporary techniques (such as [76, 56]) model SET propagation through digital
designs as DTMCs. However, in this work, the SET propagation is modeled as MDP due to
the following reasons :
1) MDPs accurately models SET propagation through digital designs : MDPs allow nondeter-
ministic choices while with DTMCs everything is probabilistic. This difference can be clearly
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Figure 8.7 Illustrative Example for the Difference Between Modeling SET Propagation as
MDP and DTMC.
seen when different probability distributions over a successor state exist. An example on this
case of SET propagation in digital design is depicted in Fig. 8.7 S2, there are two proba-
bility distributions which depend on two actions C1, C2. This usually occurs at diverging
node where each diverging path represents a probability distribution and all paths have the
same triggering action. Modeling this behavior using DTMC means that we are assigning
equal probability i.e., fault propagation probability through any diverging path is equal to
1
# of divergening path . In other words, fault propagation probability is reduced by this factor at
each diverging node as shown in Table 8.3. However, experimental results at transistor and
lower abstraction levels have proven that diverging paths may not reduce the fault propa-
gation probability. On the contrary, for some design structural conditions, diverging paths
can increase the probability of propagation by broadening the SET width as demonstrated
in [96, 20]. On the other hand, when modeling such behavior with MDP, then the choice of
the path through which the SET will propagate is non-deterministically determined which
reflects more the actual SET propagation behavior.
2) MDPs allow modeling SET propagation through different paths while DTMCs do not : An
injected SET can have different propagation paths to reach one output and cause a failure in
the design operation. As shown in Table 8.3, with MDP, we can evaluate the minimum and
the maximum probabilities to reach the desired state of a design. Since the goal is to analyze
the design tolerance to SETs, then the path with the minimum probability is considered as
the best propagation path. The path with the maximum probability is considered as the worst
propagation path. Therefore, modeling SET propagation as MDP allows the analysis of worst
case scenarios of SET propagation. However, by deploying the DTMC modeling approach,
such quantitative evaluation is not possible. For instance, the probabilities evaluated with
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Table 8.3 Illustrative Example for the Difference Between Modeling SET Propagation as
MDP and DTMC
DTMC MDP
What is the probability of eventually reaching the state S=10 ? ? ?
Conditions C1 & C2 are valid
Path1 ⇒ S=0 → S=1 → Path1 ⇒S=0 → S=1 →
S=2 → S=5 → S=10 S=2 → S=5 → S=10
Path2 ⇒ S=0 → S=1 → S=2 → Path2 ⇒S=0 → S=1 → S=2 →
S=7 →S=8 → S=9 → S=10 S=7 →S=8 → S=9 → S=10
P(Path1)= 0.5 ∗ (1 ∗ 1 ∗ p4 ∗ p5) P(path1)= 1 ∗ 1 ∗ p4 ∗ p5
P(Path2)= 0.5 ∗ (1 ∗ 1 ∗ p2∗ P(Path2)= 1 ∗ 1 ∗ p2∗
p6 ∗ p7 ∗ p8) p6 ∗ p7 ∗ p8
PDTMC?[F(S = 10)] Pmin?[F(S = 10)]Pmax?[F(S = 10)]
PDTMC= 0.5 *P(Path2) + 0.5 *P(Path2) Pmax= P(Path1)
= 0.5 *(P(Path2) + P(Path2)) Pmin=P(Path2)
DTMC provide an under-estimation of SET propagation by averaging all possible propagation
probabilities as shown in Table 8.3.
In this paper, an MDP is constructed by parallel synchronization (‖S) of the PAs of all
components. The global states of the entire MDP are the interleaved states of each sub-
module. At each state, a non-deterministic choice is done from a finite set of transitions as
follows :
MMDP = {PA1 ‖S PA2 ‖S . . . ‖S PAn} (8.1)
8.5.4 Proposed High Level Formal Analysis
The function Analyze in Algorithm 4 (line 24) implements the model checking process in
which the state space of the MDP model of the design is exhaustively checked to verify
the satisfiability of a property p ∈ P , returning a verification result ε ∈ Ψ. This analysis
is performed using the PRISM probabilistic model checker. At any abstraction level, the
maximum and the minimum probability that the injected SET will eventually reach a primary
output (e.g., v) is evaluated by verifying the following properties :
Pmax?[F(IS_fault(v))] Pmin?[F(IS_fault(v))] (8.2)
This analysis is performed for all vulnerable nodes. The output of this analysis is OUT_RTL,
which is the set of all fault propagation probabilities. We assume that there is no correlation
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between the signals in the design. Therefore, if a fault has to propagate through κ components
to reach the output, then its probability to reach the output is calculated as follows :
Pmax,min(z) =
κ∏
i=0
PPri (8.3)
where PPri is the fault propagation probability through each component in the propagation
path of the injected fault. The values of Pmax and Pmin depend on the number of components
in the propagation path and the fault propagation probabilities through each component,
i.e., Pmax and Pmin can be different if there are different propagation paths with different
probabilities. The maximum and the minimum probabilities that SETs will reach a primary
output (e.g., Ov) of the design from all vulnerable nodes (i.e., Z) in its COI is calculated as
follows :
Vulmin(Ov) =
Z∑
z=0
Pez ∗ Pmin(z) (8.4)
Vulmax(Ov) =
Z∑
z=0
Pez ∗ Pmax(z) (8.5)
where Pez is the injection probability at the vulnerable node z. Pmin(z) and Pmax(z) are
evaluated based on Equation 8.3. This approach is accurate when the COIs of all outputs are
mutually exclusive. In contrast, when COIs of different outputs overlap (or do not correspond
to mutually exclusive events), then the probabilities for SET propagation to these outputs are
correlated. In this case, if exact probabilities are required, then signal dependencies due to re-
convergent fan-outs and/or correlated inputs have to be investigated. This leads to the path
enumeration problem, where the number of paths that have to be enumerated independently
can increase exponentially with the number of dependent re-convergent fanouts and correlated
inputs [100]. Therefore, to avoid such complexity, COIs are assumed to be mutually exclusive
as in Eq. 8.5 and Eq. 8.4, which can lead to safely over approximated probabilities. Finally,
we estimate SER of the design using the vulnerability of all outputs as follows :
SER(comb) =
∑
O∈comb
Volmax(O) (8.6)
8.6 Implementation of the Proposed Framework
In this section, we illustrate the implementation of our proposed framework depicted in Fig.
8.1 at both gate and RTL levels. Our experiments were performed on a workstation with an
Intel Core i7 running at 3 GHz and 24 GB RAM.
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Figure 8.8 Annotated Gate Level Model of C17 (ISCAS85 Benchmark) Design.
The proposed model of SET propagation at gate level and RTL takes into account the
impact of logical masking and SET width variation due to electrical masking and broadening
phenomenon. In this work, we propose a mixed Boolean/linear integer encoding, in which
logic variables and fault states are encoded as Boolean variables. The SET width is modeled
as an integer variables. Thus, signals are composed of three elements : logic state (faulty or
not) and SET polarity which are modeled as Boolean variables and the SET width which is
modeled as an integer variable. The fault is considered to have positive polarity if a bit-flip
changes the logical state of the signal from 0 to 1 (i.e., 0→ 1→ 0 ) and a negative polarity
if the signal changes from 1 to 0 (i.e., 1→ 0→ 1).
8.6.1 Implementation at Gate Level
Starting from a gate level netlist, gate level analysis starts with the design COI reductions
and then the mode of operation for all the gates is decided based on the injection scenario.
The probabilistic models for SET propagation through each logic gate are developed based on
their Transistor Propagation Tables (TPTs). In this paper, we adapted the TPTs developed
in [111]. For example, consider the gate level netlist of the C17 benchmark shown in Fig.
8.8. Based on the TPT of each gate (based on its size and fan-out) is annotated with its
width threshold (i.e., Wthr) and ∆tp, which is the difference between tpLH and tpHL. These
details are then utilized to build the probabilistic SET propagation behavior through each
gate in this design. Let us assume we modeling 2-input NAND gate with in1 and in2 being
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PPi
if ((in1 = SET) | (in2 = SET)) & (polf = Pos) & (Wf ≥Wthr)
P(out = SET) = PP1 · Pin1 ; % For in1
P(out = SET) = PP2 · Pin2 ; % For in2
Wf = Wf + ∆tp ;
polf = not(polf ) ;
else if ((in1 = SET) | (in2 = SET)) & (polf = Neg) & (Wf ≥Wthr)
P(out = SET) = PP1 · Pin1 ; % For in1
P(out = SET) = PP2 · Pin2 ; % For in2
Wf = Wf −∆tp ;
polf = not(polf ) ;
else if (((in1 = SET) | (in2 = SET)) & (Wf < Wthr))
Wf = 0 ; % Fault is Electrically masked
P(out = SET) = 0 ;
Figure 8.9 Probabilistic Model of SET Propagation Through a 2-input NAND Gate. PPi is
the Injection Probability for a NAND gate. PP1 and PP2 are the Propagation Probabilities for
an SET Propagating Through in1 and in2, Respectively. Pin1 and Pin2 are the Probabilities
an SET is Reaching in1 and in2, Respectively. Pm1 and Pm2 are the Probabilities That an
SET is Masked While Propagating Through in1 and in2, Respectively.
the inputs and out being the output. The finite transition PA (S; s;P ) for any 2-input NAND
gate is depicted in Fig. 8.9. S is the set of states S = (S0;S1;S2;S3), s is the initial state
s = S0. P is a transition probability matrix, Pi,j, such that PS0,S1 = Pin1, PS0,S2 = Pin2,
PS0,S3 = PPi, PS1,S3 = PP1, PS2,S3 = PP2, PS1,S0 = Pm1, PS2,S0 = Pm2. Starting from the
initial state S0 (in1 & in2 are not faulty) there are two main scenarios for SETs :
— Injection scenario : if an SET is injected internally in the gate, then the next state is
S3 (output is faulty) with the injection probability PPi. This probability is related to
actual size of the gate, number of sensitive nodes, and the fanout of the gate which
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are extracted based on the TPT.
— Propagation scenario : if an SET is propagating through the gate inputs, then the next
state can be either S1 (SET reached in1) or S2 (SET reached in2), with probabilities
Pin1 and Pin2, respectively. At this point, an SET can be masked i.e., go back to the
error free state (S0) with the probabilities Pm1 and Pm2 for in1 and in2, respectively.
These transitions reflect the impact of both logical and electrical masking. For a NAND
gate, an SET at one input is logically masked if the other input is 0. Moreover, if the
width of the SET (Wf ) at the input is less than the threshold (Wthr) of the gate, then
it is electrically masked as shown in Fig 8.9. On the other hand, an SET can propagate
and reach the output (S3) with the propagation probabilities PP1 and PP2 for in1
and in2, respectively. In this case, a NAND gate broadens the width of a positive SET
(in average by ∆tp) and attenuate the width of a negative SET (in average by ∆tp)
as shown in Fig. 8.9.
When analyzing the SET propagation from different gates in the C17 circuit, this PA (shown
in Fig. 8.9) is used to construct the behavior of the gates which operate in Injection and Pro-
pagation modes. Next, the MDP model of SET propagation through the design is constructed
by parallel composition of gates PAs as explained in Section 8.5. PRISM is then employed to
model this MDP as Multi-Terminal BDDs (MTBDDs) and to exhaustively analyze the pro-
bability of SET propagation from each vulnerable node to each primary output by verifying
the following set of properties :
— Pmax =?[F ((ni = SET )&(Oj = SET ))] : If an SET is injected at node ni, then what
is the maximum probability that this SET will eventually propagate and reach output
Oj ?
— Pmin =?[F ((ni = SET )&(Oj = SET ))] : If an SET is injected at node ni, then what
is the minimum probability that this SET will eventually propagate and reach output
Oj ?
If the injected SET has more than one propagation path to reach the output, then Pmax and
Pmin provide the probabilities for the worst and the best propagation paths, respectively. As
an example on this analysis, SET propagation probabilities for all vulnerable nodes in the
C17 benchmark (shown in Fig. 8.8) are analyzed. Results are depicted in Table 8.4. If an
SET propagates through node b, then it can reach O1 with a maximum probability of 0.5 and
a minimum probability of 0.375 and it will reach O2 with a maximum probability of 0.375
and a minimum probability of 0.25.
As explained in Section 8.3, these tables can be utilized to accurately model the SET pro-
pagation probabilities of this design at RTL i.e., RFs. For instance, if the C17 is a part of
a larger design and an SET is injected somewhere outside the C17 then the PA depicted in
108
Table 8.4 Characterized Benchmark Circuits at Gate Level
O1 O2
Node Pmin Pmax Pmin Pmax
a 0.375 0.375 0 0
b 0.375 0.5 0.25 0.375
c 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.375
d 0.125 0.125 0.25 0.25
e 0 0 0.375 0.375
G1 0.625 0.625 0 0
G2 0.375 0.375 0.5 0.5
G3 0.75 0.75 0.625 0.625
G4 0 0 0.625 0.625
O2
a b c d e
O1
0.375
0.375
0.5
0.625
0.125
0.375
0.375
0.25
0.375
0.25
(a) PA for Propagation Mode
O2
G1 G2 G3 G4
O1
0.625
0.375
0.75
0.5
0.625
0.625
(b) PA for Generation Mode
Figure 8.10 Utilizing the Gate Level Table to Construct the Probabilistic Automata for SET
Propagation for the C17 Benchmark Design.
Fig. 8.10(a) is constructed for the C17 when it is in the propagation mode. In other words,
PA depicted in Fig. 8.10(a) describes the SET propagation probabilities through the primary
inputs (a, b, c, d, and e). The PA depicted in Fig. 8.10(b) is constructed for the C17 when it
is in the Generation mode i.e., an SET is injected internally in one of its gates (G1, G2, G3,
and G4 ). For G5 and G6 the SET probabilities are 1 (because they are directly connected
to the output).
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Similarly, several combinational benchmark designs have been characterized such as basic
adders and muxes. We have observed that the size of the MTBDD and the complexity of
the gate level analysis is highly effected by the number of possible propagation paths (i.e.,
number of fan-outs and re-convergent gates in the propagation path). Therefore, this analysis
is performed for moderate size designs. Generating gate level tables for the GLFs is a one-time
effort that can be done oﬄine.
FA
b0a0
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CN+1
SN S1 S0
C2 C1 C0
b1a1bNaN
Figure 8.11 RTL of N-bit RCA and its SET Propagation Probabilities.
8.6.2 Implementation at RTL
In this section, we demonstrate how effectively SET propagation probabilities can be compu-
ted directly at RTL. Similar to the gate level analysis, this analysis starts with COI reduction
of the model. Then, the modes of operation for all the components are decided based on the
injection scenario and PAs are constructed for all components from their gate level tables, as
explained in Section 8.3. Exhaustive analysis is performed over the MDP model to investigate
SET propagation probabilities (i.e., Pmax and Pmin) from each component to each primary
output.
As a first case study, our SET propagation analysis at RTL was performed on the Ripple
Carry Adder (RCA) circuit. The RTL structure of a N-bit RCA is shown in Fig. 8.11, which
is basically a chain of identical full adders. A N-bit RCA has 2N primary inputs and N + 1
primary outputs. Moreover, it can be observed that an SET which is present at one full adder
can propagate to only one other full adder through only one propagation path which is the
carry path.
In order to analyze any size RCA, the analysis of only one full adder at the gate level is
required. The gate level representation of a full adder (depicted in Fig. 8.12) is analyzed as
explained in Section 8.6.1. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 8.5, which are
generated under the assumptions that the injection probability for an SET at any node is
1 and that all primary inputs are equally probable. It can be observed that the sum output
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Figure 8.12 Gate Level Structure of the Analyzed Full Adder.
Table 8.5 SET Propagation Probabilities for Full Adder
C S
Node Pmin Pmax Pmin Pmax
a 0.75 0.75 1 1
b 0.75 0.75 1 1
cin 0.5 0.5 1 1
G1 0.375 0.375 1 1
G2 0.75 0.75 0 0
G3 0.75 0.75 0 0
(S) of a full adder is very vulnerable as the SET propagation probabilities equal to one for
all the vulnerable nodes in its COI. The propagation probabilities for the carry output are
smaller and vary based on the injection scenario.
At RTL, if the SET is injected at one full adder, then this adder is in the generation mode.
All the full adders before that full adder are in the error-free mode and all the full adders
after that full adder are in the propagation mode. For example, in Fig. 8.13, an SET is
injected at FA0 i.e., it is in the generation mode. All other FAs (FA1 − FAN) are in the
propagation mode. The SET probabilities reported in Table 8.5 are used to generate PAs for
the generation and the propagation mode of the FA.
Fig. 8.14 reports the results of RTL analysis of a N-bit RCA. Fig. 8.14(a) depicts the SET
propagation probabilities when it is injected at all the nodes in FA0 (c0, a0, b0, g1, g2,
and g3 as shown in Fig. 8.12). Each curve represents the change in the SET probabilities
while propagating from a certain node in FA0 to the outputs of the RCA (S1, S2, . . . , SN as
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Figure 8.13 Modeling of SETs Propagation Probabilities in a N-bit RCA at RTL Based on
the Injection Scenario.
shown in Fig. 8.13). It can be observed that SET propagation probabilities vary based on the
injection scenario for the next four stages. After that, SET propagation probabilities become
almost the same for all the injection scenarios and is near to zero.
Fig. 8.14(b) depicts the results for injecting SET at the primary inputs (ai/bi) of different
FAs. Each curve represents the probabilities of SET propagation from the full adder where it
is injected to the outputs of the RCA (S1, S2, . . . , SN as shown in Fig. 8.13). The same SET
propagation probabilities are shifted to the stage of the full adder where the SET is injected.
Due to the structure of the RCA, SET propagation probabilities are the same for any full
adder from where it is injected to the Nth-stage. The proposed RTL modeling of the full
adder allows us to model and analyze any adder implementation such as RCA, Carry Save
Adder, and Carry Select Adder (CSA).
The 4-Bit ALU/function generator (74181 benchmark) depicted in Fig. 8.15 was also exhaus-
tively analyzed. As explained before, at RTL one component can be in the Generation mode
at a time, where we analyze SET propagation for all vulnerable nodes of this component,
then another component is switched to the Generation mode. For example, in Fig. 8.15, if
M1 is in the Generation mode, then M2 is in the Error-Free mode and both M3 and M4
are in the Propagation mode. The results of this analysis, which are the minimum and the
maximum SET propagation probabilities from each vulnerable node to each primary output
are depicted in Table 8.6. Based on these results, the contribution of each vulnerable node
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Figure 8.14 The Results of the RTL Analysis of SET Propagation Probabilities of a N-bit
RCA.
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Figure 8.15 RTL Structural of the 4-bit ALU Circuit.
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and each component to the failure of the design can be characterized. For example, as shown
in Table 8.6 node z20, z21, and z22 have the least contribution to the failure of the 4-bit
ALU, because if an SET is generated at these nodes, then it can only propagate to F3 with
maximum probability 0.0903. Such information can be very helpful for designers when ap-
plying some soft error tolerance techniques based on hardware redundancy such as TMR. In
this experiment, it is assumed that the injection probabilities (Pe) for all vulnerable nodes
are equiprobable and equal to 1/(number of nodes). The values of Vulmin and Vulmax are
reported in the last row of Table 8.6. Therefore, the output nodes can be ranked based on
their average vulnerability to soft error as F2 B F1 B F3 B F0 where F2 is the most vulne-
rable. These results can be used as a measure of the fault observability of each output. Such
information can be very helpful for designers when applying a soft error tolerance techniques
which is based on retiming. The SER of the design can be computed based on Eq. 8.6 which
is equal to 0.679.
8.7 Discussion
At gate level, different formal methods based techniques have been proposed to investigate
fault propagation conditions. In the closest related work [5, 4], the authors employ formal
methods to identify one CIC for each injection scenario. A CIC is basically an input vector
that allows propagation of a SET to an output. In [4, 5], it is assumed that the SET pro-
pagation probability is equal to the probability of having the generated CIC at the input of
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Figure 8.16 Inaccuracy in the Evaluation of the SET Propagation Probabilities in Related
Works [4, 5] for the C17 Benchmark.
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Table 8.6 Propagation Probabilities for a 4-bit ALU Circuit.
F0 F1 F2 F3
min max min max min max min max
M1
z1 0 .875 0 .156 0 .09 0 .06
z2 0 0 0 .875 0 .304 0 .176
z3 0 0 0 0 0 .75 0 .14
z4 0 0 0 0 0 0 .5 .5
z5 0 .875 0 .156 0 .09 0 .06
z6 0 0 0 .875 0 .304 0 .176
z7 0 0 0 0 0 .75 0 .14
z8 0 0 0 0 0 0 .5 .5
M2
z9 0 .375 0 .094 0 .043 0 .025
z10 0 0 0 .375 0 .16 0 .025
z11 0 0 0 0 0 .304 0 .025
z12 0 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .25
z13 0 .375 0 .094 0 .043 0 .025
z14 0 0 0 .375 0 .16 0 .025
z15 0 0 0 0 0 .304 0 .025
z16 0 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .25
M3
z17 0 0 .438 .438 0 0 0 0
z18 0 0 0 0 .175 .175 0 0
z19 0 0 0 0 .281 .28 0 0
z20 0 0 0 0 0 0 .09 .09
z21 0 0 0 0 0 0 .09 .09
z22 0 0 0 0 0 0 .09 .09
M4
z23 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
z24 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
z25 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
z26 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
z27 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
z28 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
z29 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
z30 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Vul .067 .15 .081 .181 .082 .192 .126 .156
design. However, this probability provides an under-estimation of the actual fault propaga-
tion probability. This is mainly because in practice different CICs can allow the propagation
of a fault. To demonstrate how much inaccuracy can be introduced with this assumption, we
applied the technique proposed in [4] on the C17 circuit. We compare those vulnerabilities
obtained with the values evaluated using the proposed technique. Fig. 8.16 shows that esti-
mating propagation probability using a single CIC causes 27.4 % inaccuracy in the evaluated
vulnerabilities, and the maximum deviation reaches around 67 %. For example, as shown in
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Fig. 8.16, when analyzing SET injected at gate G2 (as proposed in [4, 5]) then the inaccuracy
in the result varies from -33 % to -68 %.
It is important to note that the techniques in [4, 5] provided accurate results (0% inaccuracy)
as the case for a, d, e, G1 and G4 only in two scenarios : 1) if there is no propagation for
the injected SET to reach a certain output ; or 2) the injected SET can propagate under
only one input vector. Therefore, the only way that the technique proposed in [5] can lead
to the same level accuracy as our technique is if it generates all the CICs. Thus, in that case
the SET propagation probability will be equal to P (⋃all CIC). However, for large designs it
is not practical nor possible to generate all the CICs for all the injection scenarios. Further
detailed comparison between these techniques and the proposed framework is shown in Table
8.7.
Table 8.7 Comparison Between the Proposed Framework and the Contemporary Techniques
at Gate Level
RASVAS [4] MDG [5] This work
Logical Included Included Included
Masking
Electrical Not Included Included
Masking Included
SET Not Included Enumerated Integer data
width Data type type–for n
Attenuation – 4 stages stage
SET width Not Included Not Included Included
Broadening
Formal Tool MDG model MDG model PRISM model
Used checker checker checker
Results of CIC for CIC for Propagation
the analysis each fault each fault Probability
for each fault
At RTL, our results demonstrate that the proposed framework outperforms contemporary
formal verification techniques ([112, 56]) in the following aspects :
1) Accuracy : Our framework provides more accurate results than contemporary methods.
This is mainly because the proposed probabilistic analysis explores all possible transitions
of the MDP model. By contrast, contemporary techniques (such as [6] ) typically explore a
limited number of input vectors (random input assumption) to evaluate SET propagation
probabilities, thus providing an incomplete analysis. Therefore, such analysis can provide
inaccurate estimation of the SET propagation probabilities. For instance, based on the tech-
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nique reported in [112], SET propagation probabilities for any size RCA is 1. Results in Fig.
8.11 demonstrate that the probability of SET propagation is not 1 for all outputs. Moreover,
probability of SET propagation through more than 29 FAs is almost zero ( < 1.38× 10−17).
Furthermore, contemporary techniques (such as [4]) model SET propagation at the RTL
using the CICs computed at the gate level. To see how much inaccuracy can be introduced
from relying only on the gate level CICs, we compare the probabilities reported in [4] with
the values evaluated using the proposed framework for the 4-bit ALU. Fig. 8.17 shows using
CICs on average causes up to 55.84 % inaccuracy.
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Figure 8.17 Inaccuracy in the Evaluation of the SET Propagation Probabilities in Related
Works [6, 4] by Relying Only on the Gate Level CICs for the 4-bit ALU Circuit.
2) Scalability : State-of-the-art techniques are limited due to the state explosion problem
when dealing with large designs. In Table 8.8, we compare our methodology with the DTMC
RTL approach (proposed in [56]) by considering different sizes of RCA adders as a case study.
In [56], each input vector is mapped to a unique state. The corresponding Markov model has
22N states. Thus, PRISM runs out of memory while constructing RTL models for adders
(> 14-bit). Therefore, in [56] the authors try to partition large RTL designs into smaller
sized blocks to minimize the total runtime. However, even with the proposed partitioning,
the verification time is growing exponentially with the design size. For example, the time
required to analyze a 64-bit RCA with partitioning is 223.58 sec as shown in Table 8.8.
With the proposed framework, it is possible to analyze a 256-bit RCA within 0.601 sec. The
analysis time in Table 8.8 is the time required to evaluate SET propagation for any injection
scenario.
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Table 8.8 Digital Designs Analyzed at RTL
PI
DTMC RTL [56]
RTL RTL Without With Our
Design Cells Partitioning Partitioning Method
Count Time Time Time
(sec.) (sec.) (sec.)
16-bit 33 16
√
2.141
√
1.24
√
0.016
32-bit 65 32 × > 10hrs √ 41.84 √ 0.102
64-bit 129 64 × > 10hrs √ 223.58 √ 0.119
128-bit 256 128 × - × - √ 0.308
256-bit 512 256 × - × - √ 0.601
× : with this technique PRISM runs out of memory while building the model.√ : with this technique PRISM builds the Markov model and verifies the property.
8.8 Conclusion
In this paper a hierarchical framework to quantitatively model, analyze, and estimate the
effects of soft errors at different abstraction levels is proposed. This is achieved by reducing
the design size, utilizing propagation tables generated from lower abstraction level models,
and adapting a probabilistic model checker. Proposed framework achieves significant speedup
compared to statistical fault injection and contemporary formal techniques with more precise
estimated vulnerability.
At gate level, the proposed framework was implemented on different combinational bench-
marks. SET propagation probabilities at gate level are utilized to model SET propagation
through larger designs at RTL. Results demonstrate that our proposed framework can handle
larger and more complex designs (e.g., 256-bit RCA), while the best previously reported tech-
niques run out of memory for 14-bit RCAs.
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CHAPTER 9 GENERAL DISCUSSION
Recent radiation ground testing campaigns of digital designs have demonstrated that the
probability for Single Event Transients (SETs) propagation is increasing in advanced techno-
logies. Classical models have been found to underestimate the Soft Error Rate (SER) due to
SETs. This thesis addresses the verification problem using a unified approach, which utilizes
new mechanisms to bridge the gap between design abstraction levels. In the techniques pro-
posed in this thesis, the verification process starts as early as possible, while providing the
flexibility to move across different abstraction levels.
9.1 Discussion of the Proposed Transistor Level Analysis
SETs become prevalentas as geometric dimensions scale down [11]. As our results demons-
trate, SET characteristics are dependent on the propagation paths, the input patterns, the
strike time, the converging node and the diverging node. Therefore, it is predicted that all
these factors will continue to impact SET characteristics with technology scaling. New in-
sights of the impact of the PIPB phenomenon on SET propagation are provided.
In order to bridge the gap between the different analysis of SET propagation at different
abstraction levels, based on our understanding of SET propagation behavior at transistor
level, I proposed different methods to improve the usability of the results of this analysis.
The main constraints related to the design structure, SET timings, and SET characteristics
are abstracted.
9.2 Discussion of the Proposed Gate Level Analysis Methods
One of the main challenges in analyzing SET propagation at higher abstraction level is to
accurately model all the SET propagation scenarios observed at the transistor level. For
example, contemporary techniques (such as [48], [6]) are not sufficiently accurate, as these
techniques omit the possibility of SET broadening while propagating, which is significant
because a relatively short pulse, just sufficient to propagate, can become arbitrarily long,
provided the existence of a sufficient logic depth. Moreover, state-of-the-art techniques at
gate or higher abstraction levels analyze the susceptibility of digital circuits to soft errors by
only modeling the masking effects that can prevent SETs from propagating [11]. Nonetheless,
existing state-of-art techniques are unable to model the effects of propagation paths charac-
teristics, re-converging paths, and input patterns on SET characteristics at high abstraction
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levels. Deficiencies in conventional models lead to inaccurate estimation of soft error rates
(SERs). Hence, there is a growing need to better abstract and characterize SET propagation
at gate and higher abstraction levels.
During my Ph.D., I investigated possible solutions to address these shortcomings. Table 9.1
depicts a comparison between the proposed modeling and analysis techniques of SETs at gate
level using model checking with MDG [111] and Satisfiability verification using SMTs [113].
In all these techniques, details from transistor level are utilized to accurately model SET
characteristic width variation at gate level. In each technique, I developed different methods
to better abstract SET propagation scenarios and to characterize the impact of pulse polarity,
the logic structure, and the input patterns on the propagating SET width. These methods are
mainly different based on the modeling capabilities for the adapted formal formulation. As
discussed in details in Chapter 5, based on certain assumptions, the proposed MDG modeling
include the impact of different masking effects using the abstract and the enumerated data
types. However, I have observed that such modeling is not very efficient to model complex
behaviors such as SET width variation and temporal masking using only enumerated data
types as it is not possible to enumerate all possible values of all the variables in the model.
Furthermore, I faced a major scalability issue when trying to implement this technique on
complex combinational designs such as multipliers. For example, the MDG model checker
runs out of memory when trying to analyze an 8-bit array multiplier.
Hence, I started looking for a better formal formulation of these complex phenomena at
gate level. I proposed a new formulation of SETs propagation as a Satisfiability problem
by utilizing Satisfiability modulo theories. Using different SMT theories (e.g., the theory
of real numbers, the theory of integers, and the theory of difference logic) I was able to
model all the making effects and the SET width variation. The proposed modeling relies
on details extracted from the pre-characterized TPTs of the technology node and the gates
timing extracted from the layout. An SMT-based exhaustive analysis of SET propagation
is proposed. As shown in Table 9.1, the implementation of the proposed methodology on
different combinational designs shows its applicability and scalability. For instance, it can
analyze complex arithmetic circuits such as a 128-bit multiplier in about 70 minutes, while
existing techniques fail to handle multipliers larger than 32 bits. Our results demonstrate that
the complexity of the proposed analysis varies for different faults. In other words, while most
SET injection scenarios are solved in a reasonable amount of time, some SETs are harder to
analyze than others. The complexity of the proposed non-functional analysis depends on the
number of paths that lead from a node to the outputs. Furthermore, results indicate that
the performance greatly varies by the used SMT solver. We implemented the proposed SMT
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modeling on different SMT solvers in order to compare the performance of each and decide
on an optimal verification technique and solver. The solvers we used are Z3 [58], Yices [59],
Mathsat [60], and CVC4 [61]. Yices performance was found to be much better than that of
other solvers. These results agree with the results published in the SMT competition [114],
since Yices is known to have the best performance in the verification of quantifier free theory
of arrays and the theory of linear integer arithmetic. However, if the results of this analysis
are to be used to estimate the vulnerability of the design then one problem rises when dealing
with large designs is generating the exact probabilities. This is mainly because (as explained
in Chapter 6) the propagation probabilities of the injected SET are computed based on the
solutions generated by the SMT solvers. Therefore, for exact probabilities, all solutions are
needed. However, this present a complex issue when dealing with large designs with large
number of primary inputs. To handle this issue, we can utilize of all-solutions SMT solvers
to provide an estimate of the actual number of solutions.
Table 9.1 Detailed Comparison Between the SET Gate Level Analysis Techniques Proposed
in This Thesis
Accuracy of the Model Results Accuracy
Includes Includes Includes Models Model Scalability Analysis For Each Estimated
Logical
Masking ?
Electrical
Mas-
king ?
Temporal
Mas-
king ?
SET
Width
Varia-
tion ?
Size Results Injection
Scenario
SER
Analysis
Using
MDG
YES YES,
very
approx.
model
NO NO Large Not Sca-
lable
One input
assign-
ment
Accurate High
Over/Under
approx.
Analysis
Using
SMTs
YES YES YES YES Small Highly
Scalable
Multiple
Soultions
Accurate Moderate
Over or
under
approx.
9.3 Discussion of the Proposed RTL Analysis Methods
The analysis of SET propagation at higher levels of abstraction is key to manage the com-
plexity of today’s VLSI chips. In this thesis, I have proposed different modeling and analysis
techniques of SET propagation at RTL based on MDGs and Markov decision process.
As demonstrated in Chapters 7, 8, these RTL techniques outperform the existing modeling
and analysis techniques. In Table 9.2, a comparison is made between all the techniques I
proposed to analyze SETs propagation at RTL namely :
1. RTL modeling and analysis based on multiway decision graphs (MDGs) and gate level
propagation tables of the CICs. This is referred to in Table 9.2 as MDG.
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2. RTL probabilistic modeling and analysis based on Markov Decision Process (MDP)
and gate level propagation tables of the CICs. This is referred to in Table 9.2 as PMC1.
3. RTL probabilistic modeling and analysis based on MDP and gate level characterization
libraries developed by our probabilistic gate level analysis. This is referred to in Table
9.2 as PMC2.
By utilizing MDG, I developed a hierarchical abstraction and modeling approaches of SET
propagation. The RTL model I built here relies on gate level propagation tables which I
developed based on the proposed MDG gate level analysis in [111]. As explained before,
in these tables, a CIC for each SET injection scenario is reported. In this analysis, two
reduction techniques are used to significantly reduce the time and memory requirements
required to model and analyze SET propagation at RTL : 1) the cone of influence reduction
techniques proposed in [99] ; and 2) cross-level modeling of the RTL sub-component based
on their mode of operation. For each injection scenario, reduced version of the design is built
and analyzed using the invariant checking tool from the MDG tool-set. The reported results
demonstrate that due to the proposed modeling, the CPU time and the memory requirements
are reduced by more than 60%. The proposed analysis investigates SET propagation and
returns a counterexample which reports a CIC that can propagate the injected SET to the
output. The generated CICs are then utilized to estimate the SER of the design at the RTL.
For complex RTL design each SET injection scenarios can have a large number of different
CICs which allow its propagation. However, with the proposed MDG RTL analysis, it is
not possible to generate multiple CICs for the same injection scenario. We have observed
that this limitation led to large discrepancy (under-approximation or over-approximation) in
the computed SER at RTL. Therefore, I worked on developing a hierarchical probabilistic
framework to quantitatively model, analyze, and estimate the effects of SETs at RTL (PMC1
in Table 9.2). In this framework, I utilized the same gate level tables. Moreover, similar
to the MDG based RTL analysis I utilized the COI reduction technique and the mode of
operation cross-level modeling. In this work, the SET propagation at the RTL is modeled as
DTMC model. This modeling allows the probabilistic analysis (using PRISM probabilistic
model checking) of each injection scenario and estimate the overall design SER. With this
framework a significant speedup was observed compared to the MDG RTL analysis (MDG
in Table 9.2). Furthermore, the computed SERs based on this framework are more accurate
than the SER computed based on the MDG RTL model. However, after further investigation,
I concluded that there is still a certain amount of discrepancy (under-approximation or over-
approximation) in the computed SERs. I observed that this inaccuracy is introduced at the
component level by the gate level propagation tables. This is mainly because these tables
reports only one CIC for each injection scenario in this component (i.e., one input vector
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that allows the propagation of an SET to an output). However, it is possible to have many
CICs for each injection scenario. The accumulative inaccuracy from all the sub-components
in the SET propagation path can lead to high inaccuracy in the probability computed based
on our MDP model.
Table 9.2 Detailed Comparison Between the SET RTL Analysis Techniques Proposed in This
Thesis
Results Accuracy
Multilevel
Model
Cross-
level
Mo-
del
Formal
Model
Reduction For
Each In-
jection
Scenario
SER Results Scalability Results
Usabi-
lity
Notes
MDG
[115]
Underlying
CICs
from
MDG
gate
analysis
YES Multiway
decision
Graph
COI &
Lower
Details
Varies
For Each
Node
Weak One RTL
CIC
moderate Low Best
for
LOF
PMC1
[4]
Underlying
CICs
from
MDG
gate
analysis
YES Markov
Decision
Process
COI &
Lower
Details
Varies
For Each
Node
Good Max
and Min
prob.
Moderate Moderate Best
for
LOF
PMC2
[116]
Underlying
PPs from
PMC
gate
analysis
YES Markov
Decision
Process
COI &
Lower
Details
Accurate AccurateMax
and Min
prob.
High High For
LOF
and
HOF
It is important to note that the techniques in Table 9.2 (MDG and PMC1 ) can provide
accurate results (0% inaccuracy) in three cases : 1) if it is not possible for the SET injected
to reach the output ; 2) the injected SET propagates under only one CIC ; or 3) if theses
techniques are able to generate all CICs that allow SET propagation. Thus, in that case the
SET propagation probability will be equal to P (⋃all CICs). However, for large designs, it is
not practical nor possible to generate all the CICs for all the injection scenarios. Therefore,
in order to provide more accurate estimations using this multilevel and cross-level approach
I developed new modeling at each abstraction level based on the fault space mapping. At
each abstraction level, there is a certain number of faults which lead to design failure. Each
fault at each abstraction level, which is considered as a Top Level Event (TLE), occurs
due to faults at lower abstraction levels (i.e., Low Level Events (LLEs)). Each High Level
Fault (HLF) can be mapped through a one-to-many mapping to its corresponding set of
Low Level Faults (LLFs) realization, which is defined as a correlation group. Based on this
concept, a new gate level modeling was developed based on transistor propagation tables.
The PA for each gate is generated based on its mode of operation. Thereafter, an MDP of
SET propagation through the design is constructed by parallel composition of gates PAs as
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explained in Section 8.5. If the injected SET has more than one propagation path to reach the
output, then Pmax and Pmin provide the probabilities for the worst and the best propagation
paths, respectively. All these probabilities are characterized and made available to model SET
propagation probabilities at higher abstraction levels. At RTL, PMC2 approach models SET
propagation is modeled as an MDP. The SET propagation probabilities can be computed and
an accurate estimation of soft error rates can be developed based the results of the proposed
RTL analysis. As shown in Table 9.2, this framework is the most efficient in comparison with
MDG, PMC1 and all other existing techniques.
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CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION
10.1 Conclusion
Soft errors, induced by radiation, have a growing impact on the reliability of CMOS inte-
grated circuits. The progressive shrinking of device sizes in advanced technologies leads to
miniaturization and performance improvements. However, ultra-deep sub-micron technolo-
gies are more vulnerable to soft errors. In this thesis, we propose a hierarchical multi-level
methodology to model, analyze, and estimate Single Event Transients (SETs) propagation in
combinational designs expressed at different abstraction levels (transistor to Register Trans-
fer (RT) levels). Basic components are modeled and analyzed at low level and the results
of this analysis are condensed into SET propagation tables. At high level, these tables are
utilized to model the underlying probabilistic behavior of SET propagation. The methods
proposed and explored in this thesis are validated through case studies and the reported
results confirm their accuracy, scalability, and applicability.
Chapter 1 explained the context of this thesis, introduced the problem of soft errors due to
SETs, and reviewed the main shortcoming of the existing techniques. The main objectives
are identified and the research contributions presented in this thesis were highlighted.
In Chapter 3 a background is provided about the main sources of single event transients
in digital circuits. Thereafter, formal verification methods utilized in this thesis to model
and analyze SET propagation at high abstraction levels are introduced namely ; MDG model
checking, probabilistic modeling checking using PRISM, and Satisfiability formulation based
on SMTs. In Chapter 2, existing related SET propagation analysis at transistor level as well
as at gate and RT levels are discussed.
Chapter 4 presented the article entitled “New Insights Into the Single Event Transient Pro-
pagation Through Static and TSPC Logic". In this chapter, we investigate the variations of
SET characteristics while propagating due to propagation paths, input patterns, and pulse
polarity in both static and TSPC logic. We demonstrate that these factors can aggravate the
SET pulse broadening phenomenon. Worst and best propagation paths (WPPs and BPPs)
were identified for the analyzed designs. New insights on the propagation induced pulse broa-
dening (PIPB) phenomenon in different combinations of static and TSPC logic are reported.
Moreover, timing constraints related to SET propagation in TSPC logic such as the strike
time and clock period are identified. Our results demonstrate that SET pulses propagation
can lead to Byzantine faults as they propagate through diverging paths.
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Chapter 5 presented the paper entitled “Modeling, Analyzing, and Abstracting Single Event
Transient Propagation at Gate Level". In this chapter, the proposed transistor level analysis is
leveraged to offer a mechanism to abstract at gate level the PIPB effects, width attenuation,
and electrical masking and their implications on the soft error rate. For example, the impact
of the applied input pattern and the gate fan-out on the SET pulse width is abstracted
using the Load and Input Combination Factor (LICF). At the gate level, we analyzed SET
pulse propagation by utilizing the MDG model checker and the delay degradation model. We
proposed a novel method to identify paths that can propagate SET pulse causing soft errors
in digital designs. Finally, we proposed new gate level characterization libraries which can be
used to accurately analyze SET pulse propagation and estimate the SER at the RTL.
Chapter 6 presented the paper entitled “Efficient and Accurate Analysis of Single Event
Transients Propagation Using SMT-Based Techniques". In this chapter, the problem of SET
propagation was formalized as an SMT problem. This model captures all the details related
to : 1) all masking effects (logical, electrical, and temporal) ; and 2) variations in the SET
characteristics (attenuation and broadening). By solving the SMT model of the design under
specific assertions, the following results are obtained : a) the set of input vectors to be present
at the primary inputs so that SET is not logically masked ; b) the window of vulnerability
within the clock cycle and the minimum SET width such that it is not temporally and
electrically masked. Thereafter, based on these results, the SET propagation probabilities
and the Soft Error Rate (SER) of the design are estimated.
Chapter 7 presented the paper entitled “Towards Formal Abstraction, Modeling, and Analysis
of Single Event Transients at RTL". In this chapter, a hierarchical formal modeling and
analysis of SET propagation at register transfer level by introducing new abstraction and
modeling of the underlying behavior of SET propagation using MDGs. Invariant checking
tool from the MDG tool set is utilized to formally validate the SET propagation for each
injection scenario which is designed to return a CIC that can propagate the injected SET
to the output. In order to illustrate the practical utilization of our work, we have analyzed
different RTL combinational designs. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed
MDG formulation significantly reduces the time and memory requirements to model and
analyze SET propagation at RTL. For instance, the CPU time and the memory required are
reduced by more than 60% which enabled the analysis of SET propagation through complex
designs e.g., 16-bit multiplier.
Chapter 8 presented the article entitled “Comprehensive Multilevel Probabilistic Analysis of
Single Event Transients Propagation Induced Soft Errors". In this chapter, our hierarchical
probabilistic framework to quantitatively model, analyze, and estimate the effects of soft er-
126
rors at RTL is presented. First, for each injection scenario, the design is reduced based on the
proposed reduction techniques and the propagation tables generated from lower abstraction
level models. Then, SET propagation through the reduced design is modeled as a Markov de-
cision process based on the probabilistic automatas of all the RTL sub-components. PRISM
is adapted to analyze the probability of SET propagation for all vulnerable nodes. Further-
more, a new method to estimate the SER is proposed. Results demonstrate that the proposed
framework achieves significant speedup compared to statistical fault injection and contem-
porary formal techniques with more precise estimated vulnerability. For example, with this
framework, we were able to analyze larger and more complex designs (e.g., 256-bit RCA),
while the best previously reported techniques run out of memory for 14-bit RCAs.
10.2 Future Work Directions
10.2.1 Layout-Based Multiple Events Transients (METs) SMT-based Analysis
As demonstrated in this thesis, the progressive miniaturization of device sizes in advanced
technologies increases the probability for a high energy particle strike to cause a transient
fault in several adjacent cells in a circuit resulting in Multiple Event Transients (METs)
in combinational gates. Different radiation experiments (such as [117], [118]) demonstrated
that a considerable fraction of the soft errors were contributed by single particle strikes in
random logic results in METs. Additionally, the distribution of affected error sites and the
number of affected cells depend on the target technology node, and the injected particle type,
energy, strike angle, cell structure, cell size, cell capacitance which are not available at high
abstraction levels.
The proposed framework in this thesis could be easily extended to include the impact of
METs. First, both the design layout timing of the cells can be extracted as done in Chapter
6. The physically adjacent error sites are extracted from the circuit layout based on the
sensitive area size. The SMT modeling and analysis proposed in Chapter 6 is then extended
to include METs instead of SETs. It is expected that high accuracy and scalability will be
observed when analyzing METs.
10.2.2 SMT-Based Reliability-Aware Synthesis
The results in this thesis demonstrate the applicability and efficiency of the proposed frame-
work. Such framework can be very useful when developing mitigation techniques at different
abstraction levels. For instance, in order to develop efficient mitigation techniques, the vul-
nerability of each node in the design is needed. Such vulnerability can be estimated using
127
our framework. A hierarchical reliability-aware synthesis framework to design combinational
circuits at gate level for soft error tolerance with minimal area overhead can be proposed.
The main idea is based on utilizing the results of our SMT-based analysis to harden sensitive
cells, paths, or sub-circuits, whose SET propagation probability is relatively high, until the
desired SER is achieved or a given area overhead constraint is met.
In this context, we already exploited the techniques presented in this thesis toward developing
an efficient SETs reliability-aware synthesis framework. Initial steps of this directions are
presented in [119], [120].
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